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1 
Introduction 
 
Panpsychism is the view that everything is mental – or more precisely, that every concrete 
and properly unified thing has at least a fundamental form of phenomenal consciousness 
or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken 
on new life in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. In philosophy of mind, it has been 
put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem, or the problem of 
finding a place for consciousness in the physical world. In metaphysics and philosophy of 
science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem of accounting for the nature of 
the physical itself. Philosophers who have recently defended
1
 panpsychism in one or both 
of these ways notably include Galen Strawson (2006b), David Chalmers (1996, 2003, 
forthcoming-b) and Thomas Nagel (1979, 2012). 
In this thesis, I aim to show that panpsychism is also importantly related to the 
metaphysics of causation, in two main ways. Firstly, panpsychism is a consequence of an 
argument from our (arguable) acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency. This is 
an argument that has appeared within many traditions in the history of philosophy, but 
nowadays is mostly forgotten, and I think unjustifiably so. Secondly, causation is 
important insofar as mental combination, the manner in which complex, i.e., human and 
animal-type, consciousness results from simple, i.e., fundamental particle-type, 
consciousness according to panpsychism can be construed as a causal process. This is 
opposed to accounts of combination as a matter of either constitution or radical 
emergence, which have been held to exhaust the alternatives, and I think incorrectly so.  
Furthermore, I aim to show that this would help panpsychism avoid two serious 
challenges. Firstly, it avoids a challenge to the line of argument from metaphysics and 
philosophy of science, according to which a metaphysics of primitive causal relations, 
powers or dispositions can account for the nature of the physical at least as well as, and 
perhaps much better than, panpsychism. Secondly, it would help avoid a challenge to the 
line of argument from philosophy of mind, known as the combination problem. This is 
                                                 
1
 But not necessarily endorsed. 
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the problem of accounting for complex consciousness within panpsychism without facing 
problems analogous to those of physicalism, dualism and other competing views – 
problems which according the line of argument from philosophy of mind panpsychism 
was supposed to dissolve all traces of. 
In this introduction, I will elaborate and discuss all of these claims and aims. I will 
begin with the definition of panpsychism. Then I will present and analyze the two main 
arguments for the view, followed by their respective problems. Finally, I will give an 
overview of the structure of the thesis, with an outline of the two new arguments and how 
they are able to solve the problems of the two old ones.  
1 THE DEFINITION OF PANPSYCHISM 
What does it mean to say that everything, or every concrete and proper thing, is mental or 
involves at least a fundamental form of experience? There are some aspects of the 
doctrine which most of its contemporary defenders agree about, and some which are more 
contested. In this thesis, I will define panpsychism so as to include most of what I take to 
be the generally agreed upon features, and to leave most of the contested questions open. I 
will take the definition word by word,
2
 and explain what I think goes where. 
1.1 Everything 
What do defenders of panpsychism normally mean when they say that everything is 
mental? It seems generally agreed upon that the “pan” of “panpsychism” requires that 
mentality is to be attributed to at least every fundamental and concrete thing, in addition 
to humans and other animals. Being concrete means being non-abstract, perhaps in virtue 
of being spatiotemporal, so numbers and other abstract objects are excluded from the 
thesis. The fundamental concrete entities are often taken to include at least the ultimate 
particles of physics,
3
 but to exclude most ordinary objects like tables, chairs and rocks. 
Therefore, panpsychism does not require that such ordinary objects have mentality (as 
                                                 
2
 Here I follow the example of Daniel Stoljar (2009), who discusses the definition of physicalism by a 
similar procedure.  
3
 Some, however, regard the whole universe as fundamental, and in combination with panpsychism this 
would yield the thesis of cosmopsychism, i.e., the thesis that mentality should be attributed to the universe 
as a whole. This variety of panpsychism is much less discussed than varieties that regard non-cosmic 
objects as fundamental. Why is this? Perhaps it is because science seems to treat particles and other non-
cosmic objects as fundamental (although one sometimes hears about quantum holism), or perhaps it is 
because of cosmopsychism’s theistic associations, together with the fact that it does not seem to offer any 
theoretical advantages over other varieties of panpsychism. In any case, I will mostly set cosmopsychism 
aside.  
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emphasized by Strawson 2006b: 26). The same goes for more esoteric objects sometimes 
considered by philosophers, such as undetached rabbit parts or the set of my nose and the 
planet Venus (however, see Goff (forthcoming) for an argument to the contrary). Such 
presumably non-fundamental things can be regarded as mental only in virtue of having 
mental parts or constituents, i.e., in the same indirect way that we ordinary think of a 
society of people as having mentality.
4
  
However, panpsychism does not prohibit attributing mentality directly to some non-
fundamental objects either. Many hold the view that organisms or brains, that we know 
(sometimes) have mentality, are not fundamental things, and if so, it could well be that 
some other non-fundamental things, such as cells, molecules, and so on, have mentality is 
well. It could also be argued that these kinds of things should be regarded as fundamental, 
and as mental in virtue of that. Whether any other things, in addition to fundamental 
particles and animals (including humans), have mentality, and if so which things and by 
what principle they come to possess it, is an open question. Accordingly, I take 
panpsychism to entail that mentality is to be attributed to all things that are, firstly, 
concrete, and secondly, either fundamental or otherwise properly unified according to a 
principle yet to be determined. 
1.2 Mental  
What does it mean to say that everything is mental? What is the “psyche” of 
“panpsychism”? As I will explain in section 2.1 below, much of the appeal of 
panpsychism is that it seems to straightforwardly dissolve the mind–body problem (or at 
least some of its most important aspects) by positing as fundamental (and ubiquitous) 
those mental features which physicalists have most difficulty with reducing or explaining, 
namely phenomenal consciousness or experience. This feature of mentality is what gives 
rise to what Chalmers has called the hard problem of consciousness, as opposed to the 
easy problems concerning the behavior and cognitive functions associated with 
consciousness.
5
 If something has phenomenal consciousness or experience it means that 
                                                 
4
 Cosmopsychists could regard tables, chairs and rocks as mental merely in virtue of being part of a larger 
mental whole, which is how we could perhaps think that a neuron of a waking brain involves mentality. 
5
 “The hard problem of consciousness […] is that of explaining how and why physical processes give rise to 
phenomenal consciousness” (Chalmers 2010: 105, my emphasis). The (comparatively) easy problems of 
consciousness as the problems of explaining the behavior and cognitive functions associated with 
consciousness, such as “the ability to discriminate stimuli, or to report information, or to monitor internal 
states, or to control behavior” (Chalmers 2003: 103). Concerning the easy problems of consciousness in the 
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there is something that it is like to be that thing – in the phrase introduced by Nagel 
(1974). One could also describe it as having states with a qualitative feel, or qualia 
(Chalmers 1996: 4), or as having an inner life or feeling broadly construed. I will use the 
terms phenomenal consciousness, phenomenal qualities, qualia, experience and 
phenomenology, and the associated adjectives conscious, experiential and phenomenal, 
interchangeably to point to this aspect of mentality, and use mentality such as to include 
this aspect unless otherwise implied. I will take panpsychism to entail that everything has 
mentality in this sense.  
Some philosophers think that in order to dissolve the mind–body problem one does 
not have to say that there is something that it is like to be every (fundamental or unified) 
thing; rather, it may suffice to attribute protomental (Chalmers 1996, forthcoming-b) or 
neutral (Nagel 1986; Coleman 2013b) properties to them. However, as will be discussed 
below, it is controversial whether such properties can serve the same explanatory purpose 
as full-blown experientiality. What is less controversial is that it is useful to reserve the 
term panpsychism for views that posit full-blown experience as ubiquitous, while 
panprotopsychism and neutral monism should denote views that posit protomental or 
neutral properties as ubiquitous.  
A substantive question related to protomentality is whether phenomenal qualities
6
 
always come with a subject of experience, or whether they can exist unexperienced or 
without a subject. Strawson argues that it is a necessary truth that there is always a subject 
of experience wherever there is experience (Strawson 2006b: 26; 2008b). Others, such as 
Sam Coleman (2012) and Gregg Rosenberg (2004), posit unexperienced qualities.
7
 I will 
count unexperienced phenomenal qualities, insofar as they are possible, as protomental or 
                                                                                                                                                  
behavioral and functional sense, he argues that: “There is no real issue about whether these phenomena can 
be explained scientifically. All of them are straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in terms of 
computational or neural mechanisms” (Chalmers 2010: 4). The hard problem of phenomenal consciousness 
or experience, is different: “To explain experience, we need a new approach. The usual explanatory 
methods of cognitive science and neuroscience do not suffice. These methods have been developed 
precisely to explain the performance of cognitive functions, and they do a good job of it. Still, as these 
methods stand, they are equipped to explain only the performance of functions. When it comes to the hard 
problem, the standard approach has nothing to say” (Chalmers 2010: 9). 
6
 I said I would use phenomenal qualities interchangeably with experience, but experiences without a 
subject of experience sounds like a contradiction in terms, while phenomenal qualities without a subject 
does not (at least not as clearly), so there is a difference in meaning which I acknowledge. However, since 
the phenomenal qualities posited by panpsychism as I define it will always be experienced phenomenal 
qualities, the terms will be extensionally equivalent in this context, so this will not be a problem.  
7
 Rosenberg posits them as belonging only to the realm of mere possibilia. Coleman posits them as actual, 
but categorizes them as neutral, not mental.  
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neutral, and take panpsychism to entail that everything involves subjective experience. 
The definition will leave entirely open the nature of subjects and whether phenomenal 
qualities are necessarily experienced and if so why (but I will argue for a position on both 
points in the course of the thesis). In saying that experiences are always had by subjects, 
we can elaborate on what it means to have mentality – directly, as opposed to indirectly in 
virtue of mental constituents. Having mentality means being a subject of experience. 
Tables and chairs, if indeed they do not have mentality except indirectly, are constituted 
by things which are subjects of experience, but without being subjects of experience 
themselves.  
Panpsychists say that there is something that it is like to be a fundamental physical 
entity such as an electron, but do they also say something about what it is like? 
Historically, many panpsychists have had definite views about this. Arthur Schopenhauer 
claimed that groundless will constituted fundamental reality, and Empedocles claimed 
that everything was governed by love and strife – they seem to respectively posit 
volitional phenomenology and emotional phenomenology as fundamental.
8
 In recent 
times, it seems most defenders of panpsychism have been non-committal on this issue,
9
 
although sensory phenomenology, such as color qualia, often figures in thought examples. 
I will not take panpsychism to entail anything about the character of fundamental 
experience – although, in the course of the thesis, I will argue for a view about this.  
An objection which is frequently heard is that to say that fundamental entities have 
fundamental experiences is a borderline category mistake, because, for example, the kind 
of experience we can positively conceive of is of a kind which would be incoherent to 
attribute to things like electrons, because they are too physically and behaviorally simple, 
or have none of the features we ordinarily take to be reasons for attributing mentality.
10
  
One response could be to say that we can vaguely, but positively, conceive of 
experience which is maximally simple and perhaps minimally rich compared to ours. 
Why would it be incoherent to attribute simple experience to simple things? Perhaps 
because it seems explanatorily redundant. For example, humans and animals perceive and 
                                                 
8
 There is always controversy about whether historical figures who seem to be panpsychists are really 
panpsychists. In chapter 2 (section 2), I will point to evidence that Schopenhauer was in fact a panpsychist. 
David Skrbina (2005: 23–33) claims that Empedocles was.  
9
 Lewtas (2013) is an exception: he argues that quark experiences are simple and homogenous fields of the 
basic types of qualities or raw feels that we ourselves can experience. 
10
 Thanks to Camilla Serck-Hanssen and Einar Duenger Bøhn for this objection.  
6 
 
react to their environment in accordance with purposes, while particles do not, and as 
Catherine Wilson (2006a: 181) objects to panpsychism, why would consciousness be of 
any use to them? In response, one could say that we cannot really complain that 
consciousness does not play a causal or explanatory role in the behavior of particles, 
because we cannot say, on the basis of the debate in philosophy of mind, what causal or 
explanatory role consciousness plays in our own behavior either – this is the problem of 
mental causation, and some think epiphenomenalism is an adequate response to it. We 
can assume that the simple behavior of particles could in principle be explained with 
reference to their simple mental states, if we could know them, in the same way that 
complex human behavior can be explained with reference to our complex mental states. 
One might also doubt whether we can really positively conceive of simple 
experiences or whether we are just stipulating them without any positive conception. 
Another response, then, is to grant that perhaps there are no experiences that we can 
positively conceive of that are appropriate to attribute to an electron. Still, one should be 
able to claim that there is something that it is like to be an electron without having any 
idea about what it is like. Some might doubt whether it is meaningful at all to attribute 
experiences without any determinate specific character. In response, it can be pointed out 
how this worry it at least not widely shared in philosophy of mind. This is clearly 
illustrated by Nagel’s canonical question about what it is like to be a bat, part of the point 
of which is precisely that we can meaningfully consider that there is something that it is 
like to be a bat, without having any positive conception of what it is like. Someone might 
reply that in fact we do implicitly have some idea about what it is like to be a bat in 
general, in the sense that bats must perhaps have desires, beliefs, pain or such things; we 
only lack a conception of the particular qualia associated with sonar navigation. My 
response would be that, firstly, we have no determinate idea about what it is like for a bat 
to, say, have desires, or what bat pain is like. Furthermore, even if in the bat case we do 
have some indeterminate, but positive, idea about what it is like to be a bat, the fact that 
we can, relatively unproblematically, meaningfully consider very indeterminately 
conceivable experiences is a starting point for clarifying or introducing the concept of a 
wholly unspecific or indeterminate (for us, not for its subject) experience. It is that which 
lies at the limit of the kind of abstraction process we perform when considering bat 
experience. I think there are many concepts in philosophy which are specified in an 
equally abstract way, and which are not thereby dismissed as meaningless.  
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1.3 Is 
Finally, what does it mean to say that everything is mental? Is it an “is” of predication or 
identity? And what remains of the physical when everything is mental?  
The kind of panpsychism which, as I will explain below, is compatible with the 
important argument from physical causal closure in philosophy of mind, and is able to 
answer questions about the nature of the physical according to the arguments from 
metaphysics and philosophy of science (these arguments will be discussed in sections 2.1 
and 2.2) is a form of Russellian monism. Russellian monist panpsychism is the view that 
the phenomenal somehow “fills a gap in the picture of nature painted by physics” (Alter 
and Nagasawa 2012: 67). Russellian monism may also be non-panpsychist and assert that 
protophenomenal, neutral or unknown properties fill the gap. What is this gap? According 
to Bertrand Russell, in The Analysis of Matter (1927), physics only tells us about the 
abstract, purely relational structure of reality, and nothing about what realizes the 
structure or about the intrinsic nature of the entities that stand in the relations. Russell also 
takes it that realizers of the structure or relata with intrinsic properties nevertheless must 
exist, and argues that nothing rules out that these are mental properties: 
Physics is mathematical, not because we know so much about the physical world, but 
because we know so little: it is only its mathematical properties we can discover. For the 
rest, our knowledge is negative […] The physical world is only known as regards certain 
abstract facts about its space-time structure – features which, because of their 
abstractness, do not suffice to show whether the physical world is, or is not, different in 
intrinsic character from the world of mind. (Russell 1948/1992: 240) 
Russellian monism is not a kind of property dualism where everything has both mental 
and physical properties contingently; rather, the mental and the physical are 
complementary properties or aspects and, therefore, to some extent necessarily or 
intelligibly connected. There are many, not necessarily mutually exclusive, alternatives 
for how the physical and the mental may complement each other – for how to specifically 
understand character of the gap and how the mental fills it, and for how the physical is to 
be understood. Mental properties have been claimed to be the categorical grounds of 
physical dispositions, the concrete realizers of physical structure and the intrinsic relata of 
physical relations (Alter and Nagasawa 2012: 72 mention all these alternatives). 
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Sometimes the physical and the mental are described as two aspects of the same reality.
11
 
Chalmers has suggested that “information (in the actual world) has two aspects, a 
physical and a phenomenal aspect” (Chalmers 1996: 286) and that perhaps “wherever 
there is information, there is experience” (Chalmers 1996: 297).12 Strawson suggests that 
all experiences have an inside as well as an outside, where the outside is a matter of how 
the experience interacts with other experiences (Strawson 2006a: 255–256).  
Most of these relations suggest that the mental is more fundamental than the physical. 
Grounds and realizers are prior to what they ground or realize and relata are often taken to 
be prior to relations. It is arguable, especially for some kinds of relations, that they are not 
only posterior to but really nothing over and above their relata. This suggests that 
panpsychism might entail or at least be compatible with idealism. Strawson defines pure 
panpsychism as the view that “all being is experiential being” (Strawson 2006a: 222), 
which entails that there is no physical, in the sense of non-experiential, being. He claims 
that this is not idealism in the conventional sense:  
I avoid the word “idealism” because conventional idealism – the claim that reality 
consists entirely of ideas or experiences – is blatantly incoherent […] in assuming [a] that 
the subject of experience is in some way ontologically over and above its experiences and 
[b] that the subject of experience is not itself a mere idea. (Strawson 2006a: 229, footnote 
95).  
The experiences of pure panpsychism “[…] must not for a moment be conceived as some 
sort of ‘mere experiential content’, where this is in some way passively conceived” 
(Strawson 2006a: 243). I will take panpsychism to be compatible with pure panpsychism, 
according to which the physical is nothing over and above the mental, but incompatible 
with conventional idealism regarded as the view that the physical is nothing over and 
above mere mental content, in a Berkeleyan sense (where this refers to the popular 
conception of Berkeley). Panpsychism mainly requires that everything physical has 
                                                 
11
 The term aspect sometimes indicates properties which are somehow observer or point-of-view dependent. 
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mental content – everything is not mental in sense of being the contents of someone else’s 
experience, but in the sense of itself having experience or being subjects of experience.
13
  
Is panpsychism also compatible with saying that the physical irreducibly exists and is 
co-fundamental with the mental – i.e., can it also be impure? Strawson argues that this is 
hard to make sense of, because it seems like a contradiction in terms to say that the same 
thing is both experiential and non-experiential (Strawson 2006a: 234–238). That is, it 
sounds like one is asserting that the same thing both has and does not have the property of 
experientiality. This argument, however, depends on Strawson’s metaphysics of 
properties (Strawson 2006a: 239) and is not supposed to follow directly from the 
definition of panpsychism. Ordinarily, we see no problem in one thing being both, say, 
blue and cold, even though the fact that coldness is not the same property as blueness 
entails that the thing would thereby be both blue and non-blue. As long as the negative 
property non-blueness is constituted by a positive property, coldness, as opposed to the 
pure absence of blueness, a thing being both blue and non-blue is not contradictory. 
Correspondingly, as long as the non-experiential and physical is not defined wholly 
negatively as absence of fundamental mentality, but is rather constituted by a positive 
property, it seems logically possible that everything has both fundamentally mental and 
fundamentally physical properties. 
But what could these positive, non-experiential, physical properties be? The physical 
cannot be regarded simply as the kind of properties physical sciences talk about, because 
according to Russellian monism, the physical sciences tell us only about structure, 
relations or dispositions, which seem dependent on realizers, relata or grounds and 
therefore not fundamental. However, we might understand structure not merely abstractly. 
Some think that dispositions are not merely relations between categorical relata, but are 
somehow irreducibly causal (a view I will discuss in section 3.2 below). Many would also 
hold that science describes an irreducibly spatiotemporal structure. If causation and 
space-time are regarded as having concrete reality, then it is not obvious that this reality 
must be construed as reducible to or grounded in the fundamentally mental. Therefore, it 
seems that causation, spatiality and temporality are candidates for fundamental physical 
properties of an impure panpsychism. There might be other candidates too. Accordingly, I 
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will not take panpsychism to entail that the physical is reducible to or nothing over and 
above the mental. However, in the course of the thesis, I will argue that causation can and 
should actually be understood as being grounded in mental properties. 
According to Russellian monism, either the physical consist of the structural or 
relational aspects or properties of the mental, or the mental and the physical are two 
aspects or properties of the same structure. In either case, the mental and the physical 
have structure in common, and this is part of what explains their connection. The 
structure of reality as revealed via the physical “from the outside” aspect, or by observing 
its physical properties via the physical sciences, must therefore match the structure as 
revealed from the mental “from the inside” aspect, or by observing its mental properties 
via introspection or phenomenological investigation. Russellian monist panpsychism 
therefore entails that the physical and the mental are either structurally isomorphic, i.e., 
perfectly matching, or at least fully compatible, as the full structure of reality might not be 
discernible from both aspects.  
2 THE ARGUMENTS FOR PANPSYCHISM 
I will now present and discuss the most important and influential arguments for 
panpsychism in the recent literature and identify some of their central presuppositions.  
First a note about terminology: I will use the term physicalism in roughly the way 
Strawson uses physicSalism (2006b: 4), Chalmers uses narrow physicalism (forthcoming-
b: 9–10) and Daniel Stoljar uses t-physicalism, based on what he calls the theory-based 
conception of the physical (2001: 256). According to Strawson, physicSalism is “the view 
– the faith – that the nature or essence of all concrete reality can in principle be fully 
captured in the terms of physics.” (Strawson 2006b: 4). However, I will make one 
modification: I will use the term physicalism to mean the view that everything, or at least 
the mental, can in principle be accounted for in terms of a completed physical theory, 
either physics or physics together with a set of physical sciences. This is because, as I will 
discuss in chapter 5 (section 3), it may turn out that not all sciences, such as chemistry or 
biology, are in principle reducible to physics, and if so, it seems they should still be 
regarded as physical sciences. 
Strawson uses physicalism or real physicalism (2006b: 4), Chalmers uses broad 
physicalism (forthcoming-b: 9–10), and Stoljar uses o-physicalism, based on what he 
calls the object-based conception of the physical (2001: 257), for the view that everything 
is physical, but where the meaning of the term physical is not defined in terms of the 
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properties revealed by physics or physical theory. Rather, the physical is defined by 
pointing to a paradigmatic physical object and referring rigidly to whatever stuff it is 
fundamentally made of, whose nature might not be fully captured by physical science. As 
Strawson puts it: “I simply fix the reference of the term ‘physical’ by pointing at certain 
items and invoking the notion of a general kind of stuff” (Strawson 2006b: 8). Real, broad 
or o-physicalism is compatible with panpsychism, and according to Strawson (2006b), it 
entails it.  
Physicalism, as I will use the term (unless otherwise noted), is incompatible with 
panpsychism. This follows from (1) taking panpsychism as a view according to which 
mental properties are fundamental, (2) defining “psyche” or the mental in terms of what it 
is like-ness or experientiality,
 
as I have done here,
14
 and (3) the thesis that what it is like-
ness or experientiality will not be fundamental terms of the completed set of physical 
sciences.  
The latter thesis is widely accepted by both physicalists and non-physicalists, but it is 
justified in different ways. Some stipulate that physical properties are fundamentally non-
mental (Wilson 2006b; Papineau 2001), partly in order to capture what is fundamentally 
at stake in debates between those who tend to call themselves physicalist and non-
physicalists about consciousness, namely whether or not the mental is fundamental. It 
would follow from this stipulation that any science that ends up positing mental properties 
as fundamental will not be a physical science. Others reject the stipulation, but still 
support the thesis on the basis that it seems highly unlikely, based on that present science 
looks like, that future physical science will end up positing mental properties as 
fundamental (Dowell 2006). Others again stipulate that (narrowly) physical properties are 
structural (Chalmers forthcoming-b: 10), where structural properties may include 
dispositional and spatiotemporal properties as well as abstract logico-mathematical 
properties (as per the Russellian view of the physical). If mental properties are non-
structural (as is supported by many argument soon to be discussed below), then it follows 
that physical properties are non-mental, and subsequently that any science that posits 
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mental properties as fundamental will not be a physical science. One might justify this 
stipulation by arguing that the methods of science are in principle unable to reveal non-
structural properties, or that they are unlikely to do so. Arguments to this effect will be 
discussed in section 2.2 below. I will assume the thesis that what it is like-ness or 
experientiality will not be fundamental terms of the completed set of physical sciences, 
but remain neutral for now on the justification.  
2.1 The Argument from Philosophy of Mind  
Chalmers claims the best reason for accepting panpsychism is that it is compatible with 
both the conceivability argument against physicalism and the argument from physical 
causal closure against dualism, two of the most influential and powerful arguments in 
philosophy of mind:  
I call my argument the Hegelian argument for panpsychism [because it] takes the 
dialectical form often attributed to Hegel: the form of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. […] 
In my Hegelian argument, the thesis is materialism, the antithesis is dualism, and the 
synthesis is panpsychism. Or at the level of arguments: the thesis is the causal argument 
for materialism (and against dualism), the antithesis is the conceivability argument for 
dualism (and against materialism), and the synthesis is the Hegelian argument for 
panpsychism. In effect, the argument presents the two most powerful arguments for and 
against materialism and dualism, and presents a certain sort of panpsychism as a view that 
captures the virtues of both and the vices of neither. (Chalmers forthcoming-b: 2) 
Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa make the same kind of point: “It can be argued that 
Russellian monism retains strengths of traditional versions of physicalism and dualism, 
while overcoming their weaknesses” (2012: 87). Note that Russellian monism is not 
necessarily panpsychism, and I will return to the advantages panpsychism arguably has 
over other kinds of Russellian monism later. 
What are the main weaknesses of physicalism and dualism respectively? I will begin 
with physicalism. Chalmers mentions the conceivability argument, varieties of which 
have been put forth by himself (e.g., Chalmers 1996) and Kripke (1980). Together with 
the knowledge argument (Jackson 1986) and the explanatory argument (from the presence 
of an explanatory gap (Levine 1983) or a hard problem (Chalmers 1995)) they constitute 
what is often regarded as the main anti-physicalist arguments. According to Chalmers, 
these arguments all have in common that they point out an epistemic gap between the 
mental and the physical (2003: 107). They claim that the epistemic gap is not closable in 
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principle – no amount of physical information would make zombies inconceivable, enable 
Mary to deduce what it is like to see red, or close the explanatory gap or solve the hard 
problem. Finally, they suppose that epistemic gaps which are not closable in principle 
must be explained by an ontological gap; by the properties or entities in question in fact 
being distinct. This refutes physicalism, understood as the view that asserts that mental 
properties are identical to, realized by or constituted by the physical or in some other way 
nothing over and above it.  
Physicalists who accept that epistemic gaps that are not closable in principle entail 
ontological gaps could deny that there is an epistemic gap between the mental and the 
physical. Chalmers calls this view type-A materialism or physicalism.
15
 He claims that 
“the obvious problem with type-A materialism is that it appears to deny the manifest” 
(2003: 109), and that this is highly counterintuitive. Strawson similarly argues (in effect, 
he does not use the term epistemic gap) that the idea that: 
[…] all characteristics of what is going on, in the case of experience, can be described by 
physics and neurophysiology or any non-revolutionary extensions of them […] amounts 
to radical ‘eliminativism’ with respect to experience […] (Strawson 2006b: 7) 
Eliminativism he regards as “the strangest thing that has ever happened in the whole 
history of human thought, not just the whole history of philosophy” (Strawson 2006b: 5). 
Type-A physicalism includes views which are not explicitly eliminativist, such as analytic 
functionalism. However, in saying that the mental exists, but is exhausted by functional or 
behavioral properties, the phenomenal aspect of the mental is arguably implicitly 
eliminated (in section 2.2 below I will discuss arguments that the phenomenal is not 
purely functional or otherwise relational).  
Type-A physicalists could acknowledge that phenomenal properties, or mental 
properties that are not exhausted by a functional or behavioral description, certainly seem 
to exist, but claim that this is an illusion. Against this, Strawson makes an appeal to 
Cartesian certainty, claiming that the existence of the phenomenal is more certain than 
anything else (2006b: 3). Similarly, John Searle has argued that dismissing the 
phenomenal as mere illusory appearance is self-defeating, because “where consciousness 
is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality” (Searle, Dennett, and 
Chalmers 1997: 112). Chalmers is not as absolute – he claims that highly counterintuitive 
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claims must be supported by extremely strong arguments (2003: 110), and argues that the 
arguments for the denial of the phenomenal fail to reach this standard.  
Physicalists who accept that epistemic gaps that are not closable in principle entail 
ontological gaps could also accept the epistemic gap, but claim that it is closable in 
principle, for example, when physics and neuroscience have developed further. However, 
if physical properties are stipulated to be structural, then we can already tell that they 
cannot give a sufficient basis for consciousness. This is because, as Chalmers argues 
(2003: 120–122), the anti-physicalist arguments mentioned above can all be seen to 
demonstrate that there will always be an epistemic gap between any structural properties 
and phenomenal properties.  
Some physicalists would not agree that physical properties are necessarily structural. 
But it could still be argued that the epistemic gap would remain as long as our 
understanding of what it means to be physical, however the notion is to be precisely 
explicated, does not undergo a complete revolution. It seems no conceivable 
configuration of properties that are continuous with properties that are fundamental in any 
current physical theory is such that it cannot conceivably exist in the absence of 
phenomenal properties, or such that phenomenal properties would be deducible from 
them.  
If physicalists claim that the mental is physical only in a sense of “physical” that we 
can grasp after a complete revolution in science, physicalism will end up no longer 
distinguishable from competing views. We cannot rule out that after a revolution, mental 
properties will themselves end up as fundamental, which would make physicalism 
compatible with panpsychism and dualism. Neither can we rule out that the kind of non-
mental properties that non-panpsychist Russellian monists currently posit (to be discussed 
below), but which are currently not part of any physical scientific theory, end up as 
fundamental, and so physicalism (i.e., narrow/t-/physicSalism) also becomes compatible 
with all kinds of Russellian monism (i.e., broad/o-/real physicalism). In other words, 
physicalism becomes an almost trivial thesis. To avoid this, physicalists could stipulate 
that fundamentally mental (as Papineau and Wilson do) and Russellian properties will not 
qualify as physical. This makes physicalism less trivial, but in return, less justified, 
because what reason would there be for thinking that physicalism in this sense will 
survive a revolution which is radical enough to let the epistemic gap be closed? 
Finally, physicalists can deny that an epistemic gap that is not closable in principle 
entails an ontological gap. This is the view of type-B physicalists (in Chalmers’ 
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terminology) or a posteriori physicalists, such as Brian Loar (1997), Christopher Hill 
(1997) and David Papineau (2002). On this view, mental properties are identical
16
 with 
physical properties, but this identity can neither be established nor made sense of on the 
basis of a priori philosophical reasoning (hence the epistemic gap). Rather, the identity 
must be accepted as a brute empirical fact, much like the identity between water and H2O. 
Chalmers points out some important disanalogies between the alleged mind–brain 
identity and any identities found elsewhere in nature, such as between water and H2O, and 
DNA and genes. Other identities are deducible from the complete physical truth about the 
world, while the mind–brain identity is not. Furthermore, he points out that: 
Elsewhere, the only sort of place that one finds this sort of primitive principle is in the 
fundamental laws of physics. Indeed, it is often held that this sort of primitiveness – the 
inability to be deduced from more basic principles – is the mark of a fundamental law of 
nature. (Chalmers 2003: 113) 
Because laws of nature relate distinct entities or properties, if the primitiveness associated 
with them also characterizes the relation between the mental and the physical, then this 
would, by standard scientific reasoning, indicate that the mental and the physical are 
distinct, which in turn indicates the falsity of physicalism, Chalmers concludes that the 
primitive and inexplicable identities needed in type-B physicalism seem to be suggested 
“largely in order to preserve a prior commitment to materialism. Unless there is an 
independent case for primitive identities, the suggestion will seem at best ad hoc and 
mysterious, and at worst incoherent” (Chalmers 2003: 113). Additionally, Chalmers gives 
an elaborate argument based on the theory of two-dimensional semantics (2003: 115–119; 
2009), which is too complicated to go into here.  
One popular response to this kind of criticism is the phenomenal concept strategy, 
pursued by Papineau (2002) and Loar (1997). This strategy consists in arguing that the 
fact that epistemic gap between the mental and the physical is not closable in principle 
can be explained by theories according to which our phenomenal concepts work in a 
peculiar way: they do not actually reveal any information about the nature of their 
referents, even though they robustly appear to do so. As an objection to the this strategy, 
Philip Goff, who has also defended panpsychism, shows how it entails that thinking of 
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phenomenal experiences such as pain in terms of how it feels reveals nothing about what 
it is to feel pain – which he argues is highly implausible (Goff 2011). Similarly, Strawson 
puts forth what he calls The Partial Revelation Thesis: “In the case of any particular 
experience, I am acquainted with the essential nature of the experience in certain respects, 
at least, just in having it” (2006a: 252). According to this thesis, not only can we know 
with certainty that experience, or phenomenal properties, exist, in the sense we know that 
phenomenal concepts succeed in referring to something; we also know something about 
the nature of what we refer to through phenomenal concepts. The nature of phenomenal 
properties appears to consist in how they feel, and hence be such that they cannot be even 
a posteriori identified with any physical properties. The Partial Revelation Thesis, which 
justifies trusting this appearance, would therefore seem to be a sufficient, and perhaps 
also necessary, basis for rejecting type-B physicalism, at least the kind that depends on 
the phenomenal concepts strategy.  
Physicalism can also be understood to include the view that the mental is distinct 
from, but metaphysically necessitated by, the physical. If so, it is in principle compatible 
with an ontological gap. One problem with this view, however, is that it might seem 
compatible with dualism: necessitation is arguably not sufficient for physicalism (Stoljar 
2010: ch. 8). I will refer to this view simply as emergentism, and leave it open whether it 
should be regarded as a kind of physicalism, a kind of dualism, or as compatible with 
both.  
Strawson argues, against emergentism and in defense of panpsychism, that there is no 
intelligible way in which the mental can depend on the physical, given that we fully 
accept the reality of experience and also hold that the physical is fundamentally non-
experiential. He argues that the experiential cannot emerge from the non-experiential in 
the intelligible way in which phenomena like liquidity emerge from a configuration of 
non-liquid constituents. An analogy of the right size would be the idea that the extended 
might emerge from non-extended points (Strawson 2006b: 16), but this is a destructive 
analogy, because this kind of emergence is either impossible or not really emergence at 
all:  
If it really is true that Y is emergent from X then it must be the case that Y is in some 
sense wholly dependent on X and X alone, so that all features of Y trace intelligibly back 
to X (where ‘intelligible’ is a metaphysical rather than an epistemic notion). Emergence 
can’t be brute. It is built into the heart of the notion of emergence that emergence cannot 
be brute in the sense of there being absolutely no reason in the nature of things why the 
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emerging thing is as it is (so that it is unintelligible even to God). For any feature Y of 
anything that is correctly considered to be emergent from X, there must be something 
about X and X alone in virtue of which Y emerges, and which is sufficient for Y. 
(Strawson 2006b: 18, emphasis original) 
To further emphasize the unacceptability of brute emergence, Strawson claims that: 
One problem is that brute emergence is by definition a miracle every time it occurs, for it 
is true by hypothesis that in brute emergence there is absolutely nothing about X, the 
emerged-from, in virtue of which Y, the emerger, emerges from it. (Strawson 2006b: 18) 
If emergence can be brute, then it is fully intelligible to suppose that non-physical soul-
stuff can arise out of physical stuff – in which case we can’t rule out the possibility of 
Cartesian egos even if we are physicalists. I’m not even sure we can rule out the 
possibility of a negative number emerging from the addition of certain positive numbers. 
(Strawson 2006b: 19) 
Similarly, Nagel argues, in a tentative defense of panpsychism, that “there are no truly 
emergent properties of complex systems” (Nagel 1979: 182).  
These problems of physicalism can all be classified as problems of intelligibility. 
According to the arguments, physicalism is committed to the world in some way being 
fundamentally unintelligible – by containing miraculous brute emergence (insofar as this 
is compatible with physicalism at all), by containing primitive, inexplicable identities or 
constitutive relations between properties that robustly appear distinct (i.e., separated by an 
epistemic gap), or by being such that we are completely ignorant about the nature of our 
own consciousness and possibly wrong in thinking that it even exists, a proposal many 
judge to be a priori self-defeating.  
The main problem of dualism, on the other hand, can be classified as an empirical 
problem. By this I mean a problem of fitting the mental into the scientific picture of the 
world, especially as regards its causal structure, while at the same time preserving 
theoretical virtues such as elegance and parsimony. These theoretical virtues seem to be 
part of scientific methodology, and therefore I count having to go against them as an 
empirical problem.  
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The empirical problem of dualism is the argument from the causal closure of the 
physical. It seems intuitively and theoretically reasonable (which is perhaps to put it 
mildly) that the mental often has physical effects, mainly in agency. However, it is widely 
held that the physical is causally closed; that is to say, that every physical event (that has 
a cause) has a sufficient physical cause (Stoljar 2009). I will go into the reasons for 
accepting this principle in chapter 6 – they are largely based on empirical observations 
and features of scientific methodology. To say that some types of physical events 
systematically have a mental cause in addition to a sufficient physical cause, i.e., that 
some physical events are systematically causally overdetermined, is an inelegant, 
unparsimonious and ad hoc hypothesis. The denial of epiphenomenalism and 
overdetermination together with acceptance of physical causal closure seem to entail that 
the mental is physical, which refutes dualism.  
Standardly, dualism is regarded as a view according to which mental properties and 
physical properties (and perhaps also substances) are distinct, but causally related (either 
mutually, or just one-way, as with epiphenomenalism). Many hold that causal relations 
are not metaphysically necessary, but depend on contingent laws of nature that could vary 
between different possible worlds. Others hold that the laws of nature hold with 
metaphysical necessity; that there are no possible worlds with the same things, but where 
the laws on nature are different (a view that will be discussed extensively in many 
chapters below). Given this so-called necessitarian view of causation, there is no clear 
distinction between emergentism and dualism: both entail that mental properties are 
metaphysically necessitated by physical ones (and vice versa for non-epiphenomenalism). 
This would give dualism an intelligibility problem as well as an empirical one, the 
problem of brute emergence or brute necessitation. But dualism arguably has an 
intelligibility problem anyway. A traditional objection to dualism, first posed to Descartes 
by his correspondent Princess Elizabeth, is that interaction between mental and physical 
substances is unintelligible. The unintelligibility of physical–mental emergence, pressed 
by Strawson, could perhaps be seen as a further aspect of this problem. Causation and 
emergence are both productive relations, and it seems that productive relations in general 
between the mental and the physical can be argued to involve an intelligibility problem.
 
 
It should be noted that physicalism also has both kinds of problems. An empirical 
problem of causally integrating mental properties arguably arises for physicalism even as 
mental properties are identified with physical properties. This is the exclusion problem, 
which was introduced by Jaegwon Kim (1989). It results from the fact that physicalism 
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identifies the mental with higher-level macrophysical properties such as properties of 
brains or relevant brain areas, properties which are not fundamental in physics. According 
to the principle of microphysical causal closure, there is a sense in which all causation 
fundamentally goes on at the microphysical level. It may seem that if microphysical 
causal closure is true, microphysical constituents will causally exclude the macrophysical 
wholes they constitute, including mental wholes, rendering them epiphenomenal. The 
principle of microphysical causal closure is stronger than the principle of mere physical 
causal closure that the argument against dualism depends on. The principle of 
microphysical causal closure is widely held, but some philosophers argue that our best 
evidence only supports the weaker principle of physical causal closure – I will discuss 
this in chapter 6, section 3.1. 
Many philosophers dismiss dualism’s intelligibility problem, of the intelligibility of 
interaction, and physicalism’s empirical problem, the exclusion problem, as pseudo-
problems. I will come back to their relevance for panpsychism. For now, I will focus on 
physicalism’s intelligibility problem and dualism’s empirical problem, which are more 
broadly recognized and can be regarded as their respective main problems.  
Physicalism avoids dualism’s empirical problem by identifying the mental with the 
physical, and dualism avoids physicalism’s intelligibility problems by not identifying 
them. How does panpsychism, as Chalmers, Alter and Nagasawa, Strawson (implicitly
17
) 
and Nagel (tentatively and implicitly
18
) claim, avoid both? 
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 Strawson argues that physicalism finds itself in a dilemma between eliminativism and radical 
emergentism, where the former is obviously false and the latter is deeply unintelligible, and that 
panpsychism is the only monist view which lets us escape this dilemma. He dismisses substance dualism as 
a view for which there has never been a good argument (Strawson 2006b: 25–26), and argues that property 
dualism is either incoherent or collapses into substance dualism (Strawson 2006b: 28). 
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 Nagel argues that panpsychism seems to follow from four plausible premises: “1. Material composition: 
Any living organism, including a human being, is a complex material system. It consists of a huge number 
of particles combined in a special way. […] No constituents besides matter are needed. 2. Nonreductionism: 
Ordinary mental states like thought, feeling, emotion, sensation, or desire are not physical properties of the 
organism – behavioral, physiological, or otherwise – and they are not implied by physical properties 
alone.
[footnote omitted] 
3. Realism: Nevertheless they are properties of the organism, since there is no soul, and 
they are not properties of nothing at all. 4. Nonemergence: There are no truly emergent properties of 
complex systems […]” (Nagel 1979: 181–182).  
Although Nagel does not present it this way, the argument can be made to fit into Chalmers’ Hegelian 
structure. The disadvantage of physicalism is that it seems incompatible with either Nonreductionism or 
Nonemergence (as Strawson also argues). The disadvantage of dualism is its incompatibility with Material 
composition. Panpsychism seems compatible with all the premises. 
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Panpsychism avoids the intelligibility problems of physicalism because it does not 
identify the mental with, reduce it to, or have it emerge from, properties that can be 
exhaustively described by physics or the physical sciences. Rather, panpsychism takes the 
mental to ground these properties in a Russellian way. Panpsychists can accept that there 
would be an ontological gap from the physical to the mental if the physical is taken to be 
prior to the mental, and panpsychism is therefore compatible with all the anti-physicalist 
arguments that aim to demonstrate such a gap. However, when the mental is conceived of 
as prior to the physical instead of vice versa, as the categorical grounds of physical 
dispositions, the realizer of physical structure or the intrinsic relata of physical relations, 
there will be no epistemic gap, at least not one that seems not closable in principle, and 
therefore no ontological gap. In a way, this inverts the idea central to functionalism about 
the mental. A panpsychist would, as discussed above, reject functionalism about the 
mental because the existence of phenomenal properties that are not functionally 
exhaustible is obvious or self-evident (I will say more about how this seems obvious in 
section 2.2 below). But it is not equally obvious that we should resist functionalization of 
the physical, and as Russell and many others have argued, there is good reason to accept 
it.  
Panpsychism avoids the empirical problem of dualism, the problem of mental 
causation within causal closure, because it does not secure a causal role for the mental by 
having it generate its own extra causal relations that will either violate causal closure or 
redundantly mirror existing causal relations. Rather, the mental fills in physical causal 
structure, by grounding or realizing it or constituting its relata. By filling in the structure 
with non-structural properties only, panpsychism leaves the structure itself unchanged. It 
does not introduce overdetermination, because mental properties are essential to the 
causal structure and the opposite of redundant. But does the claim that mental properties 
are essential to all causal relations amount to denying that every physical event has a 
sufficient physical cause after all? Not in the any sense that is supported by empirical 
evidence. The evidence for causal closure (which I will discuss in chapter 6, section 3.1) 
only supports the claim that physical causal structure is independent of any other causal 
structure, or alternatively, that the physical in the sense that does not exclude a hidden 
inner nature, i.e., the o-physical or really/broadly physical, is causally closed. In a way, it 
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should be obvious that empirical evidence
19
 cannot rule out that physical events 
systematically depend on inner natures that are by hypothesis hidden from empirical 
view, i.e., there is no way to empirically detect their presence or absence.  
Now, as mentioned, only pure panpsychism wholly reduces the physical to purely 
relational or structural properties, properties that can be fully grounded in mental 
properties so as to completely avoid the problems of physicalism and dualism in these 
ways. Impure panpsychists, who posit, say, non-mental spatial properties or some non-
mental aspect of causation, will not have a purely relational or abstractly functional 
account of the physical. But although this makes it impossible that mental properties 
wholly constitute or realize physical properties, one can still see how the two sets of 
properties systematically complement and depend on each other. Clearly, space and 
things in space seem to intelligibly depend on each other, and so do causal powers and the 
things they belong to and affect. Therefore, the epistemic gap between the mental and the 
physical is still lessened, and the two kinds of properties are not kinds that can causally 
compete and render each other redundant, so the problem of causal closure is still 
avoided. 
In this way, it seems that panpsychism is able to intelligibly locate and causally 
integrate the mental in nature, while avoiding the main problems of physicalism and 
dualism. But the argument for the view is not complete until it is also shown that 
panpsychism is the only view that can do so. Alter and Nagasawa claim that other kinds 
of Russellian monism avoid the problems, and Chalmers argues that at least 
panprotopsychism does (Chalmers forthcoming-b: 2). Varieties of non-panpsychist 
Russellian monism include micropsychism, neutral monism, panprotopsychism and a 
view I will call mysterianism.  
Micropsychism is the view that physical structure is partially realized by mental 
properties and partially by other kinds of properties. This view is distinct from impure 
panpsychism, which says that physical structure overall has aspects or properties that are 
not grounded in the mental, for example an irreducibly causal or spatiotemporal aspect. 
Rather, it is the view that only some of the realizers or grounds of physical structure (or 
those aspects of physical structure that needs grounds) are mental. For example, one 
might think that some types of particles, such as neutrinos, that have not been observed to 
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 By empirical evidence I mean observational evidence, but excluding evidence from introspection and 
phenomenological investigation.  
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play any part in constituting brains, have non-mental intrinsic properties, but other 
particles, the kinds that are found in brains, have mental intrinsic properties. 
Micropsychism is suggested and quickly rejected by Strawson (2006b: 24–25), mainly on 
the basis of parsimony: “I would bet a lot against there being such radical heterogeneity at 
the very bottom of things” (2006b: 25). He also regards it as a kind of dualism and it 
would perhaps therefore not really belong with the other Russellian monist views. 
However, as a form of Russellian dualism, as one may call it, micropsychism could have 
a chance of avoiding the argument from causal closure in a similar way as Russellian 
monism, so this important reason for rejecting ordinary dualism does not necessarily 
apply to it (I will discuss a form of Russellian dualism briefly in chapter 5, p. 202). But 
the argument from parsimony should be sufficient on its own, if one accepts the principle 
that other things being equal one should prefer the more parsimonious theory. 
Micropsychism does not seem to offer any significant advantages over panpsychism and 
is therefore at best equal in other respects – for example, they are both equally revisionary 
and counterintuitive in positing mentality at the fundamental level.
20
  
Mysterian Russellian monism is the view that physical structure is realized by 
unknowable properties, which are not mental (otherwise they would not be unknown), but 
would explain consciousness if known. That consciousness must be explained by 
properties that are unknowable for creatures like us, properties of matter that are not 
physical in the ordinary sense, is a view that has been defended by Colin McGinn (1989) 
and that has subsequently been labeled mysterianism. McGinn does not commit to the 
Russellian view about the physical, but his mysterianism seems compatible with it and the 
way it avoids the problem of causal closure.
21
 McGinn rules out that the unknown 
properties might really just be mental, dismissing panpsychism as “extravagant” (1989: 
350, footnote 2).  
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 Micropsychism and panpsychism are very close views, and have all of their most controversial aspects in 
common, so refuting micropsychism is not a high priority for panpsychism. Chalmers defines panpsychism 
so as to be compatible with micropsychism: “[…] we can understand panpsychism as the thesis that some 
fundamental physical entities have mental states […] we can read the definition as requiring that all 
members of some fundamental physical types (all photons, for example) have mental states” (Chalmers 
forthcoming-b: 1). I find it useful to distinguish them, however, in particular in view of the argument from 
metaphysics and philosophy of science, to be discussed in the next section, which rules out micropsychism.   
21
 If the causal relevance of the mysterian properties can in some (mysterious) way be transferred to the 
mental properties they explain.  
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Mysterian Russellian monism does not clearly avoid physicalism’s and 
emergentism’s intelligibility problems. Mysterian properties are non-mental, and the view 
thereby entails that the mental is constituted by or emerges from the non-mental, which 
Strawson argues is impossible. However, even if one agrees that the mental cannot be 
constituted by or emerge from the physical, one might not be equally convinced that the 
mental cannot be constituted by or emerge from other, non-physical, non-mental 
properties. Chalmers makes the following argument: 
The epistemic arguments all turn on a more specific gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal, ultimately arising from a gap between the structural (or the 
structural/dynamical) and the phenomenal. We have principled reasons to think that 
phenomenal truths cannot be grounded in structural truths. But we have no 
correspondingly good reason to think that phenomenal truths cannot be grounded in 
nonphenomenal (and nonstructural) truths […]. (Chalmers forthcoming-b: 14) 
Given our positive grasp of the physical as structural, according to Chalmers, we can see 
how it is incapable of grounding the mental. One might also add that we can see how the 
mental cannot be (non-constitutively) necessitated by the physical. Given our lack of a 
positive grasp of mysterian non-mental properties, then, it follows by this reasoning that 
we cannot claim to see how they are also incapable of this. In contrast, Strawson thinks 
that merely based on our negative grasp of the physical as non-mental, we can rule out 
that it can ground or necessitate the mental. By this reasoning, since mysterian properties 
are also non-mental, the same can be ruled out for them.  
However, even if one sides with Chalmers on this, and grants that mysterianism can 
therefore avoid the main problems of dualism and physicalism, the view faces another 
complaint. Mysterianism does not actually intelligibly locate and causally integrate 
consciousness in nature; it merely states that this would be possible if we knew the 
unknown or unknowable properties. It provides a schema for an explanation, without the 
explanation itself. Now, mysterianism can of course be true even though it is not very 
explanatory, and it is hard to think of an argument that would show that mysterianism 
could not be true. Strawson remarks, when confronted with this kind of view (he calls it 
radical Ignorantism), that it is “consistent, indefeasible, safe, but it opts out of the real 
difficulty” (Strawson 2006a: 273). It seems the argument for panpsychism, unless the 
strong principle that the mental cannot be necessitated by anything non-mental is 
accepted, will have to rely on a pragmatic or methodological premise that we should not 
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opt out of difficulties in this way, that we should not declare ignorance before we have 
considered and found good reason to reject all positive theories, or that we should always 
prefer theories with that give explanations as opposed to mere schemata for explanations. 
Perhaps this could be justified on the same grounds as general anti-skepticism about 
knowledge or justification: if we are not justified in believing a hypothesis just because an 
alternative hypothesis that nobody so far has been able to conceive of could be true 
instead, then it seems there is not much that we are justified in believing. 
Neutral monism posits properties that are neither physical nor mental as realizers of 
physical structure and explanatory grounds of the mental. Neutral monist views can be 
divided into positive and negative versions, according to whether they also positively 
characterize the neutral properties, or only leave it at the “neither/nor”. An example of 
negative neutral monism is panprotopsychism, as Chalmers defines it.
22
 Protophenomenal 
properties are characterized only negatively (and relationally/dispositionally) as follows:  
[…] protophenomenal properties are special properties that are not phenomenal (there is 
nothing it is like to have a single protophenomenal property), but that can collectively 
constitute phenomenal properties, perhaps when arranged in the right structure. (Chalmers 
forthcoming-b: 13) 
Negative neutral monism is hardly distinguishable from mysterian Russellian monism, 
and it would therefore face the same objections: either, that it involves the mental being 
grounded in or necessitated by the non-mental, or that it fails to provide an actual positive 
explanation.  
Positive neutral monism could also be quickly dismissed on the former basis, that the 
mental cannot be grounded in or necessitated by the non-mental, because neutral 
properties are in any case not mental. But what if one rejects, or is uncertain about, this 
strong principle? Positive neutral monist views still face another problem as to precisely 
how to characterize the neutral properties. Neutral properties seem to either end up 
looking much more mental than neutral with the result that the view collapses into 
panpsychism, or they will leave an epistemic gap between the neutral and the mental 
yielding problems of intelligibility similar to those of physicalism.  
                                                 
22
 Chalmers explicitly likens panprotopsychism to neutral monism (forthcoming-b: 17). 
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An example of a view that is susceptible to the former problem is the neutral monism 
of William James, who defended it at one point but later returned to panpsychism.
23
 He 
describes the neutral as pure experience, and claims that consciousness arises when pure 
experiences relate to one another in a certain way (James 1912a). This might sound more 
like an explanation of self-consciousness or reflective experience in terms of unreflective 
experiences
24
 than an explanation of the mental in terms of the non-mental, and 
accordingly more like panpsychism than neutral monism.  
An example of a view susceptible to the latter problem is Coleman’s neutral monism. 
Coleman holds that neutral unexperienced qualities are ubiquitous in matter, and 
whenever they relate appropriately, along the lines of higher-order thought theory, they 
constitute experienced qualities (Coleman 2013b). One problem with this view is that 
there seems to be an epistemic gap between unexperienced qualities and subjective 
experience of them. Chalmers (forthcoming-b: 25–27) constructs a conceivability 
argument against Coleman’s view, according to which no matter how we conceive of 
unexperienced qualities as being related to each other does it seem necessary that they 
become experienced.
25
  
Since panpsychism posits neither unknown nor any novel non-mental properties, it 
thus avoids the problems of non-panpsychist Russellian monism, as well as those of 
physicalism and dualism. Now, this claim naturally presupposes that panpsychism really 
does succeed in avoiding every one of these problems or closely similar ones, i.e., that the 
outline given so far of how it avoids all these problems survives closer scrutiny. As will 
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 According to Marcus P. Ford, “most of James’ interpreters agree that in 1902 and 1903 James was a 
panpsychist, however, most contend that in 1904 and 1905, with the publication of his articles in the 
Journal of Philosophy, James turned away from panpsychism. According to Ralph Barton Perry, in 1904 
James gave up his panpsychic notion that every instance of actuality is inherently psychical (i.e., an 
experience for itself) and endorsed instead the notion that every actuality is inherently neither psychical nor 
physical. In these articles, which were later published as Essays in Radical Empiricism, James did indeed 
speak of ‘pure experiences’ which are inherently neither psychical nor physical. However, there are good 
reasons to suspect that this was not his final position. One can find panpsychic notions in Essays in Radical 
Empiricism and one can find James endorsing panpsychic beliefs after 1905” (Ford 1981: 163–164). 
24
 Together with a deflationary view of the subject, which is not incompatible with panpsychism (as 
explained in Strawson 2006a). I will discuss this further in many of the chapters below.  
25
 In the passage quoted above (p. 23), Chalmers claimed that we have good reason to deny only that the 
gap between the physical (qua structural) and the mental is closable in principle, the reason being that we 
have a positive grasp of the physical as structural. Unexperienced qualities, are not (purely) structural, so 
the conclusion that there is an epistemic gap between unexperienced qualities and mental qua experiential 
properties that is not closable in principle cannot be deduced from this former conclusion. Rather, this gap 
must be independently demonstrable on the basis of our positive grasp of what unexperienced qualities are 
supposed to be. 
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be discussed in section 3.1 below, this is something that the so-called combination 
problem casts into doubt. For now, I will note that the argument for panpsychism from 
philosophy of mind presupposes that panpsychism can be defended against any such 
challenges that may come up.  
In summary, it seems panpsychism, from the point of view of philosophy of mind, is 
motivated by a set of principles which are jointly incompatible with any other (so far 
suggested) view. These can be roughly listed as follows: 
(i) There is an epistemic gap between mental and physical properties that 
is not closable in principle. 
(ii) Epistemic gaps that are not closable in principle entail ontological 
gaps. 
(iii) There is nothing about the physical in virtue of which the mental can 
non-brutely emerge. 
(iv) Brute emergence is impossible. 
(v) The mental is not epiphenomenal. 
(vi) There is no systematic overdetermination. 
(vii) The physical is causally closed. 
(viii) The mental is not grounded in or emergent from properties whose 
nature is unknown or not positively conceivable. 
The problems of the various views discussed so far can be put in terms of incompatibility 
with these principles as follows. Physicalism’s intelligibility problem is its conflict with 
principles (i) or (ii). Emergentism’s (which some regard as compatible with physicalism 
and others regard as entailing dualism) intelligibility problem is its conflict with 
principles (iii) or (iv). Dualism’s empirical problem is its conflict with (v), (vi) or (vii). 
Physicalism’s empirical problem is its conflict with principles (v), (vi) or (vii), but where 
(vii) is given a strong reading, as affirming not only physical but also microphysical 
causal closure. Non-panpsychist Russellian monism mainly runs into conflict with 
principle (viii). However, some versions of positive neutral monism are in conflict with 
(ii) insofar as an epistemic gap can be demonstrated between their Russellian properties 
and mental properties, or with (iv) insofar as it can be shown that there is nothing about 
these properties in virtue of which the mental can intelligibly emerge. Micropsychism is 
ruled out mainly on the basis of parsimony, which is not on the list, but is among the 
underlying reasons for accepting, e.g., (vi), that there is no overdetermination.  
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If principle (i) is strengthened to say that there is an epistemic gap between mental 
properties and any non-mental properties, including but not limited to physical properties, 
and principle (iii) is strengthened, correspondingly, to say that there is nothing about the 
non-mental in virtue of which the mental can non-brutely emerge, principle (viii) will be 
redundant, and non-panpsychist forms of Russellian monism can all be rejected on this 
basis. However, it seems principle (viii) is more widely endorsed than these strong 
principles. 
2.2 The Argument from Metaphysics and Philosophy of  Science  
The other main argument for panpsychism starts from a problem in metaphysics and 
philosophy of science. This argument is wholly independent of the problem of 
consciousness, but it shares with the argument from philosophy of mind the underlying 
premise that science only tells us about the structure of the world, or that all physical 
properties are structural. But instead of taking this gap as something that can be filled by 
mental properties in order to solve problems in philosophy of mind, this argument takes 
the gap as something that must be filled. Then it asserts that mental properties are the only 
properties that could do so.  
William Seager explains how G. W. Leibniz arrived at his panpsychism by 
combining the structuralist view of the physical with what he calls a strong reducibility 
principle: “All extrinsic properties are determined by intrinsic properties” (Seager 2006: 
131). Seager goes on to describe the general structure of the Leibnizian argument:  
According to the reducibility principle, matter must have an intrinsic nature to ground the 
relational or structural features revealed to us by physical science. We are aware of but 
one intrinsic property of things, and that is consciousness. It is plausible to assert 
physicalism – we are physical beings and our consciousness is a feature of certain 
physical structures.
[footnote omitted] 
Therefore, consciousness is an intrinsic property of matter. 
(Seager 2006: 136) 
Alter and Nagasawa present a similar argument for Russellian monism: 
In the philosophy of science, there is a problem of a lack of metaphysical grounding. All 
fundamental physics gives us is nomic spatio-temporal structure. That is, it gives us little 
more than structure without any underlying non-structural properties. Some believe that 
what we should conclude from this is that nature consists in nothing but structure 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007). But Russell and others think that we must look outside of 
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physics for properties that ground the network of causes and effects that physics 
describes. (Alter and Nagasawa 2012: 88–89)  
According to both arguments, Russellian monism follows from structuralism about 
physics or physical theory together with a reducibility or grounding principle for the 
structural. Adding the principle that consciousness is the only categorical, intrinsic or 
otherwise suitably non-structural property we know, and that we should not posit wholly 
unknown properties, we get panpsychism.  
I suggest that this argument for panpsychism can be formulated as follows: 
1) Structuralism about physical theory: Science only tells us about the 
structure of the physical. 
2) Denial of ontological structuralism: All physical structure must be 
instantiated by (individuals with) categorical properties. 
3) Mental categoricity: The only categorical properties (whose nature) we 
can know, or positively conceive of, are mental properties. 
4) Anti-mysterianism: The (nature of the) properties that instantiate 
physical structure are knowable or positively conceivable.  
Therefore, 
5) Panpsychism: Physical structure is instantiated by (individuals with) 
mental properties. 
This formulation leaves open various ways of interpreting the premises, while at the same 
time entailing the conclusion. It is presupposed that none of the premises are vacuously 
true, i.e., that we know some categorical mental properties, and that there is some 
physical structure. Strictly speaking, premise 1 is superfluous – the conclusion follows 
from premises 2, 3 and 4 alone.
26
 Its role is rather, as will be discussed, to support 
premise 3. I still include it because it matches the way in which the argument is usually 
presented and defended, and makes it read more intuitively. A preliminary note on 
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 Insofar as the non-vacuous truth of premises 2 and 4 requires that there is some physical structure. 
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categorical properties: I take them to be a kind of intrinsic properties, but this will be 
elaborated further below. I will now discuss all the premises one by one. 
Premise 1 claims that science only tells us about the structure of the physical. What 
kind of structure? Russell claimed that science only reveals logico-mathematical 
structure. Alter and Nagasawa claim it reveals spatiotemporal, nomic structure. Simon 
Blackburn has argued that science only reveals dispositional structure: 
When we think of categorical grounds, we are apt to think of spatial configurations of 
things – hard, massy, shaped things, resisting penetration and displacement by others of 
their kind. But the categorical credentials of any item in this list are poor. Resistance is 
par excellance dispositional; extension is only of use, as Leibniz insisted, if there is some 
other property whose instancing defines the boundaries; hardness goes with resistance, 
and mass is knowable only by its dynamical effects. Turn up the magnification and we 
find things like an electrical charge at a point, or rather varying over a region, but the 
magnitude of a field at a region is known only through its effects on other things in spatial 
relations to that region. A region with charge is very different from a region without [...] It 
differs precisely in its dispositions or powers. But science finds only dispositions all the 
way down. (Blackburn 1990: 62–63) 
As long as dispositional, nomic and spatiotemporal relations are not taken to include any 
categorical properties, it can be left open whether science reveals, in some sense, a 
structure of dispositional, nomic or spatiotemporal relations, or just pure mathematico-
logical structure, because the conclusion will still follow. 
What are the arguments for premise 1? Blackburn can be taken to give an inductive 
argument from the lack of counterexamples. If even paradigmatic candidates for physical 
categorical properties such as mass and extension can be analyzed as really dispositional, 
it is plausible that they all can. One can also note the how the theories of physics are 
formulated in mathematics. Mathematics is a language of relations – mathematical objects 
are exhaustively defined in terms of how they relate to each other. The number 2 seems 
not to have any intrinsic properties, only a position within the system of numbers. If we 
stipulated that from now on the number 2 will have no relationship to the other numbers – 
it is neither smaller nor greater than 3, it is not half as much as 4, and so on – then we 
would no longer in any meaningful sense be talking about the actual number 2, or any 
number at all – at least this would be so according to structuralism in philosophy of 
mathematics, as defended by, e.g., Stewart Shapiro (1997). If mathematics describes 
relational structures only, physics is formulated solely in terms of mathematics, and all 
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other physical theories are reducible to physics or themselves mathematical, then it 
follows that science only tells us about relational structure. 
There are also arguments based on accounts of our epistemic situation. One might 
think that empirical knowledge is gained by way of causally relating to things, and that 
from this it follows that the relational properties of things are all we can know 
empirically. Kant can be understood as making an argument based on our epistemic 
situation that we could not know intrinsic and categorical properties. Such properties 
pertain to things as they are irrespective of their relations to us, and this would place them 
in the category of unknowable things-in-themselves. Rae Langton (1998) defends such an 
interpretation of Kant, as well as the plausibility of the view on its own terms.
27
 
Premise 2 – all physical structure must be instantiated by individual with categorical 
properties – replaces Seager’s Leibnizian reducibility principle, according to which all 
extrinsic properties reduce to intrinsic properties. Reducibility premises can be formulated 
in terms of all the Russellian distinctions. It is often said that dispositions need categorical 
grounds, or that relations need relata with intrinsic properties. One could regard all of 
these dependencies as ways in which structure can be instantiated.  
As mentioned, categorical properties are a kind of intrinsic property. Intrinsic 
properties, according to David Lewis and Langton, are properties that are compatible with 
both the loneliness and the accompaniment of its bearer (1998: 334). As Lewis and 
Langton specify, some additional qualifications must be made in order to rule out all 
counterexamples, but it still makes the general idea reasonably clear. Intrinsic properties 
contrast with relational properties that make up structures. These are properties that are, 
characterize or are partly constituted by a relation between two or more properties or 
things. They are not independent of loneliness or accompaniment; they require the 
existence of at least one other property or thing.  
Some think that categorical properties are not just a kind of intrinsic property, but 
that they are the only kind. The terms are very often used interchangeably. However, the 
categorical is typically contrasted with the dispositional and not the relational or extrinsic. 
Categorical properties can be defined as properties that are always manifest, or manifest 
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 How could a panpsychist accept this kind of argument, but claim that we can still know mental intrinsic 
properties? Is must be argued that mental intrinsic properties escape it, because they are not properties of 
other things, but our own properties, and we do not know them by empirically, or by causally relating them, 
but rather via direct acquaintance. This is in the spirit of Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant, which I will 
discuss in chapter 2 (section 2).  
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whenever they are actual. This means that they are manifest independently of what goes 
on around them, and are therefore intrinsic. Dispositional properties can be defined as 
properties that are manifest only in certain circumstances, or that can be actual without 
manifesting, which gives them a relational aspect. Since all categorical properties are 
intrinsic, and in order to capture the contrast with dispositionality, I put the argument in 
terms of categorical properties only. Whether the terms are in fact fully interchangeable, 
i.e., whether all intrinsic properties are also categorical, I leave open for now (but it will 
be discussed in section 3.2 below).  
It is very intuitive, and often taken for granted, that all relations must have relata with 
intrinsic and categorical properties, that all dispositions have categorical grounds, and that 
structure cannot exist without categorical realizers. However, it is hard to back up the 
intuition once challenged. As Alter and Nagasawa mention in the quote above, acceptance 
of premise 1, the view that physical sciences only tell us about dispositional or relational 
structure and nothing about categorical grounds or properties of its relata, has led some 
philosophers, such as James Ladyman and Don Ross (2007), to conclude that no such 
properties are really needed, and that they should be eliminated from our ontology.  
This view is known as ontic structural realism. It contrasts with epistemic structural 
realism, the view defended by Russell, according to which intrinsic, categorical, non-
structural properties exist, but are either unknowable or accessible by non-scientific 
modes of inquiry. According to ontic structural realism, structure and relations can subsist 
on their own, or at least prior to their relata, such that the relata are constituted by their 
position in the relational structure and would have no reality outside of it. On this view, 
physical objects will be just like nodes in a graph, entities that have no properties except 
their position in the graph, or like numbers when conceived of according to the 
structuralist view about mathematical objects. 
Premise 2 is often defended by appeal to arguments against ontic structural realism. 
One such argument starts out precisely from the manner in which physical objects 
become comparable to mathematical objects on ontic structural realism. On this basis, the 
view can charged of collapsing the distinction between the physical and the mathematical. 
It has been argued that “the difference between mathematical (uninstantiated) structure 
and physical (instantiated) structure cannot itself be explained in purely structural terms” 
(Bas van Fraassen as paraphrased in Ladyman and Ross 2007: 158). Ladyman and Ross 
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respond that the question of what makes structure physical and not mathematical is a 
question they refuse to answer (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 158).
28
 If the physical ends up 
being indistinguishable from the mathematical, it seems the result is a kind of 
Pythagoreanism. If ontic structural realism entails Pythagoreanism, or it cannot explain 
why it does not, it can be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum. There seems to be only one 
current philosopher, Max Tegmark, who argues for an explicitly Pythagorean view.  
Seager cites Newman’s problem (Newman 1928) as one of the most powerful 
arguments against ontic structural realism: 
The conclusion of Newman’s argument, when interpreted to bear on relationalism [i.e., 
structural realism], is that the existence of a system of relations is trivially true of a set of 
objects, so unless there is something, as Newman says, “qualitative” (I read this as 
involving intrinsic properties) about the relata, relationalism says exactly nothing about 
the world, beyond an assertion of cardinality. This is because, assuming there are enough 
entities it follows from pure logic that any system of relations over those entities is 
instantiated. How can that be? Because, conceived apart from considerations of the 
intrinsic properties of the relata, relations are simply sets of ordered sequences of entities 
(e.g. a two-place relation is a set of ordered pairs) and, given the entities, those sets and 
sequences will automatically exist. Newman puts it thus: “any collection of things can be 
organized so as to have the structure W, provided there are the right number of them.” 
(Seager 2006: 142–143).  
Now, Ladyman claims the objection from Newman’s problem does not apply to ontic, as 
opposed to epistemic, structural realism because the ontic structural realist “eschews an 
extensional understanding of relations” (Ladyman 2013). This sounds prima facie 
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 When Ladyman and Ross refuse to answer the question, it is not because they think there is no distinction 
between the physical and the mathematical; rather, it is because they think there is nothing we can 
meaningfully say about the distinction. They appeal to a primitive notion of ineffable reality: physical 
structure is just real in a way mathematical structure is not. As they themselves point out, this sounds 
suspiciously Kantian (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 158). They pose themselves the question: “We say these 
structures describe real patterns, but since we can only represent the real patterns in question in terms of 
mathematical relationships, in what sense are these real patterns ‘real’ other that in which, according to 
Kant, noumena are real?” (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 299) – and again, do not give an answer (they merely 
point out other ways in which their view differs from Kant’s). One might regard the reply as question-
begging: merely stating that physical structure is “real” will not do when we are asking for an account of 
what makes it real. One might also claim that primitive “realness” should count as a categorical property, 
which means that ontic structural realism is compatible with premise 2 after all instead of threatening to 
refute it. Further down the line, the view would be eliminated on the basis that primitive realness (modeled 
on Kantian noumenality) is in tension with premise 4 of the argument: “Anti-mysterianism: The properties 
that instantiate physical structure are knowable or positively conceivable.”  
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reasonable – if there are no entities prior to relata, how can all relations follow trivially 
from them? Still, it seems Newman’s worry about indeterminacy can be generalized to 
ontic structural realism. The core of Newman’s worry can be regarded as being that every 
abstract logico-mathematical structure or relational system exists, in the same way that we 
say that every number abstractly exists (and the existence of a number as a relational 
entity seems to entail the existence of the entire relational system of numbers). In 
contrast, the concrete structure of the world, of which there is only one, must have some 
non-mathematical and non-structural qualities. If there are no objects and no intrinsic, 
categorical properties, as ontic structural realism holds, then what makes it the case that 
the world has the mathematical structure that it actually has and not some other 
mathematical structure?  
If no answer can be given to this question, the ontic structural realist is committed to 
the physical existence of all mathematically possible structures. Tegmark embraces also 
this consequence, making precisely this claim: “all structures that exist mathematically 
exist also physically” (Tegmark 1998: 1). For this reason, I think the main argument 
against ontic structural realism should be regarded as the reductio of Pythagoreanism, and 
the argument from Newman’s problem (or something in its spirit) as a sub-argument 
spelling out why Pythagoreanism is to be taken a reductio, for those who do not find it 
problematic in and of itself. 
Can the answer to what makes the structure physical or concrete be that it is 
spatiotemporal, nomic or dispositional? As discussed, the notion of structure can be 
understood so as to leave these options open. If one is a substantivalist, as opposed to a 
reductive relationalist, about space or space-time, one could certainly say that it can 
concretely and physically exist without there being things with some non-spatiotemporal 
properties to fill it. One could then claim that the properties of particles are reducible to 
their spatiotemporal extension and their spatiotemporal relations to other particles. 
However, it seems that entities that only have spatiotemporal properties are not 
distinguishable from mere spatiotemporal points (i.e., unoccupied locations). The 
difference between a mere spatiotemporal point or area and a real particle cannot be 
accounted for in purely spatiotemporal terms. This is a problem, because granted that 
space-time exists, it follows trivially that every spatiotemporal point, i.e., location in it, 
exists, and every spatiotemporal point is spatiotemporally related to every other 
spatiotemporal point. The result would be that all possible spatiotemporal structures exist 
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at once, or that the structure is radially indeterminate between all possibilities. Therefore, 
spatiotemporal structuralism ends up with the same problem as Pythagoreanism. 
How about causal, i.e., nomic or dispositional, structure? Reductionism or 
Humeanism about causation entails that causation is either wholly grounded in relations 
between categorical properties, or that relations between categorical properties constitute 
all that we can know about causation (according to Hume, if there is anything more to 
causation, it cannot be experienced nor positively conceived of). Hence, there could be no 
causal structure without categorical properties on any such view. David Armstrong’s 
influential non-reductive realism about the laws of nature construes them as relations 
between categorical universals, so there can be no nomic structure without categorical 
properties on this view either. However, another common view is that causation is 
grounded in causal powers or dispositions, which are not reducible to anything non-causal 
or non-dispositional, i.e., categorical. Ordinarily, it is supposed that objects with 
irreducible causal powers must still have categorical properties in addition to their causal 
powers. However, some philosophers deny this, claiming that objects can have purely 
dispositional essences. This potential problem for the argument from categorical 
properties is sometimes hinted at in the literature on panpsychism and Russellian monism; 
for example, Alter and Nagasawa remarks that Sydney Shoemaker’s dispositionalist view 
of properties complicates the articulation of Russellian monism (Alter and Nagasawa 
2012: 73), and Seager notes how some philosophers have taken causation to be among the 
qualitative properties needed to evade Newman’s problem (Seager 2006: 143, footnote 9). 
But there has not been much discussion of what would be the best response to this. 
Below, in section 3.2, I will look at the problem in more detail. For now, I will just note 
that premise 2 rules out that things can have purely dispositional essences.  
Premise 3 says that the only categorical properties (whose nature) we can know, or 
have a positive conception of, are mental properties. Mental properties such as the redness 
of red, or a total field of experience, could conceivably exist all alone in the universe, and 
could conceivably keep existing in the very same way if other things were introduced, 
i.e., independently of loneliness and accompaniment. Seager thinks Descartes is the first 
philosopher to argue for this thesis: “The philosophical problem of the external world and 
the coherence of solipsism entail that consciousness is an intrinsic property of things. We 
do not have to embrace Descartes’s dualism to share this insight” (Seager 2006: 136). The 
fact that Cartesian solipsism is at least in some sense a conceivable and coherent scenario 
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shows that total experiential-cognitive fields could exist independently of whatever may 
or may not be going on outside of them.  
The inverted spectrum thought experiment can also be taken to show that color 
phenomenology is not exhausted by the relations in which the colors stand to physical 
properties they represent, nor by their relations of similarity or difference to the other 
colors in the spectrum. If the redness of red remains even if all its relational properties 
were to be changed, as the inverted spectrum thought experiment aims to demonstrate, 
redness could not be a relational property.  
This is not to say that mental properties are purely intrinsic or categorical, or that 
they have no relational and dispositional aspects. Alter and Nagasawa specify that:  
[…] when [proponents of Russellian monism] characterize inscrutables intrinsic, they 
likely mean not that inscrutables lack extrinsic aspects altogether but only that such 
properties have intrinsic aspects. […] it is sometimes noted that phenomenal properties 
have structure and dynamics. The series of auditory phenomenal properties typically 
caused by hearing a musical scale plausibly has a structure corresponding to the scale. 
And your headache might become more intense over time. At first glance, such simple 
observations might seem to create problems for Russellian monism (Stoljar, 2006, pp. 
144–9). But […] this concern is unfounded. The relevant claim is not that phenomenal 
properties lack structure or dynamics, but only that phenomenal properties are not merely 
structural or dynamic (Alter, 2009). (Alter and Nagasawa 2012: 74)  
In addition, mental properties can be relational insofar as they represent, and dispositional 
in the sense that it seems the feeling of pain essentially disposes one toward avoidance, 
and pleasure does the opposite (this will be central to the argument I will defend in 
chapter 3). But not only does this not show that they are purely relational or dispositional; 
reflection on these properties seems to reveal the opposite. Perceptual phenomenology 
seems to represent in virtue of its intrinsic character, and pain seems to dispose in virtue 
of how it intrinsically feels, meaning that the relational or dispositional aspect does not 
exhaust these properties. 
Are mental properties the only categorical properties we can know, or of which we 
have a positive conception? If science does not tell us about any such properties, there are 
not many places to look for them – this is how premise 1 supports premise 3. Alter and 
Nagasawa mention protophenomenal and neutral properties as alternatives. A panpsychist 
could in the context of this argument not reject these properties because they leave an 
epistemic gap with respect to mental properties, because the argument is supposed to 
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motivate panpsychism independently of the problem of consciousness. They would have 
to argue that we have no positive conception of them, that all we can specify is the role 
they are supposed to play (which is relational/dispositional) or their negative properties, 
and that they are therefore ruled out by premise 4.  
But what about Coleman’s unexperienced qualities? Qualitativeness is an intrinsic 
and positively specified property. Panpsychists would therefore have to argue that 
unexperienced qualities are metaphysically impossible, or that our positive conception of 
them is incoherent. Perhaps what we are really conceiving of, in the case of, say, 
unexperienced redness, is something that has the disposition to produce the experience of 
redness, in certain observers.
29
 Accounting for how secondary qualities would be able to 
exist mind-independently is a classic philosophical problem, which indicates that entirely 
ruling out such concepts and related ones might not be a hopeless case. Perhaps one could 
claim that the burden of proof is on the proponents of unexperienced qualities to show 
that they are coherent and possible.  
Alter and Nagasawa mention Derk Pereboom’s suggestions for other positively 
conceivable intrinsic properties, which Pereboom claims to be physical, not neutral: 
Pereboom considers two candidates for what specific sorts of physical properties the 
inscrutables [i.e., Russellian intrinsic properties] might be: Aristotelian prime materiality; 
and absolute (or perfect) solidity, the notion of which he attributes to Locke and Newton. 
The former is notoriously obscure, but Pereboom implies that the latter should be 
regarded as a serious option. If absolute solidity is to qualify as an inscrutable, then it 
would have to differ from ordinary solidity, which seems manifestly dispositional. 
Whether we can make sense of this idea is not entirely clear. (Alter and Nagasawa 2012: 
79) 
As with unexperienced qualities, absolute solidity is arguably either dispositional or not 
clearly coherent, and panpsychists will have to assume that the burden of proof is on 
those who claim otherwise. 
Stoljar has argued, partly on the basis of the problem of consciousness, but also on 
the basis that dispositions must have categorical grounds, that we should posit intrinsic or 
categorical properties which are physical according to the object-based conception of the 
physical but are inaccessible via science as we know it. These properties will either be 
                                                 
29
 Coleman seems to hold that the qualities are in the things and not on them like secondary qualities, but 
this does not clearly make them less mysterious or less mind-like.  
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made accessible to us through a scientific revolution, or it could be that: “[…] our 
contingent psychological nature is such that […] we cannot develop concepts of the 
categorical properties” (Stoljar 2001: 274). The view that these properties will be 
accessible after a scientific revolution, i.e., that they are unknown but not unknowable, is 
implausible in view of some of the arguments for premise 1, in particular the Kantian or 
Langtonian argument that the intrinsic properties of other things can in principle not be 
known empirically. If the properties are not only unknown but unknowable, they will be 
ruled out by premise 4 – along with Kantian (or Langtonian) things-in-themselves and 
other merely negatively defined properties.  
Premise 4, which states that the properties that instantiate physical structure are 
knowable or positively conceivable, is similar to the anti-mysterian principle (viii) (p. 26 
above) which forms part of the motivation for panpsychism from philosophy of mind. 
Given that it seems hard to prove that unknowable or inconceivable realizers cannot 
possibly exist, this premise must, like principle (viii), also be defended on pragmatic, 
methodological or anti-skeptical grounds. A reasonable pragmatic or methodological 
premise is that we should not declare ignorance before we have considered and found 
good reason to reject all positive theories, i.e., that we should, if possible, avoid positing 
properties that (or whose nature) are unknowable or not positively conceivable. This does 
not in itself entail premise 4, but in combination with premise 3, according to which there 
are some suitable knowable properties, and hence not positing unknown ones is possible, 
it comes close to. One could make all this explicit, by putting the methodological 
principle as a premise instead of premise 4. However, then the argument would not be 
formally valid, unless further modifications are made: one must either add premises 
which license moving from a methodological or pragmatic recommendation to a factual 
statement (i.e., premise 4 as it stands), or put the conclusion in terms of a pragmatic or 
methodological recommendation as well (e.g., “we should accept panpsychism” instead 
of “panpsychism is true”).  
Perhaps premise 4 would also be defensible on the basis of premise 3 in combination 
with a principle of parsimony: why multiply our ontology with unknown properties, when 
all that is needed are the mental properties that are part of it already? However, if one 
takes the view that mental properties can be grounded in the posited unknown properties, 
as, e.g., neutral monists would think, introducing them lets us exchange one fundamental 
property for another, e.g., the mental for the neutral, and our fundamental ontology will 
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not be multiplied after all. Therefore, considerations of parsimony cannot be invoked 
against unknown properties if they are regarded as suitable to ground consciousness. 
How does the argument from categorical properties relate to the Hegelian argument 
from philosophy of mind? Alter and Nagasawa point out how the two arguments – or the 
two arguments they consider, which are equivalent except that they leave out the premises 
and presuppositions that rule out non-panpsychist Russellian monism – together 
constitute a “solving two problems at once”-argument: 
In the philosophy of science, there is a problem of a lack of metaphysical grounding. […] 
In the philosophy of mind, there is a problem about integrating consciousness into nature. 
[…]  
At first glance, these problems may seem to have nothing to do with each other. But 
on reflection, they might be related. The philosophy of science problem could be 
described as a help-wanted problem. Physics wants to hire help: it wants to employ 
something outside its purview to ground the structure it so elegantly describes. The 
philosophy of mind problem could likewise be described as a job-seeking problem. 
Consciousness wants a job: it wants to be integrated into nature by playing a role in the 
causal nexus known as the cosmos. Seen in this way, a unified solution suggests itself: 
consciousness can be employed to ground fundamental physical relations – which is what 
Russellian monism says, with the one qualification that on some versions of Russellian 
monism it is not consciousness itself but its components (protophenomenal properties) 
that ground the properties found in physics. So, Russellian monism provides what seems 
on reflection to be a natural solution to two significant philosophical problems. This 
speaks in favour of the view. (Alter and Nagasawa 2012: 89) 
Nagel is one who finds the argument from philosophy of mind alone compelling, but 
regards panpsychism as so implausible that he concludes that there must be an error 
somewhere in the argument – even though he cannot precisely identify it.30 Adding in the 
argument from categorical properties, and seeing the “solving two problems at once” or 
“help-wanted/job-needed” meta-argument, would give panpsychism more plausibility and 
                                                 
30
 Nagel claims that panpsychism “appears to follow from a few simple premises, each of which is more 
plausible than its denial, though not perhaps more plausible than the denial of panpsychism.” (Nagel 1979: 
181). He concludes, accordingly, that: “[…] panpsychism should be added to the current list of mutually 
incompatible and hopelessly unacceptable solutions to the mind–body problem. It can be avoided by 
denying any of the premises of the argument” (Nagel 1979: 193). He also considers whether there might be 
an alternative, yet to be conceived of, position which is also compatible with the premises: “There is no 
reason to think that all possibilities have been thought of so there is no reason to assume that a view is 
correct if all currently conceivable alternatives are even more unacceptable” (Nagel 1979: 193). In Mind 
and Cosmos (2012) he is more sympathetic to the view.  
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therefore perhaps lead some philosophers to apply modus ponens instead of modus tollens 
to the individual arguments.  
3 PROBLEMS FOR THE ARGUMENTS 
Each line of argument faces (at least) one serious objection, both of which I have already 
indicated. The overall argument from philosophy of mind, constituted mainly by the 
Hegelian and anti-mysterian arguments, is possibly undermined by the combination 
problem. It appears to show that panpsychism is not, after all, compatible with the 
principles listed above (p. 26), as the overall argument from philosophy of mind can be 
construed as claiming. The argument from metaphysics and philosophy of science, on the 
other hand, i.e., the argument from categorical properties, is challenged by metaphysical 
positions such as dispositionalism and dispositional essentialism, because it relies on a 
reducibility principle which these views deny.  
3.1 The Combination Problem  
According to the Hegelian argument for panpsychism, mental properties cannot arise, at 
least not intelligibly, from any (known) non-mental properties, which supports the view 
that mentality must itself be fundamental. However, it is generally assumed that 
panpsychism allows that our mentality is not fundamental; rather, it results from the 
appropriate combination of the simple or primitive mental properties belonging to the 
ultimate particles that constitute our brain. This is what gives rise to the combination 
problem. 
Before explaining the different aspects the problem I will introduce some 
terminology. Micromentality, microexperience, and so on, is the kind of experience that 
would belong to ultimate particles, and microsubjects are the particles considered as 
subjects of microexperience. Macromentality, macroexperience, and so on, is the kind of 
experience had by humans and animals and any other properly unified complex physical 
things, and macrosubjects are subjects of macroexperience.  
I will use the terms constitutive, non-constitutive and emergent panpsychism as 
Chalmers defines them: 
Constitutive panpsychism is the thesis that macrophenomenal truths are (wholly or 
partially) grounded in microphenomenal truths. Nonconstitutive panpsychism is the thesis 
that macrophenomenal truths are not grounded in microphenomenal truths. The most 
important form of nonconstitutive panpsychism is emergent panpsychism, on which 
macrophenomenal properties are strongly emergent from microphenomenal or 
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microphysical properties, perhaps in virtue of fundamental laws connecting 
microphenomenal to macrophenomenal. (Chalmers forthcoming-a: 3) 
Grounding is a constitutive, as opposed to causal, determination relation. The grounded 
obtains in virtue of the ground and the ground necessitates the grounded in a way that 
leaves no explanatory gap (Fine 2012: 39). It has been suggested that reduction in 
philosophy of mind should be understood in terms of grounding, and the supervenience 
correlation should be regarded as a symptom of a grounding relation (Schaffer 2009). 
Strong emergence is when the properties of a whole are not predictable in principle from 
complete knowledge of the properties and configuration of its parts – that is, the 
properties of the parts as they manifest in isolation or in different kinds of wholes (Broad 
1925: 61).
31
 There are various accounts of what kind of determination relation underlies 
strong emergence, but it cannot be constitutive.  
The combination problem is the problem of explaining how macroexperience results 
from microexperience. But, as discussion has showed, this general problem really comes 
down to a set of many different problems. In one way, it is natural to regard the 
combination problem as the set of all problems having to do with mental combination. 
From the dialectical point of view, however, it makes sense to regard the combination 
problem as a problem whose solution requires showing two things: (1) that mental 
combination is not demonstratively impossible, and (2) that when accounting for mental 
combination panpsychism does not face any problems that are strongly analogous to the 
main problems of physicalism, dualism and non-panpsychist Russellian monism.
32
 In 
other words, it would involve showing that panpsychism cannot be accused of merely 
                                                 
31
 C. D. Broad is one of the classics of British emergentism. His definition of strong emergence is endorsed 
(with some qualifications) by contemporary philosophers such as Brian McLaughlin (1992) and F. C. 
Boogerd, F. J. Bruggeman, Robert C. Richardson, Achim Stephan & H. Westerhoff (2005). 
32
 What about problems that are non-analogous, or weakly analogous, but just as hard? If “just as hard” 
means “just as unlikely to have a solution”, then problems that are non-analogous but just as hard would 
perhaps be as significant as strongly analogous problems. But how can you tell that two problems are just as 
hard, unless they are analogous? If there are two problems, both of which philosophers have worked on for 
a long time with equal lack of progress, that would be an indication that they are just as hard. But the 
combination problem has not received much attention compared to the problems of physicalism and 
dualism, so one cannot compare their difficulty in this way. Therefore, it seems analogous structure is the 
only way (at the moment) to tell whether he combination problem is as hard as the problems of other views, 
and the combination problem can (for now) be understood in these terms.  
An additional consideration is that even if two problems are non-analogous, but still as unlikely to have 
a solution, as long as neither is wholly unlikely to have a solution, there is still a chance that one of the 
problem can eventually be solved and the other cannot. If two problem are strongly analogous, there is more 
reason to believe that if one is insoluble then so is the other, and vice versa.  
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moving and repeating the problems that it purports to solve, given that the fact that it 
appears to solve these problems is the only reason, from the point of view of philosophy 
of mind, for considering the view in the first place. If these two demands cannot be 
fulfilled then there would be no motivation for accepting panpsychism, at least none 
deriving from philosophy of mind. However, if panpsychism replaces the problems of 
dualism, physicalism and non-panpsychist Russellian monism with different problems, 
problems which are not demonstrably insoluble, then it could be reasonably regarded as 
making some progress on the mind–body problem, even if some of these new problems 
have to do with mental combination. I do not think this way of limiting the problem 
would exclude many problems that have been called combination problems in the 
literature, and many seem to think of the problem in the same way (see, e.g., Goff (2009), 
Coleman (2012: 138) and Seager (2010: 170)). 
Therefore, I will take it that an adequate solution to combination problem would 
consist in showing that mental combination can occur in a way which does not conflict 
with any of the premises and presuppositions of the main arguments against dualism, 
physicalism and non-panpsychist Russellian monism, the most important of which I 
regard as being the principles identified and listed at the end of section 2.1 (p. 26) above.  
The combination problem was first posed by James: 
Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then 
stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently 
as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence. (James 
1890/1981: 162) 
Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take 
a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever 
that might mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, 
windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-
and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feeling were set up, a 
consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101
st
 feeling 
would be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be 
a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial 
identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or 
(in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it. (James 1890/1981: 162) 
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James points out an apparent epistemic gap between microexperience and 
macroexperience: macroexperience seems not deducible from microexperiences and does 
not in any intelligible sense evolve from it.  
Constitutive panpsychism seems to have the same type of options with respect to the 
epistemic gap pointed out by James as (non-emergent) physicalism has with respect to the 
epistemic gap from the physical to the mental: denying it, arguing that it is closable in 
principle, or arguing that epistemic gaps that are not closable in principle do not entail 
ontological gap when the gap exists between mental properties. Emergent panpsychism 
needs an argument that the strong emergence of macroexperience from macroexperience 
is not brute or wholly unintelligible. 
Panpsychism thus seems to face something that looks very much like analogues of 
physicalism’s and emergentism’s intelligibility problems. If it turns out that they are 
strongly analogous and equally difficult, then the argument from philosophy of mind is 
undermined – panpsychism would not avoid the problems of physicalism and 
emergentism after all, it would just have relocated them. However, it is far from clear that 
panpsychism’s intelligibility problems are analogous. I will discuss some of the reasons 
for and against thinking this is so, for constitutive and emergent panpsychism 
respectively. I will also point out how each also faces analogues of physicalism’s and 
dualism’s respective empirical problems in view of the principle of microphysical causal 
closure.  
3.1.1  Combination Problems for Constitutive Panpsychism 
Is it plausible to deny that there is an epistemic gap from micro- to macroexperience? The 
epistemic gap between micro- and macroexperience can be demonstrated in a way which 
looks perfectly analogous to the way in which the physicalist epistemic gap is 
demonstrated. One can construct a panpsychist conceivability argument, a panpsychist 
knowledge argument and a panpsychist explanatory gap.  
Goff (2009) argues that we can conceive of a physical and microexperiential 
duplicate of our world – where every particle has the same physical properties and the 
same microexperiential properties that panpsychists think they have in our world – but 
where there is no macroexperience. The individual particles in human bodies are all 
microconscious, but our kind of experience is absent. This seems conceivable, and 
conceivable distinctness is an epistemic gap.  
Chalmers constructs a version of the knowledge argument for panpsychism:  
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We can suppose that inside her black-and-white room, Mary is told all the microphysical 
facts, and also learns all the microphenomenal facts: she learns what it is like to be a 
quark, a photon, and so on. Perhaps this is accomplished by giving her versions of those 
experiences, or by somehow enabling her to imagine them. One might think that in this 
situation, Mary would still be unable to know what it is like to see red, even given 
arbitrary a priori reasoning. (Chalmers forthcoming-a: 11) 
As for an explanatory gap, one could take the general formulation of the combination 
problem to constitute a hard problem of macroexperience: why and how does 
microexperience along with its physical aspects give rise to macroexperience? It seems no 
amount of physical and microexperiential information would answer this question.  
Because the panpsychist epistemic gap can be demonstrated in a way analogous to 
the way in which the physicalist epistemic gap is demonstrated, it is implausible for 
panpsychists who are motivated by the main anti-physicalist arguments to deny that it 
exists. Is it more plausible to claim that it is closable in principle? 
Strawson suggests, in effect, that the epistemic gap results from ignorance of the 
nature of macroexperience (2006a: 252–253). The argument from philosophy of mind as I 
have presented it presupposes that we are acquainted with the nature of our own 
experience. However, it is precisely in view of the combination problem that Strawson 
makes clear that he does not endorse a Full Revelation Thesis but only the Partial 
Revelation Thesis (see p. 16 above), according to which we are acquainted with the 
essential nature of experience only in certain respects. This allows that there may be 
unknown properties or aspects of our experience that account for how it can result from 
combination of microexperiences. If they were revealed to us, the epistemic gap would be 
closed.  
Goff has criticized the partial revelation thesis on the grounds that the notion of 
partial or “semi-acquaintance” that it presupposes has not been properly spelled out, and 
furthermore, that it seems that the combination problem arises from features of experience 
that belong to the part of our experience that we are in fact acquainted with (Goff 
manuscript). Even if there are unknown parts of our experience that avoid these problems, 
it is hard to see how that changes the fact that the known parts seem unable to be 
constituted by microexperience.  
Goff proposes instead a solution in terms of our ignorance about the nature of 
microexperience. Chalmers claims, similarly, that we know so little about what 
microphenomenal properties are like, and that “perhaps once we grasped them, we would 
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understand their connection to experiences of red and to other experiences” (Chalmers 
forthcoming-a: 11). But how can it be that we are fully acquainted with the nature of 
macroexperience, in relevant respects (as per Goff’s argument against Strawson’s semi-
acquaintance), while at the same time ignorant about the nature of its constituents? Goff 
thinks this is possible on the basis of an objection he credits to Chalmers: “it seems that 
we can completely understand the nature of a property without understanding the nature 
of the properties that constitute it.” Goff proposes that there could be a special 
phenomenal bonding relation, which is such that when microphenomenal properties stand 
in it, they would constitute a macrophenomenal property. He speculates that it might be 
the intrinsic nature of the spatiotemporal relation, and that if we were acquainted with 
phenomenal bonding, we could see how microexperiences thus related transparently 
entail macroexperience (Goff forthcoming). 
This is, as Goff admits, a form of mysterianism about combination. We have no 
positive grasp of the nature of the phenomenal bonding relation. One could therefore ask 
whether phenomenal bonding ends up explaining macroexperience much better than 
mysterian non-panpsychist Russellian monism. Neither of these views give us an actual 
explanation of consciousness; they rather explain how an explanation is possible. 
Panpsychist mysterianism does give us some more detail on how the explanation is 
possible; there are fewer blanks to fill in. But it is not clear whether this is sufficient 
reason to prefer panpsychist mysterianism over non-panpsychist mysterianism.  
Additionally, the claim that “we can completely understand the nature of a property 
without understanding the nature of the properties that constitute it” – I will refer to this 
as Opaque Constitution – is not obviously true for all cases of actual constitution, at least 
not the ones that would be most similar to constitutive mental combination. For functional 
or abstract properties, Opaque Constitution might hold true – it seems, for example, that 
we can completely understand the nature of computation without understanding the nature 
of silicon and other constituents of actual computers. But macroconsciousness is not a 
functional property, according to Russellian panpsychism, so this example would not 
show anything. With other properties that we intuitively regard as concrete, Opaque 
Constitution is more doubtful. It seems that we cannot say that we completely understand 
the nature of physical substances, such as water, as long as we do not completely 
understand the nature of the subatomic particles that constitute them. However, since on 
the Russellian view all physical properties, including the property of being water, are 
functional or structural, this example would perhaps not show anything either. Goff gives 
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an example in support of Opaque Constitution from the realm of qualitative properties, 
namely how redness is constituted by scarlet (a shade of red). But this is not clearly a 
good analogy either. One difference is that this is a one-one relation, while mental 
combination is a many-one relation. Another difference is that redness could be regarded 
as an abstract or disjunctive property relative to scarlet – red is either the disjunction of all 
particular shades of red, or an abstraction of what they all have in common. A field of 
macroconsciousness, on the other hand, is neither a disjunction nor an abstraction. These 
worries about Opaque Constitution are perhaps not serious enough to rule it out for 
mental combination, but at least it adds to the amount of mystery that must be accepted 
along with constitutive panpsychism, and makes it even less clearly preferable to 
mysterian Russellian monism.  
Arguing that epistemic gaps that are not closable in principle do not entail ontological 
gaps in mental cases is a final possibility, which nobody seems to have taken up. 
Chalmers mentions the option of type-B constitutive panpsychism, but sees no reason 
why it would not inherit the problems of type-B physicalism. Altogether, then, I think 
there is good, but not conclusive reason, to think that constitutive panpsychism faces a 
strong, but partial, analogue of physicalism’s intelligibility problems. The analogy is only 
partial because physicalism is committed to saying that we have a positive grasp of 
physical properties via physical theory, but constitutive panpsychists are not equally 
clearly committed to saying that we have a positive grasp of microphenomenal properties 
or the nature of the relations they can stand in, and therefore one cannot rule out that the 
epistemic gap between the micro- and macromental is closable in principle. However, the 
element of mysterianism that comes with an appeal to the unknown nature of the 
microphenomenal gives rise to an analogue of the problems of non-panpsychist versions 
of Russellian monism instead.  
Chalmers claims that the combination problem can be broken into three main 
problems concerning the combination of three different aspects of experience: 
subjectivity, qualitativeness and structure (Chalmers forthcoming-a: 4). When it comes to 
the combination of subjectivity, some philosophers have argued that this would involve 
not only an epistemic gap but also a contradiction.  
Coleman (2012) argues that combination of many microsubjects into one 
macrosubject requires that the microsubjects survive the combination, because: “If one 
subject is left where formerly we had two, this means at least one subject has gone out of 
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existence, which is not combination but a fight to the death” (Coleman 2013b: 14). But if 
we allow the original subjects to continue existing, that rules out combination:  
What we wanted was to assemble our two subjects so as to constitute a unified higher-
level subject, with its own point of view. If we are left with all and only the original pair 
of points of view then we still have a multitude, and are nowhere nearer to the genuine 
combination of subjectivities into one subject. (Coleman 2013b: 14) 
Coleman thinks the problem requires that we let go of microsubjects and posit only 
unexperienced qualities all the way down, but as has been discussed, this amounts to 
abandoning panpsychism.  
Pierfransesco Basile also argues that the combination problem points not only to a 
mystery but to a contradiction, given the following three assumptions about the nature of 
our experience:  
PHENOMENAL ESSENTIALISM – this is the view that, for an experience, to be is to 
feel a certain way. In the case of a pain, it seems pointless to draw a distinction between 
what the pain is in itself and the way it feels; the former – what the pain is ‘in itself’ – is 
wholly exhausted by the latter – its qualitative, felt dimension. […] 
PHENOMENAL HOLISM – this is the view that, within a person’s total psychical 
whole, the nature of a single identifiable experience […] is essentially determined by the 
other experiences occurring along-side it – synchronically – within the whole. […] 
THE SHARING PRINCIPLE – this is the view that an experience can 
simultaneously occur within two distinct psychical wholes – i.e. the very same experience 
can be felt by two different feelers, in this case, by the ‘lesser mind’ of the neuron and the 
‘larger mind’ of the human being. (Basile 2010: 107–108) 
Basile argues that: 
Once these notions are accepted, it becomes clear that the notion of mental combination 
involves a contradiction. If mental combination is to be possible, an experience must be 
felt by two different subjects while remaining numerically self-identical. But if the being 
of an experience is wholly exhausted by the way it feels, then an experience cannot be 
numerically the same while being felt by two different feelers. So, it would seem, mental 
composition is an impossible conception. (Basile 2009: 109) 
The reason an experience cannot be numerically the same while being felt by two 
different feelers is the phenomenal holism principle, according to which the experience 
would feel different (and thus be different, according to phenomenal essentialism) for 
each of its feelers, since they each experience it within different total phenomenal wholes.  
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Basile concludes that we should reject the sharing principle, and thereby accept that 
mental composition cannot happen constitutively. It seems that without sharing, 
microsubjects and macrosubjects cannot overlap in the way constitution requires. One 
might speculate about whether one of the other principles can be abandoned, in order to 
preserve the possibility of constitution. However, a view very close to phenomenal 
essentialism, that the nature or essence of an experience consists, at least partly, in how it 
feels, is necessary for the rejection of type-B physicalism and the phenomenal concept 
strategy. But phenomenal holism is perhaps less clearly indispensable. Barry Dainton 
(2010) notes that it was relatively commonplace among nineteenth century philosophers, 
such as James and F. H. Bradley. Timothy Sprigge defends it at length, for both 
metaphysical reasons and phenomenological reasons, i.e., it being apparent to 
introspection. Dainton points to many actual cases of phenomenal interdependence, from 
the way in which details in a painting can mutually influence each other’s character, to 
the Müller-Lyer illusion and inter-modal dependencies such as the McGurk effect.
33
 He 
shows that a growing body of evidence shows that this sort of interdependence is much 
more common than usually thought (Dainton 2010: 121–123). He argues, however, that 
one cannot infer from there being many cases of phenomenal interdependence to its being 
complete and necessary. It is not clear whether Basile’s argument needs it to be complete 
and necessary, as opposed to contingent but relatively prevalent. In any case, constitutive 
panpsychists would need an argument that phenomenal interdependence is not complete 
and necessary. Alternatively, it must be argued that the contradiction is somehow only 
apparent. I will discuss the phenomenal holism principle and its justification further in 
chapter 5, sections 4.1.2 and 4.3.  
James also thought that combination seemed not only mysterious but contradictory. 
As well as being the father of the combination problem, James is also the father of one of 
the most radical proposals for its solution. He was convinced that combination was actual, 
and hence somehow possible. In the absence of alternatives, he found himself compelled 
to “give up the logic, fairly, squarely and irrevocably”, that he concluded was to blame for 
the problem (James 1909/1977: 96). So it appears that constitutive panpsychism has not 
only an intelligibility problem but also a worse problem of appearing impossible. 
                                                 
33
 In the Müller-Lyer illusion, two horizontal lines of equal length appear to be of different length 
depending on the direction of “tail-fins” at the ends. In the McGurk effect, the visual perception of lip 
movements makes us hear speech differently – seeing the lip movements of “gaaa” makes us hear a 
simultaneous “baaa” sound as “daaa” (Dainton 2010: 121). 
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A noted above, physicalism also arguably has an empirical problem, the exclusion 
problem, in view of the principle of microphysical causal closure. Seager argues that the 
kind of panpsychism according to which our kind of consciousness arises by what he calls 
conservative emergence – weak emergence that is really a kind of constitution – faces a 
problem that seems strongly analogous to the exclusion problem: 
[…] conservative emergence is all that is required to rob complex consciousness of its 
efficacy and to generate the paradox of consciousness. The panpsychist hypothesizes that 
there are elemental mental properties which belong to the fundamental physical entities of 
the world. If these elemental features have their own causal powers (that is, are not 
themselves epiphenomenal) then by the logic of conservative emergence they will usurp 
efficacy from the complex conscious states which they subvene. (Seager 2012: 203) 
If constitutive panpsychism is to be accepted on the grounds that it avoids all the 
problems of physicalism, then it must either be explained why the exclusion problem is 
not really a problem for physicalism, as some philosophers hold, or it should be explained 
why macroexperience is nevertheless not causally excluded by microexperience.  
3.1.2  Combination Problems for Emergent Panpsychism 
Strawson claims that while it may be that mental combination requires emergence in 
some sense, it does not require brute emergence. The kind of emergence required to fill in 
the gap between micro- and macroexperience is more acceptable: “unintelligible 
experiential-from-experiential emergence is not nearly as bad as unintelligible 
experiential-from-non-experiential emergence” (Strawson 2006a: 250). 
How can it be justified that strong emergence within the mental is less bad? Strong 
emergence is by definition characterized by an epistemic gap that is not closable in 
principle – except, perhaps, insofar as the epistemic gap between causes and effects in 
general is closable in principle. If the presence of such an epistemic gap constitutes 
complete lack of intelligibility, i.e., bruteness, then there can be no such thing as non-
brute strong emergence, and presumably no way in which emergence within the mental 
could be less bad. In order for intra-mental emergence to possibly be less bad, one would 
have to regard epistemic gaps as something that is incompatible with explanation by 
constitution but not all explanation; that their presence indicates not that there is no 
explanatory connection between two phenomena, but rather only that there is no 
explanatory connection of the constitutive kind. That there can be explanatory relations 
between phenomena separated by an ontological gap is affirmed by ordinary causal 
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explanation. There is an ontological gap between causes and effect, but we still explain – 
which is to render intelligible, in some sense – effects in terms of their causes.  
The argument from non-emergence as Strawson presents it is compatible with 
thinking of epistemic gaps as a problem for constitution only. He can be read as first 
arguing that there is nothing about the physic(S)al in virtue of which the mental can be 
constituted by it, which can be seen from the epistemic gap, and then making the further 
claim that there is also nothing about the physic(S)al in virtue of which the mental could 
be necessitated by or emerge from it, in a way similar to the way in which physical causes 
produce physical effects (I presupposed this reading in the way I formulated the principles 
behind the total argument for panpsychism from philosophy of mind, on p. 26 above). Is 
there similar reason to think that there is nothing about the micromental in virtue of which 
the macromental could emerge, be produced or necessitated? Many find it intuitive that 
this is not the case; these two somehow have a closer connection. However, Strawson is 
not very explicit about what this connection would be, apart from perhaps just claiming 
that the macromental can emerge from the micromental in virtue of the latter being 
mental, which is not the most satisfying answer (as Goff (2006: 59) emphasizes). A more 
satisfying answer to the combination problem in terms of non-brute strong emergence 
should specify more precisely what it is about the micromental, as opposed to the merely 
physical, in virtue of which the macromental can emerge from it; or alternatively, why it 
is that the macromental can emerge from the micromental in virtue of the latter being 
mental.  
Seager (2010) has argued that combination could be a matter of combinatorial 
infusion, a process where constituents lose their individuality as they fuse, or are 
absorbed, into a so-called “large simple”. Large simples are “partless, yet extended”, just 
like macrosubjects. He argues that the models we have of classical black holes show this 
structure. This means that: 
[…] we are already in possession of a rigorous model of a kind of combination that has 
the properties demanded by combinatorial infusion. It is therefore possible to deploy this 
sort of model when thinking about how complex states of consciousness could emerge 
from simpler ones. (Seager 2010: 181) 
The black hole would be categorized as an emergent phenomenon, in one sense of the 
term, but Seager claims that “there is no radical emergence here, but there is nonetheless 
the creation of a new entity” (Seager 2010: 181, my emphasis). Why is this kind of 
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emergence not radical, and presumably then, not brute? Seager does not answer this 
explicitly. Prima facie, the process of black hole formation is intelligible only on the basis 
of a posteriori laws of nature, which do seem completely epistemically brute: we do not 
know why the laws of nature are as they are, or why there are laws at all. Hence, the 
combinatorial infusion theory cannot be a complete solution to the intelligibility problem 
of emergent panpsychism. If the black hole model applies to combination, this could 
show how combination can be modelled without formal contradiction, but it does not 
show that no brute emergence is involved (which is perhaps to be regarded as a kind of 
metaphysical contradiction).  
Emergent panpsychism faces not only an intelligibility problem but also an analogue 
of dualism’s empirical problem. If macroexperience is distinct from microexperience, 
microexperience belongs to microphysical entities and macroexperience to macrophysical 
entities, and the microphysical is causally closed, then macroexperience is either 
epiphenomenal or an overdeterminer.  
By the fusion account, this problem is prima facie avoided, because the fusion 
replaces its microscopic base, and so it would not be around to compete for causal 
relevance. However, this still leaves another kind of empirical problem, a problem of 
structural mismatch when linking combination to physical emergent processes. Seager 
says: 
DMP [deferential monadic panpsychism, i.e., Russellian monist panpsychism] requires 
that the mental realm shadows the physical, so we expect to find physical correlates of 
mental processes, including any case of combinatorial infusion. (Seager 2010: 181) 
This is in line with the criterion of structural isomorphism or compatibility for Russellian 
monism explained above (p. 10). Now, as Seager points out: “there is little evidence that 
the brain supports any processes that could count as combinatorial infusion at the physical 
level” (Seager 2010: 181–182). Would this not entail that the combinatorial infusion 
theory of combination leads precisely to the kind of structural mismatch which is 
incompatible with Russellian monism, and its solution to the problem of mental 
causation? Seager thinks not, claiming that “it is not a requirement of DMP [i.e., 
Russellian monist panpsychism] that a mental instance of combinatorial infusion be 
accompanied by a physical instance of combinatorial infusion” (Seager 2010: 181). 
However, he gives no clear reasons for why this is not a requirement. In what other sense 
can the mental shadow the physical in the way Russellian monism requires? Until this is 
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explained, the theory does not constitute a complete response to the empirical aspect of 
emergent panpsychism’s combination problem.  
In summary, the combination problem threatens to undermine the line of argument 
for panpsychism from philosophy of mind by showing how panpsychism faces strong 
analogues of the problems of dualism, physicalism and, to some extent, non-panpsychist 
Russellian monism. These are problems that, according to the argument from philosophy 
of mind, the view was supposed to avoid. Constitutive panpsychism inherits an 
intelligibility problem and an empirical problem from physicalism: the epistemic gap and 
the exclusion problem. Emergent panpsychism inherits an intelligibility problem and an 
empirical problem from emergentism and dualism: the problems of brute emergence and 
the problem of microphysical (and hence micromental) causal closure. Some proposed 
solutions to the combination problem come at the expense of cancelling panpsychism’s 
advantage over mysterian non-panpsychist Russellian monism, by appealing to unknown 
properties. In addition, constitutive panpsychism must respond to the charge that mental 
combination involves a contradiction relative to two important principles about the nature 
of experience, phenomenal holism and phenomenal essentialism/The Partial Revelation 
Thesis, the former of which can be supported by phenomenological reflection and 
empirical evidence; the latter of which is a presupposition of some of the anti-physicalist 
arguments that are part of the case for panpsychism in the first place.  
3.2 Irreducible Dispositionality  
Above, I noted a potential problem for the argument from categorical properties, namely 
that dispositional properties, such as causal powers, might be irreducible and not in need 
of categorical grounds. Pure, i.e., irreducible and ungrounded, dispositions or powers 
form the basis for views such as dispositionalism and dispositional essentialism. 
According to the former, dispositional properties ground or instantiate all physical 
structure; according to the latter, they ground or instantiate most of it. Dispositionalism is 
defended by e.g., Alexander Bird (2007), Stephen Mumford (2004) and Shoemaker 
(1980); dispositional essentialism is defended by Brian Ellis (2002) and George Molnar 
(2003). Prima facie, these views are in conflict with the reducibility principle which the 
argument from categorical properties relies on, which I put as its premise 2: 
2) Denial of ontological structuralism: All physical structure must be 
instantiated by (individuals with) categorical properties. 
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I will now examine this challenge in more detail. I will show that the way in which 
premise 2 is usually defended is not sufficient to meet it, and while there are a few 
apparent quick fixes, they ultimately fail. Therefore, the notion of irreducible 
dispositionality constitutes a serious challenge to the argument from categorical 
properties.  
As discussed above, arguments against ontic structural realism, including the 
Pythagorean reductio and arguments derived from Newman’s problem, are mainly 
appealed to in defense of premise 2, as well as alternative ways of formulating the 
reducibility principle. However, it seems that these arguments really only support a 
weaker version of the premise, which denies only that physical structure exists 
uninstantiated, or can be self-instantiating: 
2*) Denial of ontological pure structuralism: All physical structure must 
be instantiated by (individuals with) non-structural properties. 
It is only uninstantiated or self-instantiating structure which is indistinguishable from 
mathematical structure (or empty space-time). The original premise 2 does not only say 
that physical structure must be instantiated by non-structural properties; it makes the 
stronger claim that it must be instantiated by categorical properties in particular. If all 
non-structural properties were categorical, the stronger claim would follow from the weak 
claim. But this is far from obvious, because dispositional properties are arguably both 
non-structural and non-categorical.  
Dispositional properties include causal powers, potencies, or capacities. In the 
empiricist tradition, dispositions have been thought reducible to abstract relations between 
categorical properties. The power of charge might be thought reducible to a set of 
relations such as “will attract particles with opposite charge if they are nearby” and so on. 
If attraction is a kind of movement, movement is just a set of locations and location is a 
categorical property, charge is thereby reduced to a conditional relation between 
categorical location properties. One could also think of how higher level dispositions such 
as fragility, being disposed to break, are reducible to or explicable in terms of its 
underlying (relatively speaking) categorical molecular structure. Furthermore, since 
Hume, causal power in general has been attempted to be reduced to abstract relations 
between categorical properties. However, on various non-reductionist views, dispositions, 
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or at least fundamental dispositions such as charge, should be understood as having their 
own distinct nature.  
Irreducibly dispositional properties have a nature distinct from categorical properties 
in virtue of having something relational about them. Molnar claims that “having a 
direction to a particular manifestation is constitutive of the power property” (Molnar 
2003: 60). The nature of the power of charge consists in being directed against, or having 
a tendency or striving toward, attracting particles with opposite charge (and so on). Thus, 
powers are essentially related to things or states outside of themselves or to not yet actual 
possibilities. But in spite of this relational essence, dispositional properties are also by 
nature distinct from abstract relational properties that make up pure, logico-mathematical 
(or spatiotemporal) structure. Causal powers may be thought of as characterized by a kind 
of concrete force or energy, or “oomph”, as some philosophers have called it. It is often 
claimed that this quality is something that we have a primitive or intuitive grasp of. This 
allows us to distinguish the physical from the mathematical; it is something that may 
“breathe fire into the equations” of physics, as in Stephen Hawking’s phrase. 
As mentioned above, even if they are not reducible to relations between the 
categorical, dispositions or causal powers are often supposed to exist alongside 
categorical properties, and necessarily so. For example, it may be held that most things 
have the (allegedly) categorical property of extension in addition to causal powers such as 
charge. However, according to the dispositionalism of Shoemaker, Bird, and Mumford, 
all properties are really dispositional, including extension (cf. Blackburn, p. 29). This 
view is also known as power structuralism (Marmodoro undated) or causal structuralism 
(Hawthorne 2001). According to dispositionalism, the physical world consists of nothing 
but powers acting on other powers.  
Ellis’ and Molnar’s dispositional essentialism is a slightly weaker view, according to 
which the power structure requires a background of spatiotemporal location properties, 
which are classified as categorical, but all other properties are dispositional. But it seems 
the admission of spatiotemporal categorical properties by dispositional essentialists is not 
very helpful to panpsychists, given that panpsychism mainly requires that the things in 
space and time are mental, not necessarily space and time itself or the properties in virtue 
of which things are located in space and time (if one thinks such properties are indeed 
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required).
34
 As mentioned, spatiotemporal properties are good candidates for 
fundamentally non-mental properties of an impure panpsychism, which some find more 
plausible than pure panpsychism.  
In this way, both dispositionalism and dispositional essentialism constitute a 
challenge to the argument from categorical properties by contradicting premise 2. I will 
now consider two candidates for relatively quick fixes. Firstly, one might think this 
problem somehow results from formulating the argument in terms of categorical 
properties as opposed to intrinsic properties. While defending that dispositions need 
categorical grounds is very difficult, perhaps it is easier to defend the following:  
2**) Denial of ontological structuralism: All physical structure must be 
instantiated by (individuals with) intrinsic properties. 
The idea here is that categorical and intrinsic are not after all interchangeable terms – 
there are intrinsic properties which are not categorical, and while dispositional properties 
might not need categorical grounds, they will still need intrinsic grounds or properties to 
accompany them. However, insofar as premise 2** is now taken to rule out 
dispositionalism and dispositional essentialism, it would no longer be defensible by 
appeal to the arguments against ontic structural realism alone, given that dispositionalist 
structure is not uninstantiated or purely abstract or spatiotemporal. Therefore, additional 
substantive argument would still be needed, and it would not be a quick fix after all. 
Furthermore, even if additional arguments for premise 2** could somehow be easily 
found, another problem is that it would arguably not rule out dispositionalism and 
dispositional essentialism anyway. As Molnar maintains (2003: ch. 6), irreducible 
dispositions can plausibly be regarded as intrinsic properties. This is because of the way 
in which powers can exist unmanifested. An electron might have charge even if it 
happened to never encounter another particle with charge, and its charge would therefore 
never manifest as attraction or repulsion. The directedness or tendency toward 
repulsion/attraction can exist independently of anything outside of it actually existing, 
and existing independently of other things is the criterion of being intrinsic. In other 
                                                 
34
 The admission of categorical properties in virtue of which things are spatiotemporally located would only 
be of help to panpsychists if coupled with a relationalist view of space or space-time, where all the non-
spatiotemporal properties of things ground its location (as was Leibniz’s view). This is not how 
dispositional essentialists think of location properties, however.  
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words, while the manifesting of a disposition is perhaps not intrinsic, because it is 
dependent on circumstances outside of it, the disposition itself is intrinsic.  
The second potential quick fix is to claim that not only are dispositions intrinsic, they 
are in fact also categorical. John Heil and C. B. Martin (1999) and Strawson (2008a) 
defend the view that the dispositional and the categorical are really identical, or that all 
properties are fundamentally and necessarily both. The distinction between the categorical 
and the dispositional is to be regarded merely as a distinction between two aspects or 
ways of looking at one and the same property. If so, dispositionalism will entail premise 2 
and not refute it.  
However, if the identity view is correct, while it may save premise 2, it clearly does 
not save the argument. On the basis of the identity view, the challenge from pure powers 
can be reframed as an equally strong challenge to premise 3 instead. On the condition that 
we have a primitive grasp of dispositional properties – if we can understand them 
completely in terms of, say, a non-mental energetic quality – then there would be another, 
non-mental, categorical property that we know or can positively conceive of.  
I conclude that panpsychists, in order to defend the argument from categorical 
properties, must find a substantive and convincing argument against dispositionalism, 
dispositional essentialism, and the identity view, or, more precisely, against those 
versions of the identity view that would allow us to conceive of the categorical via the 
primitively dispositional and not via the mental. Otherwise, there would be a set of views 
by appeal to which one could easily refute its premises.  
4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS: CAUSAL SOLUTIONS TO THE 
PROBLEMS 
In the following chapters, I will give arguments that show how both the combination 
problem and the challenge from irreducible dispositionality can be avoided in ways that 
start from considering the nature of causation. I will begin with the argument that is 
relevant to the latter challenge.  
In chapter 2, I will present a third argument for panpsychism, an argument from our 
acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency. I will go through the history of this 
kind of argument, a history which includes Hume, Leibniz, Schopenhauer, James, Russell 
and many others. Some of these philosophers have put the argument forth in defense of 
panpsychism, others as an alleged reductio of the premises.  
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In chapter 3, I will consider the argument from causation systematically. I will show 
that there is an argument of this type that can be put in a valid form, the same general 
form as the argument from categorical properties. The two arguments also share many 
premises. The most significant difference is that whereas the first argument asserts that 
the only categorical properties we know are mental properties, the second argument 
asserts that the only dispositional properties we know are mental properties. If this were 
true, it would pre-empt the challenge to the argument from categorical properties from 
irreducible dispositionality. Prima facie, though, the premise sounds very implausible. 
Based on considerations highlighted by historical proponents of the argument from 
causation, as well as some recent work on phenomenology of agency, I will argue that, 
contrary to initial appearances, there is actually good reason to accept it.  
In chapter 4, I will present a number of objections to the argument from causation – 
some empirical and some more purely philosophical – along with replies to them. One 
objection will have to do with how the argument makes presuppositions that seem to 
intensify certain aspects of the combination problem. Another objection will be that the 
metaphysics of causation that follows from the argument leaves open some difficult 
questions, questions which are also relevant to the combination problem. They must 
therefore be answered after I have presented my account of mental combination in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
In chapter 5, I will argue that understanding combination as a causal process enables 
a solution to the intelligibility aspect of the combination problem. It allows us to escape 
the dilemma between fully intelligible but seemingly unattainable constitutive grounding 
and wholly unintelligible brute emergence. I will begin by suggesting that although 
causation is a relation that is less intelligible than constitution, it is also more intelligible 
than brute emergence. Then I will propose an account of how causation is partially 
intelligible in spite of there being in principle not closable epistemic gaps between causes 
and effects. I will show how a notion of partially intelligible causation along these lines 
seems presupposed by the argument from non-emergence given by Strawson, as well as 
by many arguments across the philosophy of mind. It also fits well with science. Then I 
show how combination can be construed as causal process of the partially intelligible 
kind.  
In chapter 6, I will argue that understanding combination as a causal process enables 
a solution to the empirical aspect of the combination problem. It allows us to eliminate 
structural mismatch and to integrate combined macromentality in the causal structure of 
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the world as science reveals it. I will show that construing combination as a causal 
process does not entail epiphenomenalism, because the kind of causal process 
combination will have to be is the kind of process that yields a fusion where the whole 
supplants its base. I will explain how this does not create a fatal structural mismatch 
between the mental and the physical even if we assume that the microphysical is causally 
closed; that is, even if there are no signs of fusions from the point of view of the physical 
sciences. I will also argue that there is more evidence for physical causal closure than 
there is for microphysical causal closure, and show how mental combinations construed 
as fusions would be the perfect structural match for the kinds of emergent behavior that 
could be most likely found in biological organisms, assuming microphysical causal 
closure is false. 
In chapter 7, I will discuss how the two arguments and their conclusions relate to 
each other. The two arguments do not depend on each other – one could accept either one 
without the other – but I will show that the notions of intelligibility in causation they 
appeal to are fully compatible and to a large extent complementary. 
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2 
The History of the Argument from Causation 
 
As we have seen, panpsychism is today mainly defended by appeal to the Hegelian 
(against physicalism and dualism) and anti-mysterian (against non-panpsychist Russellian 
monism) arguments from philosophy of mind and the argument from categorical 
properties from philosophy of science and metaphysics. These arguments, the Hegelian 
argument in particular, can subsume many sub-arguments for panpsychism that have 
sometimes been presented as distinct arguments in the literature, such as arguments from 
the uniformity of nature and from the continuity of evolution. Other arguments have 
appeared that are not so subsumable; however, these may often seem incompatible with 
the naturalistic commitments of two main arguments, e.g., by starting from theological 
considerations. However, there is (at least) one additional argument for panpsychism that 
has appeared in the history of philosophy and that is neither clearly incompatible with, 
nor subsumable under or readily assimilated to any of these two arguments. This is an 
argument from our acquaintance with the nature of causation in our own agency, which I 
will refer to as the argument from causation for short.  
The argument starts from the notion of causation which was the target of Hume’s 
well-known criticism, the notion that involves natural necessity or power. Some, like 
Hume, regard these terms as nearly synonymous;
1
 others find that it is important to 
separate them. Unless otherwise specified or implied, I will use the term causation so as 
to include both natural necessity and powers. Natural necessity or powers are part, or 
form the ground, of the kind of connection between cause and effect which according to 
Hume cannot be conceived of with the help of reason alone, and for which no adequate 
corresponding impression can be found. On the basis of this failure, Hume argues that we 
should replace the ordinary notion of causation with a notion of constant conjunction, an 
analysis in terms of regularities and similarity relations.  
                                                 
1
 “[…] the terms of EFFICACY, AGENCY, POWER, FORCE, ENERGY, NECESSITY, CONNEXION, 
and PRODUCTIVE QUALITY, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore it is an absurdity to employ any 
of them in defining the rest” (Hume 1739–40/1995: para. 4/36 p. 157). 
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According to the argument from causation, Hume is mistaken in this conclusion. The 
most significant premise of the argument is that causation can in fact be directly 
experienced in situations involving our own agency – and furthermore, that these 
experiences reveal causation as mental in character. From this, it is inferred that all 
causation must be of the same mental kind, the result of which is panpsychism.  
Today, such an argument would probably strike most philosophers as highly 
implausible. But this has not always been so. In this chapter, I will give a historical 
overview – restricted to the early modern times and thereafter – of philosophers who have 
considered the argument from causation and regarded it as valid. This history will include 
not only panpsychists who have also regarded the argument as sound, and therefore put it 
forth in order to promote the conclusion. As I will show, it has frequently been presented 
also in its modus tollens version, as a purported reductio of some of the premises. This 
will make clear that the argument has been of some importance not only for panpsychism 
but also for reductionism in the metaphysics of causation. It seems that from the very 
beginning, reductionism about causation was motivated not only by empiricist principles, 
but also by worries that the ordinary concept of causation was intrinsically 
“anthropomorphic”. I will also consider the relevance of the argument for contemporary 
debates – about causation, action and, of course, panpsychism. 
I will not directly discuss the plausibility of the argument in this chapter. In the next 
chapter, however, I will give a version of the argument based on the more plausible 
features of different versions of the argument that will be seen in this chapter and argue 
that it is actually sound. I will also compare it to the argument from categorical properties 
and see how it affects the challenge from irreducible dispositionality.  
The philosophers who have presented a version of the argument and inferred the truth 
of panpsychism include G. W. Leibniz, Arthur Schopenhauer, William James, James 
Ward, Ferdinand Schiller, George Frederick Stout and Charles Hartshorne. Those who 
regarded some version of the inference valid, but as a reductio, include Bertrand Russell, 
R. G. Collingwood, Ernst Mach, Karl Pearson, Leonhard Euler, Thomas Reid and David 
Hume himself. Additionally, the reductio has reappeared in recent literature on causal 
powers and dispositions.  
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1 LEIBNIZ 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) may be the first philosopher in the early modern 
times to have presented the argument from causation.
2
 There is some debate about 
whether Leibniz was in fact a panpsychist; if this is not his view, then his argument from 
causation would not be the type I am looking for. However, Leibniz clearly and 
repeatedly states that all substances are analogous to minds, and that the difference 
between minds and lower monads is only a difference in degree. He has also given 
versions of both the main arguments for panpsychism discussed so far, and it is 
reasonable to think that he did not regard these arguments as entailing a wholly different 
view. I will present his versions of these arguments, before presenting his version of the 
argument from causation. 
Firstly, Leibniz gives the same kind of arguments against physicalism as discussed 
above. The famous thought experiment of the mill demonstrates an explanatory gap 
between the mental and the physical: 
Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are 
inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And 
supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it 
might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one 
might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find 
only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a 
perception. (Leibniz 1714/1925: §17)  
Furthermore, in the following passage he can be taken to argue that mentality must be 
fundamental because its emergence from the non-mental is impossible:  
[…] every multitude presupposes true unities […] there must be force and perception in 
these very unities, since without that there would be no force or perception in all that 
which is made of them, which can only contain repetitions and relations of that which is 
already in these unities. And thus in bodies which have sensation there must be unique 
substances, or unities which have perception. (Leibniz, Letter to Princess Sophia, June 
12th 1700, translated in Garber 2009: 342) 
Additionally, Leibniz argues against Cartesian dualism on the basis of a conservation 
principle, which he seemingly takes to entail physical causal closure: 
                                                 
2
 Francis Bacon was perhaps ahead of him (as remarked by Hartshorne in a passage cited in section 7 
below), but he states it without much discussion and very ambiguously.  
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Descartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to bodies, because there is always 
the same quantity of force in matter. Nevertheless he was of opinion that the soul could 
change the direction of bodies. But that is because in his time it was not known that there 
is a law of nature which affirms also the conservation of the same total direction in 
matter. Had Descartes noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-
established harmony. (Leibniz 1714/1925: §80) 
These are the main elements of the Hegelian argument for panpsychism. His pre-
established harmony, or parallelism of the mental and the physical, has many similarities 
with Russellian pure panpsychism.  
When it comes to the argument from categorical properties, Leibniz was a pioneer. 
He was one of the first proponents of a relational view of the physical. Blackburn (see 
chapter 1, p. 29) mentions Leibniz’s reduction of what for Descartes was the fundamental 
categorical property of the physical, extension, to the dispositional property of resistance. 
Seager mentions (see chapter 1, p. 27) how Leibniz furthermore regarded all extrinsic 
properties as reducible to intrinsic properties of substances. Leibniz thinks minds are the 
kind of things to which all relations can reduce. Via his principle of the uniformity of 
nature, “things are everywhere and always just as they are in us now” (1704/1997: 205–
206), we can infer that the nature of substances in general is mindlike – we can 
extrapolate from the substance that is our own self to all substances. 
A third argument for panpsychism, the argument from causation, also appears in 
Leibniz’s writings:  
The clearest idea of active power comes to us from the mind. So active power occurs only 
in things which are analogous to minds, that is, in entelechies; for strictly matter exhibits 
only passive power. (Leibniz 1704/1981: 171) 
I found then that [the nature of substances] consists in force, and that from this there 
follows something analogous to sensation and appetite, so that we must conceive them on 
the model of the notion we have of souls. (Leibniz 1695/1989a: 139)  
Leibniz’s view seems to be that we are immediately and infallibly acquainted with the 
nature of causation, which he regards as involving active power
3
 and force, in willing, 
acting and thinking. This is made clear in this passage where he argues against 
occasionalism that our causal powers are undeniable: 
                                                 
3
 Active power is opposed to passive power. The former is the power to affect and the latter is the power to 
be affected.  
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Certainly if this doctrine [occasionalism] is pushed to the point of suppressing even the 
immanent actions of substances […], then nothing in the world appears to be more 
contrary to reason. In truth, who will question that the mind thinks and wills, and that 
many thoughts and volitions in us are elicited from ourselves, and that we are endowed 
with spontaneity? This would be not only to deny human liberty and to make God the 
cause of evil, but also to contradict the testimony of our inmost experience and of our 
conscience; through which we feel that those things are ours, which, without any kind of 
reason, our adversaries would transfer to God. (Leibniz 1698/1908: 126) 
Causation, the principle of action, can be shown to be not only real but also intelligible on 
the basis of inner experience: “[…] this principle of action is most intelligible, since in it 
there is something analogous to what there is in us, namely perception and appetite” 
(1699–1706/1989: 180).  
For Leibniz, activity is not something we perceive with an introspective sense which 
is analogous to the outer senses. Rather, we grasp it with what he calls the understanding:
4
  
But this indwelling force may indeed be conceived distinctly but not explained by images; 
nor, certainly, ought it to be so explained any more than the nature of the soul, for force is 
one of those things which are not to be grasped by the imagination but by the 
understanding. (Leibniz 1698/1908: 123) 
He writes to his correspondent De Volder, who complains that he cannot perceive 
primary forces (another Leibnizian causal notion): “do you wish to imagine things that 
can only be understood, to see sounds and hear colors?” (1699–1706/1989: 180) 
Leibniz can here be interpreted as claiming that we are directly acquainted with our 
own activity, as opposed to indirectly, as we are with perceptual objects that are revealed 
via “images”. He links awareness of causation with the intimate awareness he thinks we 
have of the soul or the self – they seem to come down to the same thing: “And so, to your 
first question, what is the active principle, I answer in the same way as I would to the 
question as to what the soul is” (1699–1706/1989: 176, footnote 232). 
Why does Leibniz think that everything has causal powers – a premise which is also 
needed to make the inference? Leibniz is firmly convinced that activity, in the irreducible 
sense, is the essence of being or substance. He claims that “to act is the mark of 
                                                 
4
 I am not attributing to Leibniz a fundamental distinction (as opposed to a gradual distinction) between 
perception and understanding. Kant famously claims Leibniz’s lack of such a distinction between sensibility 
and understanding was one of Leibniz’s great philosophical mistakes.  
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substances” (1695/1989b: 118) and that “what does not act does not exist” (1691/1965: 
470). 
Why does he infer panpsychism instead of that substances in general possess some 
non-mental kind of causal powers? Leibniz was committed to principles of the uniformity 
as well as the continuity of nature: “Nothing takes place suddenly, and it is one of my 
great and best confirmed maxims that nature never makes leaps” (1704/1981: 56). Since 
he was convinced that the active powers of the mind were real, and seemed to think that 
non-mental powers would be discontinuous with and distinct from the mental, these 
principles stop him from positing non-mental powers. 
He also appealed to considerations of parsimony – why appeal to new properties 
when there are old ones that can do the job? 
We impose other things [than perceivers and perceptions, as well as the existence of those 
things which must be admitted in them] on nature and we then struggle with the chimeras 
of our mind, as with ghosts. (Leibniz 1699–1706/1989: 184, footnote 239) 
Indeed, everywhere and throughout everything, I place nothing but what we all 
acknowledge in our souls on many occasions, namely, internal and spontaneous changes. 
And so, with one stroke of mind, I draw out the entirety of things. (Leibniz 1699–
1706/1989: 181) 
Leibniz is well known for his view that monads have no windows, which is to say that 
they cannot be influenced by other monads. He holds that all interaction between monads 
is really a matter of divine pre-established harmony and not real causation. However, it is 
only transeunt or inter-substantial causation, causation between distinct monads, which 
Leibniz denies. Immanent or intra-substantial causation, the way in which one state of 
same the monad causes the next, is essential to his system, and this is the kind of activity 
that is referenced in the quotes given above.  
2 SCHOPENHAUER 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) held a dual-aspect panpsychist view, according to 
which from one side, the world appears as representation (Vorstellung) and from the other 
as will (Wille). It is via representations that we know external objects, but representations 
only reveal their relational properties. The intrinsic nature of all objects is will. We are 
only acquainted with this aspect of one object, namely our own bodies, but we can infer 
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from this one object to the rest of the world and conclude that will is its inner nature 
throughout.  
Schopenhauer links his distinction between representation and will to the Kantian 
distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. As mentioned in chapter 1 (p. 
30), Langton maps the same distinction onto the distinction between relational and 
intrinsic properties. Schopenhauer thinks Kant was right in separating appearances from 
things-in-themselves, but wrong in saying that the latter are unknowable. According to 
Schopenhauer, we can know the thing-in-itself precisely because we are it:  
[…] we are not merely the knowing subject, but […] we ourselves are also among those 
realities or entities we require to know. […] we ourselves are the thing-in-itself. 
Consequently, a way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to 
which we cannot penetrate from without. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a 
secret alliance, which as if by treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not 
be taken by attack from without. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966b: 195) 
Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that we can, in a sense, not know the will, the thing-in-
itself, insofar as knowing something requires representing it. But while the will cannot be 
represented, it is still known in a deeper sense, directly and immediately.
5
 
Schopenhauer repeatedly states that the will, the thing-in-itself, is not necessarily 
conscious. This might make it seem as though he is at best a panprotopsychist and not a 
panpsychist. However, he uses the term consciousness (Bewusstseyn) not as we would use 
phenomenal consciousness, but rather to denote a mode of knowledge. This is made clear 
at the same time as he denies that Will must be conscious: “This will is not essentially 
united with consciousness, but is related to consciousness, in other words to knowledge, 
as substance to accident” (Schopenhauer 1859/1966b: 199, my emphasis). 
Schopenhauer’s argument for his view has much in common with the argument from 
categorical properties. However, he thinks an intrinsic yet dispositional (i.e., causal, 
                                                 
5
 In Volume 2 of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer concedes to Kant that while the will 
brings us closer to the thing-in-itself, it does not bring us into direct contact: “[…] in this inner knowledge 
the thing-in-itself has indeed to a great extent cast off its veils, but still does not appear quite naked. In 
consequence of the form of time which still adheres to it, everyone knows his will only in its successive 
individual acts, not as a whole, in and by itself. Hence no one knows his character a priori, but he becomes 
acquainted with it only by way of experience and always imperfectly. Yet the apprehension in which we 
know the stirrings and acts of our own will is far more immediate than is any other. […] the act of will is 
indeed only the nearest and clearest phenomenon of the thing-in-itself […]” (Schopenhauer 1859/1966b: 
197). 
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dynamic) property is what must ground physical structure. Let us see how the argument 
proceeds.  
Schopenhauer would agree with Russell that physics leaves a gap: science, or “pure 
mathematics, pure natural science and logic”, “show us nothing more than mere 
connexions, relations, of one representation to another, form without any content” 
(Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 121). 
Therefore, although all mathematics gives us exhaustive knowledge of that which in 
phenomena is quantity, position, number, in short, spatial and temporal relation; although 
etiology tells us completely about the regular conditions under which phenomena, with all 
their determinations, appear in time and space, yet, in spite of all this, teaches us nothing 
more than why in each case every definite phenomenon must appear just at this time here 
and just at this place now, we can never with their assistance penetrate into the inner 
nature of things. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 121) 
He furthermore asserts that inner natures, things-in-themselves, are necessary:  
Now if the objects appearing in these forms are not to be empty phantoms, but are to have 
a meaning, they must point to something, must be the expression of something, which is 
not, like themselves, object, representation, something existing merely relatively, namely 
for a subject. On the contrary, they must point to something that exists without such 
dependence on something that stands over against it as its essential condition, and on its 
forms, in other words, must point to something that is not a representation, but a thing-in-
itself. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 119). 
Crude materialism is Schopenhauer’s term for a view which denies any reality beyond 
what science reveals, and is in many respects analogous to ontic structural realism. Crude 
materialism, he claims, entails that: 
[…] all content of the phenomenon would have vanished, and mere form would remain. 
[…] finally mere phantom, representation and form of the representation through and 
through; one could not ask for a thing-in-itself. […] But this will not do; phantasies, 
sophistications, castles in the air, have been brought into being in this way, but not 
science. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 123)  
In fact, Schopenhauer goes on to claim, science presupposes the notion of force as always 
underlying phenomena and grounding the laws that relate them:  
[…] we do not ask why 2 + 2 = 4, or why the equality of the angles in a triangle 
determines the equality of the sides, or why any given cause is followed by its effect, or 
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why the truth of a conclusion is evident from the truth of the premisses. Every explanation 
not leading back to such a relation of which no Why can further be demanded, stops at an 
accepted qualitas occulta; but this is also the character of every original force of nature. 
Every explanation of natural science must ultimately stop at such a qualitas occulta, and 
thus at something wholly obscure. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 80)  
The nature of forces, that which answers the question as to “why any given cause is 
followed by its effect” remains occult: 
Mechanics, physics, chemistry teach the rules and laws by which the forces of [nature …] 
operate, in other words, the law, the rule, observed by these forces […]. But whatever we 
may do, the forces themselves remain qualitates occultae. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 
122) 
Men tacitly resigned themselves to starting from mere qualitates occultae, whose 
elucidation was entirely given up, for the intention was to build upon them, not to 
undermine them. Such a thing, as we have said, cannot succeed; but apart from this, such 
a structure would always stand in the air. What is the use of explanations that ultimately 
lead back to something just as unknown as the first problem was? (Schopenhauer 
1859/1966a: 125) 
Schopenhauer argues that the nature of force is not unknown and occult – we know it as 
will: 
For the purely knowing subject as such, this body is a representation like any other, an 
object among objects. Its movements and actions are so far known to him in just the same 
way as the changes of all other objects of perception; and they would be equally strange 
and incomprehensible to him, if their meaning were not unravelled for him in an entirely 
different way. Otherwise, he would see his conduct follow on presented motives with the 
constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes of other objects follow upon causes, 
stimuli, and motives. But he would be no nearer to understanding the influence of the 
motives than he is to understanding the connexion with its cause of any other effect that 
appears before him. He would then also call the inner, to him incomprehensible, nature of 
those manifestations and actions of his body a force, a quality, or a character, just as he 
pleased, but he would have no further insight into it. All this, however, is not the case; on 
the contrary, the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge appearing as 
individual, and this answer is given in the word Will. This and this alone gives him the 
key to his own phenomenon, reveals to him the significance and shows him the inner 
mechanism of his being, his actions, his movements. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 99–100)  
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Representation only shows us that effects follow causes, what Hume would call constant 
conjunction, but leaves us in the dark as to why. When it comes to the connection between 
our motives and our actions, we have insight into why, or into the nature of the forces that 
underlie the connection. The Will is the “inner mechanism” of our bodily causation. He 
infers that there is will wherever there is force: 
[The Will] appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate 
conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the 
manifestation, not the inner nature of what is manifested. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 
110) 
Force is to be understood in terms of will, and not vice versa:  
 […] if we refer the concept of force to that of will, we have in fact referred something 
more unknown to something infinitely better known, indeed to the one thing really known 
to us immediately and completely; and we have very greatly extended our knowledge. If, 
on the other hand, we subsume the concept of will under that of force, as has been done 
hitherto, we renounce the only immediate knowledge of the inner nature of the world that 
we have, since we let it disappear in a concept abstracted from the phenomenon, with 
which therefore we can never pass beyond the phenomenon. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 
111–112) 
All causation must accordingly be understood as being driven by inner motivation: 
Only from a comparison with what goes on within me when my body performs an action 
from a motive that moves me, with what is the inner nature of my own changes 
determined by external grounds or reasons, can I obtain an insight into the way in which 
those inanimate bodies change under the influence of causes, and thus understand what is 
their inner nature. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 125)  
[…] from the law of motivation I must learn to understand the law of causality in its inner 
significance. 
Spinoza (Epist. 62) says that if a stone projected through the air had consciousness, it 
would imagine it was flying of its own will. I add merely that the stone would be right. 
(Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 126) 
Importantly, Schopenhauer claims that it is in inner motivation we find causal 
connectedness revealed to us, as opposed to between intentions and physical actions. The 
will is not related causally to its physical manifestation: “there is actually no causal 
connexion between the act of will and the action of the body, for they are directly 
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identical” (Schopenhauer 1859/1966b: 248). A physical action is a representation and will 
and representation are two aspects of the same reality. The body is the way in which the 
will makes itself visible, according to Schopenhauer. This can be regarded as a form of 
Russellian dependency. 
As we saw, Schopenhauer rejected reductionism about causation, the elimination of 
what he calls force, on the basis that science presupposes force, and that abandoning this 
presupposition would leave the world as an “empty phantom” or “mere form”. The latter 
part of this corresponds well with the Pythagorean reductio of ontic structural realism. 
Positing unknown properties, so-called occult qualities, would still leave physical 
structure “hanging in the air”. But are there other non-mental but still not wholly 
unknown alternatives? Schopenhauer states that alternatives are inconceivable, and in 
particular, alternatives that would give the world of representations the same degree of 
reality as the will would give them: 
For what other kind of existence or reality could we attribute to the rest of the material 
world? From what source could we take the elements out of which we construct such a 
world? Besides the will and the representation, there is absolutely nothing known or 
conceivable for us. If we wish to attribute the greatest known reality to the material world, 
which immediately exists only in our representation, then we give it that reality which our 
own body has for each of us, for to each of us this is the most real of things. 
(Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 105) 
3 JAMES 
William James (1842–1910) was committed to panpsychism throughout large parts of his 
life (see chapter 1, p. 25, footnote 23). His panpsychism seems to some extent motivated 
from an argument from continuity, which prohibits the diachronic, evolutionary 
emergence of consciousness from fundamentally non-mental matter (which I discuss in 
chapter 5, section 3.5). He also considers something akin to the argument from 
categorical properties: “Our only intelligible notion of an object in itself is that it should 
be an object for itself, and this lands us in panpsychism” (James quoted in Perry 1935: 
446). Furthermore, he thinks panpsychism follows from his methodological stance, which 
he calls radical empiricism: 
If empiricism is to be radical it must indeed admit the concrete data of experience in their 
full completeness. The only fully complete data are, however, the successive moments of 
our own several histories, taken with their “objective” deliverance or “content.” After the 
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analogy of these moments of experiences must all complete reality be conceived. (James 
quoted in Ford 1981: 163) 
Finally, he gives a version of the argument from causation:  
[…] The concrete perceptual flux, taken just as it comes, offers in our own activity-
situations perfectly comprehensible instances of causal agency. […] If we took these 
experiences as the type of what actual causation is, we should have to ascribe to cases of 
causation outside of our life, to physical cases also, an inwardly experiential nature. In 
other words, we should have to espouse a so-called ‘pan-psychic’ philosophy. (James 
1911: 218)  
Here, in the introductory textbook Some Problems of Philosophy, he endorses the validity 
of the inference, but only hypothetically entertains the premise that our experience of 
causation is veridical and not illusory. However, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, 
he explicitly affirms the premise, and adds that this is our only experience of causation: 
[…] the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in 
the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events 
happen, and how work is actually done. (James 1902/1987: 448–449) 
He then continues:  
Hume’s criticism has banished causation from the world of physical objects, and 
“Science” is absolutely satisfied to define cause in terms of concomitant change. […] The 
‘original’ of the notion of causation is in our inner personal experience, and only there can 
causes in the old-fashioned sense be directly observed and described. (James 1902/1987: 
449, footnote 1) 
Unlike Hume, James does not take the “old-fashioned” notion of causation to be confused 
and inadequate.  
James considers the premise again as part of a lecture on pragmatism and religion: 
Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem to ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are 
the parts of the world to which we are closest, the parts of what our knowledge is the most 
intimate and complete. Why should we not take them at their face-value: Why may they 
not be the actual turning-places and growing-places which they seem to be, of the world – 
why not the workshop of being, where we catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may 
the world grow in any other kind of way than this? (James 1907/1975: 138) 
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His most extensive treatment of the argument is found in “The Experience of Activity” in 
Essays in Radical Empiricism. He starts out with a statement of radical empiricism:  
Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced 
must somewhere be real. […] By the principle of pure experience, either the word 
‘activity’ must have no meaning at all, or else the original type and model of what it 
means must lie in some concrete kind of experience that can be definitely pointed out. 
(James 1912b: 160) 
He points to our own experiences of activity, and claims that: 
If we suppose activities to go on outside of our experience, it is in forms like these that we 
must suppose them, or else give them some other name; for the word “activity” has no 
imaginable content whatever save these experiences of process, obstruction, striving, 
strain, or release, ultimate qualia as they are of the life given us to be known. (James 
1912b: 167) 
No matter what activities there may really be in this extraordinary universe of ours, it is 
impossible for us to conceive of any one of them being either lived through or 
authentically known otherwise than in this dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt 
purpose against felt obstacles and overcoming or being overcome. What ‘sustaining’ 
means here is clear to anyone who has lived through the experience, but to no one else; 
just as ‘loud,’ ‘red,’ ‘sweet,’ mean something only to beings with ears, eyes, and tongues. 
The percipi in these originals of experience is the esse; the curtain is the picture. If there 
is anything hiding in the background, it ought not to be called activity, but should get 
itself another name. (James 1912b: 167–168) 
James’ argument can be seen to be based on a pragmatically motivated form of meaning 
empiricism.  
He goes on to present an objection on behalf of someone who is not satisfied with 
activity being identical with the appearance of it, but rather demands that there be an 
“activity an sich” behind the appearances. The objector wonders whether “our feeling 
[does] more than record the fact that the strain is sustained? The real activity, meanwhile, 
is the doing of the fact; and what is the doing made of before the record is made” (1912b: 
171). James’ answer is the following: 
Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally 
achieving our intention – this is action, this is effectuation in the only shape in which, by 
a pure experience-philosophy, the whereabouts of it anywhere can be discussed. Here is 
creation in its first intention, here is causality at work.
[footnote omitted]
 To treat this offhand as 
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the bare illusory surface of a world whose real causality is an unimaginable ontological 
principle hidden in the cubic deeps, is, for the more empirical way of thinking, only 
animism in another shape. You explain your given fact by your ‘principle,’ but the 
principle itself, when you look clearly at it, turns out to be nothing but a previous little 
spiritual copy of the fact. Away from that one and only kind of fact your mind, 
considering causality, can never get.
[footnote omitted] 
(James 1912b: 183–184)  
Note that James, unlike other philosophers I will later discuss, uses the term animism as 
something that stands opposed to panpsychism. He might have put “spiritualism” instead, 
as he appears to intend to refer to something which has similarities with the mind, but is 
somehow more transcendental or outside the world of appearances. Now, James’ answer 
to the imagined objection seems to be that any notion of activity or causation as it really 
and transcendentally is in itself, behind the appearances, can only be conceived of on the 
model of the appearance, and therefore does not actually bring us away from the 
appearances and into the transcendental after all. This is in line with the meaning 
empiricism expounded earlier. He concludes on a pragmatist note, by noting that what we 
should really be interested in are concrete and individual causes:  
I conclude, then, that real effectual causation as an ultimate nature, as a ‘category,’ if you 
like, of reality, is just what we feel it to be, just that kind of conjunction which our own 
activity-series reveal. We have the whole butt and being of it in our hands; and the 
healthy thing for philosophy is to leave off grubbing underground for what effects 
effectuation, or what makes action act, and to try to solve the concrete questions of where 
effectuation in this world is located, of which things are the true causal agents there, and 
of what the more remote effects consist. (James 1912b: 185–186) 
In Some Problems of Philosophy, he also notes the distinction between these two kinds of 
knowledge of causation: “Even so our will-acts may reveal the nature of causation, but 
just where the facts of causation are located may be a further problem.” (1911: 216) 
Although panpsychism seems clearly implied throughout “The Experience of Activity”, it 
is not mentioned explicitly until the end that these questions lead into the “region of 
panpsychic and ontologic speculation” (1912b: 189). 
4 WARD 
James Ward (1843–1925) was a contemporary of James, and like him a psychologist and 
philosopher. He criticized both the dominant metaphysical theories of his day, 
materialism on the one hand and absolute idealism on the other, and argued that a form of 
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panpsychism was a better alternative. Among his arguments for panpsychism, we find a 
version of the argument from causation: 
If pleasures and pains can be sufficient reasons, they too must be reckoned among the 
causes that animate nature, or at least among the causes that determine events. […] 
motives remain as a class of causes not yet admitting of mathematical treatment, still less 
mechanical interpretation. De gustibus non est disputandum here passes from a mere 
maxim almost into a metaphysical principle. In other words, wherever there is feeling 
there is something unique. Now, either this uniqueness appears in the physical world or it 
does not. The admission that it does will make it very difficult to stop short of regarding 
all the beings that compose the world – so far as ‘being’ implies any sort of unity or 
individuality – as feeling-agents, monads or entelechies. (Ward 1915: 172–173) 
It is worth noting how Ward focuses on the efficacy of pain and pleasure, as opposed to 
will and effort. The argument is stated somewhat vaguely and hesitantly, and Ward does 
not give much more of an elaboration of it. It could perhaps be put more clearly and 
directly as follows: Pain and pleasure appear to be sufficient reasons for our actions. If 
they are in fact sufficient reasons, they must be causes. If they are physical causes, then 
all physical causes should be regarded as being capable of feeling, or of experiencing 
sufficient reasons like pains and pleasure for themselves – presumably on the basis of a 
principle of uniformity within the physical. 
5 STOUT 
George Frederick Stout (1860–1944) was another contemporary of James, and a teacher 
of Russell. He too was a psychologist as well as a philosopher. He argued for a 
panpsychist position he called animism, motivated to a large extent by a version of the 
argument from causation.  
Stout affirms the following theses about the origin of our concept of causation: 
(1) There is nothing in the immediate content of sense-experience from which the notion 
of activity and its contrasted correlate, passivity, could be derived. (2) Their source is to 
be found in what we experience in our own doing and enduring. (Stout 1931: 15–16)  
Here he emphasizes, like Leibniz and Schopenhauer, how causation does not appear in 
sense-experience, but that experience of causation constitutes its own category. He 
proceeds to explain how the causation in our own agency relates to causation outside of it: 
73 
 
It is only our own action which we actually experience; but, in being aware of our own 
agency we cannot help being at the same time aware, or seeming to be aware, of another 
agency correlated with and opposed to ours within the same total situation. If this were 
not so, the words ‘effort’, ‘resistance’, ‘pulling’, ‘pushing’, etc., would lose an essential 
part of their significance. (Stout 1931: 17) 
In a third class of instances, neither effort not counter-effort are initiated by ourselves. 
When we perceive a chip swept along by a current, or a bent spring, what is presented as a 
sensible appearance includes relative position and change of position but nothing which 
could give to such words as ‘force’, ‘stress’, ‘strain’, ‘power’, ‘energy’, or to such phrases 
as ‘swept away by the current’, the significance which they bear in ordinary language. It 
is we who supply this significance by reading into the merely sensible phenomena some 
analogue of what we ourselves experience in active movement and in making efforts 
against resistance. (Stout 1931: 17) 
On this basis, he claims that an animistic view is embedded in the common sense of “the 
plain man” and that this is not an “anthropomorphic fallacy” (1931: 33). He claims that: 
We are not warranted in rejecting the animistic position either on the ground that it is 
obviously absurd, or that it is in principle irreconcilable with the general position of 
science, or that in the history of mankind it finds expression in special ways which turn 
out to be untenable. (Stout 1931: 22) 
On what grounds are we warranted in affirming it? Stout points to how Hume by rejecting 
our ordinary notion of causation – which includes what Stout calls “active tendency” – 
and replacing it by an analysis in terms of constant conjunction, as well as an explanation 
in terms of mere habitual expectation, came upon the problem of induction. Stout argues 
that only via animism can we restore the rationality of causal inference: 
If we reject this conception of active and actual tendency, causal inference is not logically 
inference at all. We have to give up logic for a very dubious psychology. All that we are 
justified in asserting is that in past instances we have found customary conjunction to be 
followed by expectation. (Stout et al. 1935: 52) 
I hold then that active tendency is required to fill a logical gap which would otherwise 
destroy the validity of causal inference. If we have a notion of active tendency that can fill 
this gap, we are justified in using it. But have we? If so, what is its nature and whence do 
we derive it? I answer that its source and the key to its nature is to be found and can only 
be found in the experience we have when and so far as we feel ourselves active. We all 
distinguish between our doing and what happens to us. (Stout et al. 1935: 53) 
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Without [the animistic position] or some substitute for it, there seems no ultimate warrant 
for inference in matter of fact. Hence a heavy onus probandu rests on those how reject it. 
(Stout 1931: 36) 
Stout furthermore considers whether consciousness, by which (unlike Schopenhauer) he 
appears to mean phenomenal consciousness, always accompanies the kinds of 
connections we experience in agency. At first, he concludes that we have reason to posit 
throughout the physical “the operative presence of mind, or at least of an unconscious 
analogue of mind” (1935: 61). However, he expresses doubt about whether unconscious 
mental action is coherent: 
But it is worth considering whether this conception of an unconscious analogue of mind 
and of mental action is tenable at all. To me it seems that it is not. I should say that an 
unexperienced conation is as absurd as an unexperienced pleasure or pain […]. (Stout et 
al. 1935: 64) 
6 SCHILLER 
Ferdinand Schiller (1864–1937) defended panpsychism on pragmatist, or in his preferred 
terms, Humanist grounds: 
We need not shrink from words like ‘hylozoism,’ or (better) ‘panpsychism,’ [...]. For at 
bottom they are merely form of Humanism, – attempts, that is, to make the human and the 
cosmic more akin, and to bring them closer to us, that we may act upon them more 
successfully.  
In the history of panpsychism, Schiller is infamous for a passage which was ridiculed by 
Paul Edwards (1967) in an encyclopaedia entry on panpsychism: 
[…] there is a common phenomenon in chemistry called ‘catalytic action.’ It has seemed 
mysterious and hard to understand that although two bodies, A and B, may have a strong 
affinity for each other, they should yet refuse to combine until a mere trace of an 
‘impurity,’ C, is introduced, and sets up an interaction between A and B, which yet leaves 
C unaltered. But is not this strangely suggestive of the idea that A and B did not know 
each other until they were introduced by C, and then liked each other so well that C was 
left out in the cold? (Schiller 1907: 443) 
Leibniz was always careful to point out that metaphysical explanations in terms of mental 
active power were to be confined to its own metaphysical domain distinct from science. 
We can see that Schiller was not so careful. In other work, however, he argues explicitly 
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for the metaphysical explanatory power of the mental. If we allow ourselves to be 
“anthropomorphic”, he claims, then we have an answer available to Hume’s question 
about the observability of causation. According to Schiller’s analysis, Hume’s objections 
to this proposal (to be discussed below), that the impression to which our ordinary notion 
of causation can be traced back is our experience of agency, are ultimately question-
begging. Hume starts out with epistemic presuppositions that disqualify this proposal 
before it can be even properly considered: 
We [Humanists] start ab intra from the sequences which we most directly experience, 
and, treating them as typical, logically arrive at the conceptions of causal efficacy and 
necessary connexion. We admit, of course, that our method is sheer ‘anthropomorphism’ 
But then we are Humanists, and know it. You [Humeans] on the other hand only cripple 
yourself by trying to ignore the human character of your intelligence, and refusing to 
acknowledge the validity of your immediate experience. You insist on starting ab extra 
from the sequences which you observe in the outer world. You assume, that is, that you 
can know no more about yourself than about anyone else. (Schiller 1906: 104)  
One might note how the distinction between aspects from within and without maps well 
onto Schopenhauer’s distinction between will and representation – according to Schiller, 
Hume arbitrarily privileges external representations over the inner experience of will and 
imposes the loose and separate structure of the former on the latter. Schiller goes into 
further detail about the question-begging nature of Hume’s arguments:  
How can anyone, e.g., confute a polemic which begs the point at issue with the superb 
audacity of Hume’s argument in the Appendix to the Treatise? First he professes a desire 
to find a “perception” on which the causal connexion could be based; then he assumes (1) 
that “if perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected 
together;” (2) that “no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by 
human understanding.” Whence it would clearly follow that, even if we had a 
“perception” of causal connexion, it could not, ex hypothesi, serve as a principle of 
connexion, by the very fact of its being a “perception,” and so doomed to remain a 
distinct and disconnected existence!  
Thus the very attempt to prove the existence of activity to those who insist on taking 
up a point of view from which it cannot be seen, is a mistake. The true retort to their 
attitude is to show that it is arbitrary, and that better alternatives exist. (Schiller 1906: 
108–109) 
Schiller reasons that his panpsychist Humanism would be a much better alternative, given 
that unlike Humeanism (note the extra “e”), it does not result in the “the utter cancellation 
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of […] agency” (1906: 109), and other consequences that would be disastrous from a 
pragmatist point of view. 
7 HARTSHORNE 
Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000) was a process philosopher and a follower of Alfred 
North Whitehead. He developed an extensive and complex philosophy which was both 
panpsychist and panentheist. In this passage, he refers to both the Hegelian argument and 
an argument from the unknown nature of matter in one:  
Psychical monism avoids the most obvious demerits of its two rivals. It is a monism, yet it 
is not a materialism […] We cannot remain mere dualists, for that means giving up the 
hope of universal explanatory principles; and we cannot agree upon the materialistic form 
of monism, not only because it is an attempt to explain away mind, but also because it 
leaves ‘matter’ essentially mysterious. (Hartshorne 1977: ch. 3) 
He also claimed that panpsychism has an advantage with respect to causation: 
Psychicalism [i.e., panpsychism] has the signal advantage, hinted at by Francis Bacon, 
that it can construe causal connectedness of events in terms of generalized concepts of 
memory and perception. Materialism and dualism lack these resources and are in Hume’s 
predicament about causality. Memory and perception are effects whose causes are 
intrinsically given to them. These are our only clues to the intelligible connectedness of 
events. (Hartshorne 1977: ch. 3) 
In the article “Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume”, he gives further details on 
how we can know causation via memory: 
As we shall see, human beings cannot hope ever to find the causal connectedness of the 
world simply transparent at any point. But they can to some extent grasp the principle of 
it, if they are able to overcome the habit of regarding psychical conceptions, such as 
memory, as secondary, merely special cases of something nonpsychical which is more 
fundamental. Is not a real connection of the present with the past, and of effect with 
cause, in one type of instance actually constituted by our human memory? The “errors of 
memory,” which all have encountered, need not be so interpreted that they prevent us 
from recognizing memory as a given connection (for immediate memory is itself 
immediately remembered) of later with earlier experience. This given-retrospective 
relation, which I contend is involved in the very meaning of “succession,” can, with 
certain qualifications, be construed prospectively, so that in terms of it the present can be 
seen both as cause really connected with its effect and as effect really connected with its 
cause. The future is that which will, and even logically must, have retrospective relation 
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to the present we are experiencing, and this prospectively valid retrospective relation, 
adequately generalized and diversified to cover nonhuman and even nonanimal cases, 
furnishes in principle what we need by way of real causal connections. This holds, 
however, only for those who are willing to renounce […] the supposition of merely 
physical causation. Here Hume is right, the notion of mere matter furnishes no clue to 
causal connectedness. (Indeed, as Peirce said, it illuminates no problem whatever.) But in 
discussing psychical causation, Hume neglects memory and even, perhaps, the derivation 
of ideas from “impressions” for which his own doctrine seems to call. (Hartshorne 1954: 
482) 
Why does the relation that is represented in memory have to involve mentality wherever 
it is instantiated? Because the remembering itself, and the subject which remembers, is 
part of instantiating the succession relation:  
[…] to be a conceivable “successor of E” connotes being a conceivable “rememberer of 
E,” at least indirectly via memory of intermediaries one of which itself remembers E. 
(Hartshorne 1954: 490–491) 
Hartshorne mainly focuses, unlike the other philosophers discussed so far, on what it is 
like to be an effect, i.e., successor, rather than what it is like to be a cause. Agency, or 
causing, is not out of the picture, however. Memory of agency gives a clear impression of 
a modal connection:  
Thus, if I have immediate memory of having just made an eager decision to act at once in 
a certain way, I must now either carry out the decision or else counteract it in some way, 
whereas without the decision I could neither yield to it nor resist its influence. 
(Hartshorne 1954: 491) 
It is worth noting how Hartshorne affirms that the connection between cause and effect 
cannot in any sense be discovered either a priori or externally, but only a posteriori and 
internally – as in memory.  
It is not clear throughout Hartshorne’s article, however, at the end he explicitly 
confirms where he sees it as taking us: “The panpsychic theory, to which our argument 
leads, almost inevitably meets with resistance […]” (1954: 496). 
8 HUME 
After having gone through the main proponents of the validity and soundness of the 
various versions of argument from causation, I will now present some philosophers who 
78 
 
have only affirmed its validity – and then proceeded to reject one or more of its premises 
at least partly because they assume the falsity of the panpsychist conclusion.  
David Hume (1711–1776) is often taken not only as a reductionist about the concept 
of causation, but also as an eliminativist about natural necessity and power regarded as 
concrete phenomena. The existence of natural necessity or powers is presupposed by the 
ordinary, pre-theoretical concept of causation, but these presuppositions disappear from 
Hume’s final analysis. However, Hume scholars such as Strawson (1989) argue that 
Hume is a skeptical realist, not an eliminativist, about that which grounds or explains 
regularities in nature – that is, he proposes a reduction of the concept not because he 
thinks that we can be certain that natural necessity and powers, or causation in the 
ordinary sense, do not exist, but rather because we would lack epistemic access to these 
aspects of causation. The term Humean in the context of causation is often taken to entail 
not only reductionism about the concept but also eliminativism about irreducible powers 
or natural necessity. But because of this scholarly controversy, I will instead use the terms 
reductionism and regularity theory for views that entail such eliminativism.  
As has already been mentioned (in section 6 on Schiller above), Hume considered, 
very thoroughly, the suggestion that an impression of necessity was to be found within the 
mind. In A Treatise of Human Nature, he gives a number of objections, which he expands 
on in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. I will return to the plausibility of 
the argument in view of the objections of Hume and others in the next chapter. Here I will 
merely note one particular objection which is subtly added in the Enquiry. After first 
expanding on the objections from the Treatise, Hume inserts the following footnote:  
It may be pretended, that the resistance which we meet with in bodies, obliging us 
frequently to exert our force, and call up all our power, this gives us the idea of force and 
power. It is this nisus, or strong endeavour, of which we are conscious, that is the original 
impression from which this idea is copied. But […] we attribute power to a vast number 
of objects, where we never can suppose this resistance or exertion of force to take place; 
[...] to inanimate matter, which is not capable of this sentiment. […] It must, however, be 
confessed, that the animal nisus, which we experience, though it can afford no accurate 
precise idea of power, enters very much into that vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed 
of it. (Hume 1748/1995: 67, footnote 12) 
Surprisingly, Hume here admits that we do have an impression of power, an impression 
that matches the vulgar idea of it. He argues, however, that the impression does not match 
any accurate or precise idea. Among Hume’s reasons for dismissing the vulgar idea of 
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power is that he takes it to be in conflict with the view that matter is not capable of 
sentiment; that is, that he takes the falsity of panpsychism for granted. Thus it seems that 
he affirms the validity of an inference from acquaintance with causation in agency to 
panpsychism. It is interesting to note how anti-panpsychist commitments are here 
revealed as being part of the motivation for reductionism about the concept of causation 
from its beginning.  
9 REID 
Thomas Reid (1710–1796) is well known for one of the first counterexamples to Hume’s 
analysis of causation as constant conjunction. Night and day are constantly conjoined, he 
pointed out, but we do not for that reason think that the night is the cause of the day. 
However, another of his important objections to Hume’s view of causation consists in 
pointing to what he takes to be a clear and valid impression of power: 
 […] in certain motions of my body and directions of my thought, I know, not only that 
there must be some cause that has power to produce these effects, but that I am that cause; 
and I am conscious of what I do in order to the production of them. (Reid 1788: 36)  
He also holds that this is our only basis for the notion: “[…] of the manner in which a 
cause may exert its active power, we can have no conception, but from consciousness of 
the manner in which our own active power is exerted” (1788: 37). 
He further argues that only conscious beings can have powers:  
If any man, therefore, affirms that a being may be the efficient cause of an action, and 
have the power to produce it, which that being can neither conceive nor will, he speaks a 
language which I do not understand. If he has a meaning, his notion of power and 
efficiency must be essentially different from mine; and, until he conveys his notion of 
efficiency to my understanding, I can no more assent to his opinion, than if he should 
affirm, that a being without life may feel pain.  
It seems therefore, to me most probable, that such beings only as have some degree 
of understanding and will, can possess active power; and inanimate beings must be 
merely passive, and have no real activity. Nothing we perceive without us afford any 
good ground for ascribing active power to any inanimate being; and every thing we can 
discover in our own constitution leads us to think, that active power cannot be exerted 
without will and intelligence. (Reid 1788: 40–41) 
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Reid considers panpsychism (in the guise of animism) primitive and unscientific.
6
 But he 
is also dissatisfied with reductionism, the view that the behaviour of inanimate objects 
does not have any causes in the sense that involves active power at all. His preferred 
alternative is the following: 
With regard to the operations of nature, it is sufficient for us to know, that, whatever the 
agents may be, whatever the manner of their operation, or the extent of their power, they 
depend upon the first cause [i.e., God], and are under his control; and this indeed is all 
that we know; beyond this we are left in darkness. (Reid 1788: 37) 
Thus, Reid’s rejection of both panpsychism and reductionism, together with his 
affirmation of our acquaintance with our own causation in agency, leads him to accept a 
view somewhere in between occasionalism and skeptical realism.  
One may view him as implicitly endorsing a reductio of the premise that all things 
have powers of their own, on the basis of the unacceptability of panpsychism or animism. 
The premise is not, however, rejected in favor of the view that things are not moved by 
any powers at all, as per reductionism; rather, he affirms that non-conscious entities, 
which are not moved by their own powers, are moved by the powers of other agents, 
either God or unknown agents that depend on God.
7
 
10  ELIMINATIVISTS ABOUT CAUSATION AND 
NEWTONIAN FORCES 
The mathematician and physicist Leonhard Euler (1707–1783) is described by 
Schopenhauer as arguing for the elimination of force on the basis of its connection with 
will: 
Further, it is worth noting that Euler saw that the inner nature of gravitation must 
ultimately be reduced to an “inclination and desire” (hence will) peculiar to bodies (in the 
68th letter to the Princess). In fact, it is just this that makes him averse to the conception 
                                                 
6
 “Rude nations do really believe sun, moon and stars, earth, sea and air, fountains and lakes, to have 
understanding and active power. To pay homage to them and implore their favour, is a kind of idolatry 
natural to savages. […] When a few of superior intellectual abilities find leisure for speculation, they begin 
to philosophize, and soon discover, that many of those objects which, at first, they believed to be intelligent 
and active, are really lifeless and passive. […] As philosophy advances, life and activity in natural objects 
retires, and leaves them dead and inactive” (Reid 1788: 282–283). 
7
 How are we capable of conceiving of the active power that derives from God? Only on the basis of our 
own experience: “Our notion, even of Almighty power, is derived from the notion of human power, by 
removing from the former those imperfections and limitations to which the latter is subjected” (Reid 1788: 
278). 
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of gravitation as found in Newton, and he is inclined to try a modification of it in 
accordance with the earlier Cartesian theory, and thus to derive gravitation from the 
impact of an ether on bodies, as being “more rational and suitable for those who like clear 
and intelligible principles.” He wants to see attraction banished from physics as a qualitas 
occulta. This is only in keeping with the dead view of nature which, as the correlative of 
the immaterial soul, prevailed in Euler's time. (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 127)  
This account can be seen to accurately match Euler’s own statements (see Euler 1833: 
letters 50, 54 and 68). As Schopenhauer here alludes to, there was much dissatisfaction 
among scientists in general about the Newtonian concept of force. Newton himself did 
not, unlike some physicists after him, regard his second law F = ma as an exhaustive 
definition of force, but as an additional fact about something that was essentially the 
producing cause of acceleration and whose nature was not known. He says about 
gravitation that it “must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain 
laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the consideration of 
my readers” (Newton quoted in Jammer 1957: 139). And many of his readers did engage 
in extensive metaphysical and theological speculation about the true nature of force (see 
Jammer 1957: ch. 8). Others were skeptical of the concept for the same reason. Some 
skeptics came to see force as essentially anthropomorphic, such as the mathematician 
Karl Pearson (1857–1936):  
Primitive people attribute all motion to some will behind the moving body; for their first 
conception of the cause of motion lies in their own will. Thus they consider the sun as 
carried round by a sun-god, the moon by a moon-god, while rivers flow, trees grow, and 
winds blow owing to the will of the various spirits which dwell in them. Slowly, scientific 
description replaces spiritualistic explanation. The idea, however, of enforcement, of 
some necessity in the order of a sequence, remains deeply rooted in men’s mind, as a 
fossil from the spiritualistic explanation which sees in the will the cause of motion. The 
notion of force as that which necessitates certain changes of sequences of motion, is a 
ghost of the old spiritualism. (Pearson quoted in Jammer 1957: 235) 
Many scientists who recognized such anthropomorphic elements took this as a reason for 
adopting a purely relational definition of the concept of force (see Jammer 1957: ch. 11). 
As a term of physical theory, there are many methodological reasons internal to science 
for thinking that force should be defined purely relationally – and it is in full accordance 
with the Russellian view of the physical generally accepted by panpsychists. But whether 
one should also eliminate metaphysical concepts of causation or force, conceived as what 
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grounds or enforces physical relations, is an independent question. An anthropomorphic 
metaphysical concept of force does not necessarily prohibit a relational reduction of the 
term as it appears in physical theory. One cannot therefore eliminative all concepts of 
force and causation on purely methodological grounds internal to science – philosophical 
considerations must be brought in.  
Ernst Mach (1838–1916) played an important role in the development of a relational 
reduction of force. He also held that the notion of causation should be eliminated partly 
on the basis of its anthropomorphic connotations:  
I hope that the science of the future will discard the idea of cause and effect, as being 
formally obscure; and in my feeling that these ideas contain a strong tincture of fetishism 
[i.e., animism], I am certainly not alone. The more proper course is, to regard the abstract 
determinative elements of a fact as interdependent, in a purely logical way, as the 
mathematician or geometer does. True, by comparison with the will, forces are brought 
nearer to our feeling; but it may be that ultimately the will itself will be made clearer by 
comparison with the accelerations of masses. (Mach 1897: 253–254) 
This is somewhat curious, given that Mach was a proponent of a type of neutral monism 
that seems to borderline on panpsychism – like James in his neutral monist days, he took 
the neutral substrate to be pure experience. It therefore seems it was only animistic 
panpsychism, panpsychism that takes causation to be related to agency, that he dismissed.  
R. G. Collingwood (1889–1943) was another eliminativist about causation. In his 
article “On the So-Called Idea of Causation”, he claims that: 
In the first sense of the word cause, that which is caused is the free and deliberate act of a 
conscious and responsible agent, and “causing” him to do it means affording him a 
motive for doing it. (Collingwood 1937: 86)  
This is “historically the original sense [of the word cause] […] and remains strictly 
speaking the one and only ‘proper’ sense” (Collingwood 1937: 85). From this he 
concludes that Newton, with his distinction between caused (forced) and uncaused 
(inertial) motions, effectively advocated a “reduction of physics to social psychology” 
(1937: 105). 
Finally, Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), in his “On the Notion of Cause”, argues that: 
[…] the word “cause” is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make 
its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable […] 
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The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a 
relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously 
supposed to do no harm. (Russell 1912: 1) 
After pointing out a number of problems with applying the notion of cause in science, and 
on this basis arguing for its elimination, Russell explains that:  
The importance of these considerations lies partly in the fact that they lead to a more 
correct account of scientific procedure, partly in the fact that they remove the analogy 
with human volition which makes the conception of cause such a fruitful source of 
fallacies. (Russell 1912: 9) 
Some of the central fallacies that, in Russell’s view, result from the analogy between 
causation and volition are the following: 
(2) “Cause is analogous to volition, since there must be an intelligible nexus between 
cause and effect.” This maxim is, I think, often unconsciously in the imaginations of 
philosophers who would reject it when explicitly stated. […] I do not profess to know 
what is meant by “intelligible”; it seems to mean “familiar to imagination.” Nothing is 
less “intelligible,” in any other sense, than the connection between an act of will and its 
fulfilment. […] 
(3) “The cause compels the effect in some sense in which the effect does not compel 
the cause.” […] compulsion is a very complex notion, involving thwarted desire. So long 
as a person does what he wishes to do, there is no compulsion, however much his wishes 
may be calculable by the help of earlier events. And where desire does not come in, there 
can be no question of compulsion. Hence it is, in general, misleading to regard the cause 
as compelling the effect. […] 
(4) “A cause cannot operate when it has ceased to exist, because what has ceased to 
exist is nothing.” […] The mistake in this maxim consists in the supposition that causes 
“operate” at all. A volition “operates” when what it wills takes place; but nothing can 
operate except a volition. The belief that causes “operate” results from assimilating them, 
consciously or unconsciously, to volitions. (Russell 1912: 9–11) 
Partly, Russell seems to hold that understanding the notion of cause on the basis of 
volition is a fallacy because of panpsychist implications – in his point (3), in particular, it 
seems implicit that if causes compel effects, then desire would have to be involved in all 
causation. At the same time, he also argues that the analogy with volition leads to what he 
considers fallacies in virtue of not matching scientific procedure and the content of 
physics, as he understands it. Later in his career, Russell endorsed neutral monism of a 
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kind close to panpsychism, but around the time of the publication of “On the Notion of 
Cause” he was one of the doctrine’s staunchest critics.8  
11  RECENT REDUCTIOS  
Reductionism about causation, which does not aim to eliminate the concepts of cause and 
effect, but does eliminate commitment to the existence of powers, natural necessity or 
other enforcing or producing elements of causation, gradually became orthodoxy in 
philosophy. But in recent times, non-reductionist theories have seen a revival. In chapter 
1 (section 3.2), I discussed the dispositionalist, dispositional essentialist and 
categorical/dispositional identity views of properties, all of which presuppose irreducible 
powers and thereby non-reductionism.  
Interestingly, along with the return of non-reductionism also came one of the clearest 
expressions of the modus tollens version of the argument from causation. Edward Madden 
and Peter Hare were early proponents of the revival of causal powers metaphysics. They 
argue that we should reject the view that causation can be experienced in agency because 
it will enable an inference from causal powers to panpsychism: 
It is most crucial to avoid what we like to call the “inferential predicament,” because 
getting involved in it forces one inevitably into pan-psychism and animism, an 
unmitigated disaster in the eyes of a great majority of contemporary philosophers. […] 
The inferential predicament arises by taking volitional contexts as the only ones in which 
causal power is directly perceived, and then projecting such experienced power onto 
objects and events in order to make sense of causal necessities in the physical world. 
(Madden and Hare 1971: 23) 
The best, and perhaps only, way to avoid the inferential predicament and its pan-psychical 
consequence is to reject the premise that one is directly aware of causal power only in 
volitional situations […]. (Madden and Hare 1971: 25) 
Madden and Hare proceed to argue for the view that we are rather directly aware of 
causal power in the external world.  
David Armstrong gives an argument based on the same kind of inference, but takes it 
to indicate the falsity of dispositionalism about causation rather than the view that 
causation can be experienced in agency: 
                                                 
8
 Russell’s first qualified endorsement of neutral monism was in a lecture given in 1918. In 1913, right after 
the publication of “On the Notion of Cause”, he began writing his Theory of Knowledge, which contained a 
number of arguments against neutral monism (Tully 2003). 
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[…] a disposition as conceived by a Dispositionalist is like a congealed hypothetical facts 
or state of affairs: ‘If this object is suitably stuck, then it is caused (or there is a certain 
objective probability of its being caused) to shatter.’ It is, as it were, and inference ticket 
(as Ryle said), but one that exists in nature (as Ryle would hardly have allowed). That is 
all there is to a particular disposition. Consider, then, the critical case where the 
disposition is not manifested. The object still has within itself, essentially, a reference to 
the manifestation that did not occur. It points to a thing that does not exist. This must 
remind us of the intentionality of mental states and processes, the characteristic that 
Brentano held was the distinguishing mark of the mental, that is, their being directed upon 
objects or states of affairs that need not exist. This intentionality of the mental 
undoubtedly exists. But for physicalists such as myself it presents a prima facie problem. 
If the mental has intentionality, and if, as Brentano thought, it is also ontologically 
irreducible, then there is something here that would appear to falsify Physicalism. 
Physicalists about the mind are therefore found trying to give some ontologically 
reductive account of the intentionality of the mental. But if irreducible dispositions and 
powers are admitted for physical things, then intentionality, irreducible intentionality, has 
turned up in everything there is.  
Is this not objectionable? Does it not assimilate the physical to the mental, rather than 
the other way around? (Armstrong 1997: 79) 
Intentionality is the manner in which thoughts, intentions, actions and other mental 
phenomena can be about or directed toward other things. Armstrong points to how 
dispositionality and intentionality share the feature of directedness. He does not, however, 
point to any experiences of either intentionality or dispositionality; rather, he compares 
their concepts. In his view, if causation is grounded in irreducible governing laws instead 
of dispositions the problem is avoided, so he does not take it as an argument for 
reductionism. 
C. B. Martin and Karl Pfeifer also consider a similar reductio:  
We will show that the most typical characterizations of intentionality, including those 
discussed by W. Lycan in his article “On ‘Intentionality’ and the Psychological,” and also 
Lycan’s own suggested characterization and John R. Searle’s more extended treatments of 
the concept all fail to distinguish intentional mental states from non-intentional 
dispositional physical states. Accepting any of these current accounts will be to take a 
quick road to panpsychism! (Martin and Pfeifer 1986: 531) 
Somewhat ironically, if we were to leave our discussion at this point, someone might 
interpret it as an argument for panpsychism, in that the characterizations of intentionality 
that we have discussed apply to anything (mental or physical) that has causal dispositions. 
For some, this may be a happy result – for us it is a reductio ad absurdum and an 
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invitation to look elsewhere for an account of the intentional. (Martin and Pfeifer 1986: 
551)  
Martin and Pfeifer only take this as a reductio of a certain account of intentionality. Like 
Armstrong, they do not take it as something that casts into doubt any acquaintance we 
may have with the phenomena of either intentionality or agency via experience. Unlike 
Armstrong, they think dispositionalism can be made compatible with physicalism by 
revising the account of intentionality.  
Armstrong’s and Martin and Pfeifer’s arguments in particular make evident the 
relevance of the argument from causation for the challenge to the argument from 
categorical properties discussed in chapter 1 (section 3.2), the challenge from irreducible 
dispositionality. If it could be established that Armstrong is right in endorsing the 
inference, and Martin and Pfeifer are wrong in rejecting it, then dispositionalism would 
entail panpsychism, and this challenge to the argument for panpsychism from categorical 
properties would be entirely pre-empted. In recent times, however, the argument from 
causation does not seem to have been put forth in support of panpsychism.  
This concludes my historical review of the argument for causation. Before 
considering the plausibility of the argument systematically, in order to build some more 
motivation for undertaking this, I will briefly look at the relevance of the argument to 
present debates about causation and agency and its compatibility with contemporary 
panpsychism.  
12  THE PRESENT RELEVANCE OF THE ARGUMENT 
As noted, non-reductionism about causation seems to be on the rise.
9
 A reasonable guess 
would be that this has something to do with the fact that empiricism – of the kind that 
motivated philosophers to look for an impression of causation lest it be eliminated – for 
various reasons no longer has the influence that it once had. However, as I have shown, 
not only empiricism, but also a wish to avoid anthropomorphism and panpsychism has 
played a role in the rise of reductionism. Therefore, non-reductionists who are not 
panpsychists should be interested in confronting the problem constituted by the argument 
from causation.  
                                                 
9
 At least it has been on the rise in the last decades. A survey conducted by David Chalmers and David 
Bourget (2013) shows that philosophers who identify as non-Humeans about the laws of nature outnumber 
those who identify as Humeans by 2:1, but the gap is smaller among younger people.  
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Versions of one central premise of the argument, that causation is experienced in 
agency, find support among a number of non-reductionists of causation. Huw Price 
claims that “we know causes by knowing what it is like to be an agent” (1991: 173). 
David Armstrong finds that “it is plausible to suppose that we have […] non-inferential 
awareness of the successful operation of our will” (1997: 215), and “in Humean terms, 
there is an impression from which we derive the idea of causality” (1997: 217). Stephen 
Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum hold that “causation can be perceived within one’s own 
body” (2011b: 209), and that “we all have experience of dispositionality at work, through 
the exercise or our own powers and the action of other powers upon us” (2011a: 380).  
Additionally, in philosophy of action, much attention has recently been devoted 
(following earlier relative neglect) to our phenomenology of agency, i.e., what it is like to 
be an agent. Sometimes it is claimed that the phenomenology of agency is accurately 
described as experience of causation. Carl Ginet argues that actions can be analyzed as 
mental events with an “actish phenomenal quality” that seems to represent productive 
causation by the subject:  
A simple mental event is an action if and only if it has a certain intrinsic phenomenal 
quality, which I've dubbed the “actish” quality and tried to describe by using agent-
causation talk radically qualified by “as if”: the simple mental event of my volition to 
exert force with a part of my body phenomenally seems to me to be intrinsically an event 
that does not just happen to me, that does not occur unbidden, but it is, rather, as if I make 
it occur, as if I determine that it will happen just when and as it does. (Ginet 1997: 87) 
Terry Horgan similarly describes the phenomenology of agency as follows: 
[…] the actional phenomenal dimension […] is the what-it’s-like of self as source of the 
motion. […] You experience the bodily motion as generated by yourself. 
The language of causation seems apt here […]: you experience your behavior as 
caused by you yourself […] Metaphysical libertarians about human freedom sometimes 
speak of “agent causation” […] and such terminology seems phenomenologically apt 
regardless of what one thinks about the intelligibility and credibility of metaphysical 
libertarianism. (Horgan 2011: 79) 
Tim Bayne and Neil Levy, although expressing skepticism about whether we have 
experiences with causal content, nevertheless claim that “in exerting effort it feels as 
though one is exerting a power of one’s own against a force” (2006: 60), and that “the 
experience of effort involves an experience of the self as a source of force” (2006: 63). 
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They present empirical evidence that the feeling of effort reliably tracks physical energy 
expenditure.  
It should be noted that the thesis that causation is experienced in agency is different 
from the stronger thesis that it is also experienced as mental, which is required as a further 
premise or as an additional aspect that must be added to it if the argument is to have a 
chance of being valid (as will be discussed in the next chapter). Still, it clearly seems that 
these two important (though insufficient) premises or prerequisites of the argument from 
causation, non-reductionism about causation and the thesis that we at least seem to 
experience causation (or power) in agency, have stronger positions in philosophy at 
present than they have had in a long time. Furthermore, according to the arguments 
presented in chapter 1, the conclusion of the argument, panpsychism, can no longer be 
simply dismissed as absurd. Therefore, taking the argument as a reductio of the premises 
is less plausible.  
Although I gave the example of one philosopher, Mach,
10
 who had panpsychist 
sympathies but nevertheless seemed to immediately reject an animistic version of it, 
contemporary panpsychism seems to be more than compatible with the argument. 
Russellian monism asserts that mental properties ground physical dispositions, and this is 
just what the panpsychists discussed in this chapter argue. It fits Strawson’s broad 
statement that “energy is experientiality; that is its intrinsic nature” (Strawson 2006a: 
234) and does not directly entail much more. Primitive animism, which asserts that things 
like the wind, the forest and the sun are moved by their own spirits, would not follow. 
The main problem with primitive animism is its proto-scientific nature: it professes to 
explain and predict nature with reference to indwelling spirits and is thereby incompatible 
with physical causal closure. The kind of animistic panpsychism the arguments reviewed 
here point to would – or at least could – be Russellian, and thereby respect physical causal 
closure and the autonomy of science. Furthermore, contemporary panpsychism does not 
generally attribute mentality directly to things like the wind and the forest, like primitive 
animism tends to. But nothing is directly implied by the argument from causation about 
what kinds of things, other than ourselves, should be regarded as having mentality 
directly, or being agents. 
                                                 
10
 Unlike Russell, Mach was committed to pure experientialism and neutral monism at the same time as he 
endorsed the reductio. 
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As I have shown, the validity of the inference has been recognized by philosophers 
from many different philosophical traditions: rationalism, German idealism, pragmatism, 
empiricism (radical and classic) and process philosophy. Therefore, it cannot be 
dismissed as an artifact of some particular dated methodological stance.  
In conclusion, therefore, there is much that speaks in favor of reconsidering the 
argument for panpsychism from our acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency. 
Its premises and its conclusion are interesting and relevant for present debates, and they 
cannot be immediately judged as devoid of plausibility. 
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3 
A New Defense of the Argument from Causation 
 
In this chapter, I will try to formulate the most plausible version of the argument from 
causation – an argument for panpsychism that, as shown in the previous chapter, has been 
put forth by Leibniz, Schopenhauer, James and many others. I will also try to formulate it 
in a way such that it can be seen to pre-empt the challenge to the argument from 
categorical properties, which I discussed in chapter 1 (section 3.2), stemming from the 
possibility of irreducibly dispositional properties. I will consider some alternative 
formulations, and arrive at one where all the premises – except for one – are either easily 
seen to be plausible or will be defensible on the basis of what has already been discussed 
in chapter 1. Then I will give a new defense of the final premise, the thesis that we 
experience causation in agency in a way that reveals it as mental in nature – and that there 
is no other kind of causation whose nature we know or of which we have a positive 
conception. 
1 FIRST FORMULATION 
All the arguments presented in the previous chapter can be seen to fit the following 
general form: 
I) Non-reductionism: All physical things have irreducibly causal 
properties. 
II) Mental causation: The only irreducibly causal properties (whose nature) 
we can know, or positively conceive of, are mental properties. 
III) Anti-mysterianism: The (nature of the) irreducibly causal properties of 
physical things are knowable or positively conceivable.  
Therefore,  
IV) Panpsychism: All physical things have mental properties. 
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The argument is put in terms of irreducibly causal properties because these are the kinds 
of properties that Hume denied we can experience, and it is experiences of these kinds of 
properties to which the arguments discussed in the previous chapter all refer. The 
experiences were not claimed to reveal anything about the nature of causal properties as 
reductionists would construe them, and cannot therefore directly support that reducible 
causal properties are mental.  
Dispositional properties are a type of causal properties. If the only causal properties 
we know are also dispositional properties, it would clearly pre-empt the challenge to the 
argument from categorical properties from irreducible dispositionality. Dispositionalism, 
dispositional essentialism and the identity view would entail panpsychism. In order to 
make this evident, the argument can instead be formulated in terms of dispositional 
properties: 
I*) Non-reductionism: All physical things have irreducibly dispositional 
properties. 
II*) Mental dispositionality: The only irreducibly dispositional properties 
(whose nature) we can know, or positively conceive of, are mental 
properties. 
III) Anti-mysterianism: The (nature of the) irreducibly dispositional 
properties of physical things are knowable or positively conceivable.  
Therefore,  
IV) Panpsychism: All physical things have mental properties. 
Non-reductionism about causation comes in two main forms: those who posit irreducible 
governing laws (e.g., Armstrong) and those who posit causal powers, i.e., dispositions, 
belonging to individual things (e.g., Shoemaker, Ellis, Bird and Mumford). Formulating 
premise I* in in terms of dispositional properties rules out the governing laws view 
whereas the first formulation, in terms of causal properties, did not. Armstrong holds that 
singular events of causation, such as particular exertions of power or force, are a 
posteriori identical with instantiations of laws (1997: 218), and that laws are relations 
between categorical universal properties. Thus, he reduces dispositions to relations 
between categorical properties, although his conception of categorical properties and their 
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relations is not reductionist. An interpretation of the experiences of causation that the 
argument relies on as revealing Armstrongian causal properties will be problematic, 
however, because of how Armstrong’s reduction of dispositions to instantiations of 
general laws proceeds via a posteriori identification. In Armstrong’s view, the fact that 
the forces or dispositions he agrees that we appear to directly experience in agency are 
really instantiations of laws is something that can only be understood on the basis of 
empirical information about regularities and metaphysical reasoning. Reducing mental 
properties (which according to the argument includes experienced powers) via a 
posteriori identity is possibly in tension with arguments against type-B physicalism that 
are essential to the case for panpsychism from philosophy of mind (see chapter 1, p. 14–
16). Furthermore, if the true nature of causation can only be known via a posteriori 
reduction of the powers we experience, then it seems we are not really directly acquainted 
with the nature of causation via experience after all. Since Armstrong’s conception of 
causation therefore can be ruled out as an interpretation of the kind of experiences the 
argument will centrally rely on anyway, it is indirectly justified to rule it out already in 
the first premise, by putting the argument in terms of dispositional properties.  
I will now consider the plausibility or defensibility of the individual premises of this 
argument. Then I will consider whether a better formulation of the argument is available 
with more easily defensible premises.  
Premise II* – Mental dispositionality – in this formulation of the argument would be 
the least easily defensible. As I have shown, the view that we seem to experience 
dispositional causation in phenomenology of agency has the support of some present 
philosophers, however, even if they are right, this is merely a prerequisite for an argument 
in defense of premise II* – our experience also has to be veridical, reveal dispositionality 
as mental, and not be rivalled by other experiences or conceptions of dispositionality as 
non-mental. However, it is clearly essential to any argument that is going to reflect the 
views of the philosophers of the previous chapter, and a way of defending it must 
therefore be found. But before going into what can be said in defense of this premise, I 
will try to find the most plausible form of an argument for panpsychism that relies on it.  
Premise III – Anti-mysterianism – is a counterpart to the anti-mysterian premise 4 of 
the argument from categorical properties, and a closely related principle ((viii) on p. 26) 
is part of the argument from philosophy of mind, as discussed in chapter 1. There I 
claimed that this principle must be justified on pragmatic, methodological or anti-
skepticist grounds. Is this sufficient justification for premise III as well? The premise 
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rules out skeptical realism about causation, the view that irreducible causation exists, but 
that its nature is unknown. As mentioned in the previous chapter (section 8), this view has 
been attributed to Hume, and is also regarded by many (e.g., Strawson 1987) as highly 
defensible on its own terms. Therefore, it might seem unreasonable that premise III rules 
it out. However, it is consistent with the motivation for premise III to say that if it were 
true that we have no epistemic access to the nature of causation, skeptical realism would 
be preferable over eliminativism about irreducible causal powers or laws, i.e., ontological 
reductionism about causation, but in view of premise II, according to which we do have 
epistemic access to the nature of at least one kind of causation after all, skeptical realism 
is no longer justified. As with the argument from categorical properties, this reasoning 
could be made explicit, by replacing premise III with the methodological principle that, if 
possible, we should avoid positing properties that (or whose nature) are unknowable or 
not positively conceivable, as well as making some further modifications in order to 
restore the validity of the argument (cf. chapter 1, section 2.2, p. 37–38). 
Premise I* – Non-reductionism – is more easily defensible than premise II*, though it 
is far from obviously true. As mentioned, non-reductionism about causation has many 
present supporters. However, trying to argue for non-reductionism over reductionism on a 
general basis would be a very extensive project, which I will not attempt here. 
Nevertheless, I will briefly review some different arguments for non-reductionism that 
have already been alluded to as part of the arguments presented in the previous chapter. 
This will be partly in order to show why it makes sense to try to find another basis for 
defending the argument, but also partly in order to clarify the theoretical role irreducible 
causation is often supposed to play, which will be helpful later on. I will then show that 
premise I* can instead be discharged by a reformulation of the argument, so that one 
would not need to go into the debate on a general basis (as opposed to specifically on the 
basis of the experience of agency) after all. 
1.1 Arguments for Premise I* –  Non-Reductionism  
The philosophers of the previous chapter motivate non-reductionism in various ways. 
Schopenhauer holds that forces are required in order to answer the question of why the 
laws of nature hold. Stout claims that causal powers (or in his terms, active tendencies) 
are required in order to restore the rationality of causal inference, i.e., induction. Leibniz, 
Schopenhauer, James and Schiller argue that we know (or have pragmatic justification) 
from our experience that we have causal powers, and via a principle of the uniformity of 
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nature or parsimony it follows that all causation involves causal powers as well. Finally, 
Schopenhauer also claimed the physical would be reduced to a mere relational 
abstraction, a castle in the air, if not underpinned by forces. Although these philosophers 
may intend these strategies to lead all the way to panpsychism, they can also be 
considered as strategies for establishing only some form non-reductionism. As strategies 
for establishing non-reductionism only, they all seem to have some plausibility. The first 
three of them, at least, have contemporary proponents.  
The first strategy of Schopenhauer’s has been taken up by Strawson (1987: 143–144). 
Strawson argues that we should posit what he calls objective forces, even if their nature is 
entirely unknown and unknowable, on the basis that there has to be something that 
explains the regular behavior of objects. Reductionists deny that the fundamental laws or 
regularities of nature, those who cannot be explained in terms of underlying regularities, 
have explanations. The basic regularities, according to reductionism, are brute facts that 
do not obtain for any deeper reason – it is just the way the world is. But, according to 
Strawson, that the world should be regular for no reason is deeply implausible:  
There are all those mind-independent physical objects knocking about out there 
completely independently of us, persisting and interacting, and nothing – nothing – 
governs or orders the ways in which they do this. And yet they persist and interact in a 
highly regular fashion. How can this be so? It is really rather extraordinary. For, ex 
hypothesi, nothing constrains them to behave and interact in a way that exhibits any order 
or regularity at all […] it seems that [reductionists] assert positively that all causation 
actually is an outrageous run of luck. (Strawson 1987: 265) 
This objection does not only target reductive theories of causation formulated in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions, which can be regarded as refinements of Hume’s 
original analysis in terms of constant conjunction. If the objection is effective against 
such theories, it would also be effective against Lewisian counterfactual theories. Lewis 
analyses causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals whose truth conditions do not 
include any irreducible necessities, only regularities and abstract similarity relations. The 
essential difference is that on the counterfactual theory, the relations extend across 
possible worlds as well as the actual. Although it will not be mysterious on the 
counterfactual theory that there are perfectly regular possible worlds, nothing clearly 
explains why the actual world happens to be regular.  
Helen Beebee (2006) and Nicolas Everitt (1991) criticize this argument on the basis 
that positing forces to explain regularities will just be an arbitrary extra step in a 
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potentially infinite explanatory regress – at some point we have to accept brute facts. 
According to Everitt, the only way of ending the regress is by positing a necessary being, 
i.e., God, which most naturalists including panpsychists would like to avoid. Therefore, it 
makes sense to regard the ultimate empirical facts as brute facts, and not infer 
metaphysical qualities beyond them that would not be self-explanatory, and thereby 
finally end the regress, anyway. It might be retorted, for example, that this is overly 
verificationist, or that causal powers can be conceived of as having some special regress-
ending properties; however, one could see how the debate would be hard to settle.  
In accordance with Stout’s strategy, both Armstrong (1983: 52–59) and Ellis (2010) 
have argued that positing irreducible causation (grounded in governing laws and 
dispositions respectively) solves the problem of induction. The reasoning is an extension 
of Strawson’s: if irreducible causation is the reason for the world’s regularities, and 
reductionists think that there is no such reason for the regularities observed so far, then 
neither would there be a reason for regularities to continue in the future. In other words, if 
nothing constrains the world to behave in an orderly fashion, it might as well stop 
behaving regularly at any moment. 
The problem is the same on the counterfactual theory: if there is only one, or a few, 
possible worlds where our laws of nature hold without exception, but there are many 
possible worlds where things are regular up to this time, but turn chaotic in various ways 
afterwards, then it seems more likely that our world will turn out to be one of the 
suddenly chaotic ones, given that there are more ways of being chaotic (or first orderly 
and then chaotic) than there are ways of being orderly and each of these ways will 
correspond to a possible world.  
One might object that the existence of necessary connections between causes and 
effects is surely not sufficient for induction to be rational. For example, the existence of 
necessary connections does not rule out, on most understandings of the nature of causal 
necessity, that the universe suddenly be annihilated for no reason or cause internal to it. 
However, it seems causal necessary connections are still a necessary condition for the 
rationality of induction – or at least a necessary part of a jointly sufficient but unnecessary 
set of conditions. But according to Beebee (2011), reductionists may have a distinct 
sufficient basis (or a necessary part of a distinct sufficient basis) for handling the problem 
of induction as well. Therefore, this consideration is not clearly decisive either.  
The strategy of justifying non-reductionism on the basis on the experience of agency 
is pursued by Michael Esfeld. He claims that:  
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[Humean] metaphysics is at odds with our experience as acting beings (agents) in the 
world and the conceptualization of this experience in folk psychology. That experience – 
and its folk psychological description – is veridical if and only if there is a causal relation 
between mental intentions and behaviour such that the intention brings about the 
behaviour in the sense that the intention makes it that the behaviour in question exists – 
given certain favourable background conditions in the body of the person and in the 
environment. (Esfeld 2007: 211) 
In short, if and only if there is a glue that ties the behaviour to the intention such that the 
intention necessitates the behaviour (given the mentioned background conditions), then 
we are agents – instead of simply undergoing contingent sequences of mental and 
behavioural property tokens that happen to satisfy certain regularities in virtue of what is 
going on elsewhere in space-time.  
Consequently, Humean metaphysics cannot admit our experience as acting beings 
(agents) in the world as being veridical. There is no room for agents in a Hume world. 
(Esfeld 2007: 212) 
Since this argument for non-reductionism is premised on the thesis that we veridically 
experience causation in agency, it already presupposes an important aspect of premise II* 
– though not all of it, because it additionally says that we experience causation as mental. 
If premise I* can be defended on the basis of premise II*, this would obviously be an 
advantage, but it also suggests that the argument should be reformulated in order to 
accurately reflect the number of distinct theses the conclusion actually depends on.  
As an alternative to pursuing any further a direct defense of premise I*, I will now 
suggest a different formulation of the argument, that on the basis of the discussion in 
chapter 1 would let premise I* be discharged. This alternative formulation is suggested by 
Esfeld’s argument, but also, more directly, by the final strategy I credited to 
Schopenhauer and which I have not yet considered. 
2 SECOND FORMULATION 
The final strategy of Schopenhauer’s (which can also be read as a strategy of Leibniz’s) 
toward establishing the need to posit ubiquitous dispositional properties is his claim that 
the driving force of will must underlie physical structure in order for it to be real and not 
just an abstraction or an empty form. This brings to mind the formally similar, but in 
terms of content apparently completely opposite, premise 2 of the argument from 
categorical properties, which I suggested be formulated as follows:  
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1) Structuralism about physical theory: Science only tells us about the 
structure of the physical. 
2) Denial of ontological structuralism: All physical structure must be 
instantiated by (individuals with) categorical properties. 
3) Mental categoricity: The only categorical properties (whose nature) we 
can know, or positively conceive of, are mental properties. 
4) Anti-mysterianism: The (nature of the) properties that instantiate 
physical structure are knowable or positively conceivable.  
Therefore, 
5) Panpsychism: All physical structure is instantiated by (individuals with) 
mental properties. 
Schopenhauer’s justification for why dispositional properties must be ubiquitous suggests 
a parallel argument from dispositional properties:  
1) Structuralism about physical theory: Science only tells us about the 
structure of the physical. 
2') Denial of ontological structuralism: All physical structure must be 
instantiated by (individuals with) irreducibly dispositional properties. 
3') Mental dispositionality: The only irreducibly dispositional properties 
(whose nature) we can know, or positively conceive of, are mental 
properties. 
4) Anti-mysterianism: The (nature of the) properties that instantiate 
physical structure are knowable or positively conceivable.  
Therefore, 
5) Panpsychism: All physical structure is instantiated by (individuals with) 
mental properties. 
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This formulation has many advantages. Although the soundness of the argument from 
categorical properties may be doubted, on the basis of the challenge from irreducible 
dispositionality in particular, there is no clear reason to think it is invalid. If it is indeed 
valid, then the argument from causation construed as a parallel argument from 
dispositional properties should be equally valid, having the same form.  
This way of formulating the argument should also make clear how the challenge to 
the argument from categorical properties is pre-empted. If dispositional properties instead 
of categorical properties ground physical structure, but the dispositional properties we 
should posit are mental, the conclusion, Russellian panpsychism, still follows. 
Furthermore, the connection between these two arguments can be exploited in order 
to render superfluous the type of arguments needed to establish non-reductionism, i.e., 
premise I* of the previous suggested formulation. If we assume that the premises of the 
argument from categorical properties, except premise 2, are adequately defensible, then 
we have a shortcut to the truth of the disjunction of premises 2 and 2'. If we reject pure 
structuralism, the view that physical structure can exist wholly uninstantiated or be self-
instantiating, then it seems at least one of them (and possibly both), must be true – 
physical structure must be instantiated by categorical or dispositional properties.  
The rejection of pure structuralism is, as discussed in chapter 1, defensible on the 
basis of the Pythagorean reductio and arguments derived from Newman’s problem. It 
follows from these arguments that physical structure must be instantiated by non-
structural properties. As I discussed, on the basis of dispositionalism and dispositional 
essentialism, there is reason to doubt that all non-structural properties are categorical 
properties. However, there is good reason to believe that all non-structural properties are 
either categorical or dispositional (or both).  
Firstly, some simply define categorical properties as non-dispositional properties and 
dispositional properties as non-categorical properties. According to such a definition, it 
would be an analytic truth that all properties are dispositional or categorical. One might 
think it is implicit in the definition that both categorical and dispositional properties are 
also concrete properties, but all non-structural properties should be regarded as concrete 
properties (i.e., non-abstract, non-logico-mathematical) anyway, so this makes no 
difference. According to some views, however, such as the identity view defended by 
Heil, Martin and Strawson, categorical and dispositional properties are not mutually 
exclusive. Obviously, though, this view still entails that all non-structural properties are 
categorical or dispositional because they would be both, and the “or” should be taken as 
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inclusive. There are many other theories of properties that could also be considered, but 
all the theories which seem to be in discussion at the moment entail that all non-structural 
properties are categorical or dispositional.
1
  
We can therefore combine both arguments into one – an argument from non-
structural properties:  
1) Structuralism about physical theory: Science only tells us about the 
structure of the physical. 
2*) Denial of ontological pure structuralism: All physical structure must 
be instantiated by non-structural properties. 
3a) Mental categoricity: The only categorical properties (whose nature) we 
can know, or positively conceive of, are mental properties. 
3b) Mental dispositionality: The only dispositional properties (whose 
nature) we can know, or positively conceive of, are mental properties. 
3c) Exhaustiveness: All non-structural properties are categorical or 
dispositional (or both). 
3d) Non-vacuity: There are some non-structural properties that we know or 
have a positive conception of. 
4) Anti-mysterianism: The (nature of the) properties that instantiate 
physical structure are knowable or positively conceivable.  
Therefore, 
5) Panpsychism: All physical structure is instantiated by mental properties. 
In this argument, premise 3' (from the argument from dispositional properties) is renamed 
3b, and premise 3 (from the argument from categorical properties) is renamed 3a. I also 
leave some of the parenthetical qualifications in the previous arguments implicit. The 
                                                 
1
 All the views I have seen in discussion fall within one of these categories: dispositionalism, the identity 
view, the mixed view, according to which there are some purely categorical and some purely dispositional 
properties, and categoricalism, of which both Armstrong’s view and the Humean/Lewisian view are 
varieties. 
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qualification of dispositional properties as irreducible has become superfluous, because if 
dispositions are reducible, they would be reducible to relations between categorical 
properties, and therefore still mental according to 3a. The justification for each of the 
premises can be summarized as follows: 
Premises 1, 3a, and 4 are identical to premises from the argument from categorical 
properties, which I here assume are adequately defensible on the basis of the arguments 
discussed in chapter 1. Or, to be precise, I assume that premise 3a is defensible except 
insofar as it is threatened by a version the identity view according to which the categorical 
can be understood in terms of the dispositional, and the dispositional can be positively 
conceived as a non-mental energetic quality of some kind (see chapter 1, p. 55). If 
premise 3b is true, it pre-empts this threat. 
Premise 2* is a weaker version of premise 2 in the argument from categorical 
properties. It rules out only the kind of structuralism that is arguably indistinguishable 
from Pythagoreanism, as well as kinds that would suffer similar problems as 
Pythagoreanism, such as spatiotemporal structuralism.  
Premise 3c is either an analytic truth or a consequence of every theory of properties 
that seems to be in discussion at present.  
Premise 3d is added to specify that at least one of the premises 3a and 3b must be 
non-vacuously true. In the argument from categorical properties, it is presupposed that 
premise 3 (now 3a) is non-vacuously true, that we know some categorical properties. The 
same is the case for premise 3' (now 3b) in the argument from dispositional properties: it 
presupposes that we know some dispositional properties. In the argument from non-
structural properties, it is sufficient that only one of the premises is non-vacuously true, so 
the non-vacuous truth of both these premises need not be presupposed. If the argument is 
supposed to be stronger than either of the previous arguments, it must be allowed that one 
of them is only vacuously true, and so non-vacuous truth should not be presupposed.  
The argument claims that a vast class of known properties are mental, both 
categorical and dispositional properties. Can this be seen as a kind of reductio? Does it 
say, in effect, that really all we know are our own minds, with no access to the external, 
physical world? This, one might think, must be based on a solipsistic error.
2
 The response 
to this worry would be to reemphasize how it is only the non-structural known properties 
which are mental. Structural properties might include both mathematico-logical and 
                                                 
2
 Thanks to David Chalmers for pressing this objection.  
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spatiotemporal properties. According to a number of Russellian monists and ontic 
structural realists, many of whom have no sympathy with panpsychism, this adequately 
accounts for our knowledge of the external, physical world. Some structuralists about the 
physical are causal or dispositional structuralists, a position this argument would seem to 
rule out, but not everyone. Furthermore, as I will discuss in chapter 4 (section 2.6), there 
is reason to think that dispositions in a sense have a non-mental aspect, which I will argue 
might be compatible with the premises of this argument, because it would entail that 
dispositional properties are partially mental, even if not wholly. This would leave room 
for a sense in which there can be also dispositional structure after all.  
If all this is granted, then this so far looks like a solid argument for panpsychism – 
except for the fact that the justification for premise 3b is still missing. Given the challenge 
from irreducible dispositionality to premise 3a, premise 3b must be non-vacuously true. I 
will now give a defense of this premise. 
3 THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONALITY  PREMISE 
Premise 3b, Mental dispositionality, says that the only dispositional properties we know – 
or have a positive conception of – are mental properties. One possible argument for the 
premise would be to invert the reductio that philosophers most recently have worried 
about, the inference considered by Armstrong and Martin and Pfeifer (see chapter 2, pp. 
85–85). That is, one could argue that our accounts of dispositionality and intentionality 
necessarily match and that intentionality is a mark of the mental. 
As mentioned, Martin and Pfeifer argue that the account of intentionality can be 
revised, so that it no longer matches the account of dispositionality. Bird (2007: 114–129) 
argues that dispositionality does not share the characteristics of intentionality according to 
common accounts in the first place. U. T. Place (1996) and Molnar (2003), on the other 
hand, accept that the correct accounts of dispositionality and mentality necessarily match, 
but deny that intentionality is a mark of the mental. According to Place and Molnar, 
intentionality is rather the mark of the dispositional – and Molnar develops an analysis of 
dispositions in terms of physical intentionality (Molnar 2003: ch. 3). In view of this, I will 
not take for granted that intentionality is a mark of the mental. Nor will I start from 
accounts of intentionality, where the criteria for what makes them correct are to a certain 
extent left open so that they may be adjusted.  
Most of the philosophers who regarded the argument from causation as valid (Martin 
and Pfeifer did not) took as their starting point that we seem to directly experience 
102 
 
causation, or more precisely, dispositional causation, as mental in character, but without 
mention of intentionality specifically. This will also be the basis for my argument, which 
will proceed as follows: first I will describe how we seem to experience causation in our 
phenomenology of agency – how as agents we experience something which fits Hume’s 
central criterion for causation, but which Hume himself did not consider (sections 3.1–
3.3). I will then argue that this experience is not illusory (section 3.4), that it presents 
causation as grounded in or instantiated by mental phenomena, including but not limited 
to intentionality (section 3.5), and that it is our only or most revelatory experience of 
causation and we have no other positive conceptions that contradict it (sections 3.6 and 
3.7).  
3.1 Marks of Disposit ional Causation  
What are the criteria for an experience of dispositional causation? Hume thinks that 
causation, in the robust realist sense which according to him corresponds to no 
impression, is essentially characterized by natural necessity. This means that causation 
involves a necessary connection between cause and effect. It is not merely so that effects 
happen to follow their causes. Rather, given the cause, and appropriate conditions, the 
effect must occur; it would be impossible for it not to. Necessitation is also explanatory: if 
the cause necessitates the effect, it explains why it occurs. And on a general level, if 
nature is pervaded by natural necessity, this explains why the basic laws of nature hold. 
By natural necessity, nature is constrained to behave regularly in the way that it does – the 
same causes will necessitate the same effects. Furthermore, necessary connections 
between causes and effects should obtain in virtue of the natures of things out there, not 
in virtue of something having to do with us – our concepts, projections or habitual 
judgments.  
Proponents of the view that causation is grounded in irreducible dispositions or 
powers – which I will refer to as causal dispositionalists3 – tend to agree with Hume about 
these criteria of causation; that it would involve natural, explanatory necessity. As 
discussed above (section 1.1), there are arguments for non-reductionism according to 
which irreducibly causal properties explain regularities, and provide a necessary condition 
                                                 
3
 Causal dispositionalism is compatible with dispositionalism, dispositional essentialism and the identity 
view of properties and seems entailed by all of them.  
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for the rationality of induction, and these arguments presuppose that causation has these 
features.  
Causal dispositionalists also hold, against Hume, not only that there is good reason to 
think that causation exists, but also that we can say more about what it consists in, i.e., 
that we can have a positive conception of it. According to most causal dispositionalists, 
causes are things with powers, and in virtue of their powers they produce or bring about 
their effects, effects being the manifestations that the powers are directed toward.
4
 The 
powers or dispositions of things are regarded as essential to them, i.e., as belonging to 
their nature, and powers are regarded as essentially directed toward their effects. This 
makes it the case that the laws of nature are necessary: we could not have the same things 
and different laws, because the behavior which can be described by law-statements 
follows from the very nature of these things. This is the general way in which causal 
dispositionalism explains laws or regularities. 
Bringing about, or production, is a manner of defeasible necessitation: a cause will 
necessitate that which its powers are directed toward if no other powers interfere. In this 
way, powers form a ground for ceteris paribus necessary connections.
5
  
Some causal dispositionalists, such as Mumford and Anjum (2011b) and Markus 
Schrenk (2010), hold that powers ground causation but not necessary connections. They 
argue that causation involves a sui generis modality which is weaker than necessity but 
stronger than contingency, and that the absence of necessity follows from the fact that 
there is always the possibility of interference from other powers. As far as I can see, 
though, this view still entails that causation would involve necessity of the defeasible 
kind, necessity ceteris paribus.  
Some hold that dispositional causation is probabilistic – that powers only tend toward 
their effects and never guarantee them even in the absence of interference. I will argue 
                                                 
4
 Some think the fundamental dispositions are capacities or propensities, but the difference will not matter 
here – except insofar as propensities are probabilistic, and I discuss the relevance of this below.  
5
 Some complain that ceteris paribus clauses trivialize necessary connections, reducing a claim such as “B 
will follow A” to the truism “B will follow A, except when it does not”. This complaint may be valid if 
directed toward reductive analyses of causation which include ceteris paribus clauses, insofar as the nature 
of interference is not specified apart from being “that which occurs whenever B does not follow A”. 
However, in the case of non-reductive causal dispositionalism, the qualified statement will rather read: “B 
will follow A, except when external powers directed toward non-B are present and are stronger that the 
power directed toward B”. This does not reduce to a truism, because interference is understood in terms of 
the concrete powers whose nature we would, according to causal dispositionalism, have a positive, 
independent grasp of. 
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that we experience necessitation; however, someone who holds that causation involves 
only tendency may argue that the experience in question is more accurately described as 
an experience of a strong tendency, which would be very similar. Premise 3b might be as 
defensible on this basis, but I will assume that causation involves full-blown 
necessitation.  
I will take it, then, that dispositional causation is characterized by defeasible, 
explanatory, necessary connections which hold in virtue of the natures of individual 
things, as opposed to external, governing laws, or merely our own habits, expectations or 
concepts. If our phenomenology of agency contains something with these features, and 
we have good reason not to dismiss the phenomenology as illusory, it should be taken as 
an experience of causation.  
3.2 Efforts and Results –  and Hume’s Objections  
Efforts seem to have many characteristics of dispositions, such as directedness toward an 
outcome, and being something in virtue of which such outcomes can be brought about. 
But do they seem to ground necessary connections? As already noted, Hume thoroughly 
considered the suggestion we find an impression of causation in the relation between our 
own acts of will and their successful results. He mainly argues that our efforts cannot be 
necessarily connected to their results because the results cannot be inferred and foreseen a 
priori, and illustrates this convincingly with the example of a man who is struck with 
palsy and does not understand that he cannot move before he actually attempts to and 
fails. Hume also argues that there is no a priori connection between efforts and results in 
the case of mental actions. And it does seem clear that one may suddenly be struck by, 
say, a stroke and, just like in the palsy case, not find out that one’s mental powers have 
changed before one actually attempts some mental task and fails.  
One might object that when our efforts fail, it is because of interference from other 
powers (such as the events in the brain that constitute the stroke), and that this is covered 
by the ceteris paribus clause that belongs to all causal connections according to causal 
dispositionalists. But even when we do succeed in our efforts, and thereby can infer that 
there has not been interference, we still do not experience that our success was necessary 
(we could at best infer it, given the prior assumption that efforts are powers that 
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necessarily bring about what they are directed toward in the absence of interference
6
). We 
can conceive of a scenario where we have the same experience of trying without 
encountering resistance, but the successful result did not follow our effort.  
In my view, we should therefore grant Hume that we do not experience any necessary 
connections between our efforts of will and their results, either in the case of physical or 
mental actions. Still, there are other elements contained by our phenomenology of agency, 
which Hume did not consider, and between which I will now argue that necessary 
connections can be experienced in a way that satisfies even his strict requirements.  
3.3 Necessary Connections Between Motives and Efforts  
Efforts are not the only mental phenomena which seem dispositional. Motivational mental 
states also seem to dispose. In particular, pain disposes us toward trying to avoid it, and 
pleasure disposes us toward trying to pursue it.
7
 Note that I only mention efforts or 
tryings,
8
 which are mental events that need not be supposed to have any experienceable 
further necessary connection with subsequent mental or physical events that they are 
directed toward. Are there any necessary connections between motivational mental states, 
such as pain, and the efforts or tryings they motivate?  
Clearly, pain does not always lead to avoidance attempts. Often we endure pain 
because we believe that it is beneficial. Sometimes we endure pain, or even pursue it, 
because we think we deserve it as punishment. Masochists seek pain in certain contexts 
because it will also give them pleasure. But this does not rule a necessary connection out, 
because specifying the absence of other motives or reasons to endure the pain is equal to 
inserting the ceteris paribus clause excluding interference. 
Therefore, consider an instance of suddenly feeling really excruciating, torturous 
pain, where the subject of the pain experience has no other motives for enduring this pain, 
such as beliefs that it would in some way be instrumentally or morally good. We should 
                                                 
6
 In chapter 4 (pp. 135–137) I argue that the principle that efforts necessarily lead to success when there is 
no resistance can perhaps be inferred directly on the basis of the experience of effort. But it would not 
thereby enable the direct experience of the necessary connections themselves.  
7
 At least two philosophers from the previous chapter took motivation as their starting point. Schopenhauer 
claims that “[…] from the law of motivation I must learn to understand the law of causality in its inner 
significance” (1859/1966a: 126). Ward claims that pain and pleasure, in particular, present themselves as 
sufficient reasons. 
8
 Efforts can also be called acts of will or volitions. They are distinct from intentions, as ordinarily 
understood, because intentions can exist prior to efforts and sometimes end up not being followed by them. 
Searle, however, distinguishes between prior intention and intention in action (Searle 1983: 84–85), and 
intention in action seems to correspond to efforts or tryings.  
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also suppose that the subject has some belief about how to try to make the pain go away. 
Will the subject then necessarily try to make the pain go away? It is hard to conceive 
otherwise. That horrible pain, in and of itself, in the absence of any further reason to 
pursue it, should not make us to try to avoid it, in such conditions, is a scenario that seems 
impossible – in virtue of being inconceivable and unimaginable. And if it is not possible 
that pain does not lead to avoidance, then it is necessary that it does.  
One might also consider whether pain and pleasure could be inverted in our 
motivational structure. Does it not seem impossible that the experience of pleasure 
should, in and of itself, motivate us to try to avoid it? With most regularities of nature we 
have no problem conceiving of them being otherwise. We can imagine, as cosmologists 
do routinely, that the values of the physical constants were different. We can imagine 
gravity working differently – that things went upwards instead of downwards when 
dropped, or, as in cartoons, that gravity did not take effect before someone notices that it 
is supposed to. With the regularities between pain and avoidance, and between pleasure 
and pursuit, it is different – it is not clearly possible to conceive of them coming apart 
under the conditions specified. 
In this way, there is a distinct seeming of necessity. Unlike the connection between, 
e.g., efforts and a successful result, between pain and avoidance efforts we seem to 
experience a necessary connection. We can also experience any interference in the form 
of other reasons or motives. In the case of efforts and results such as bodily movements, it 
seems like we normally need to infer the presence of interferers when efforts fail and the 
absence of interferers when they succeed. When it comes to interfering motives, we can 
detect their presence or absence directly, because they would be our own mental states.  
Why could this seeming of necessity not arise on the basis of inference and not direct 
experience? Causal necessity is inferred (at least partly) on the basis of the regularities it 
underlies. If the causal necessity between pain and avoidance attempts were merely 
inferred, we could not know it (as in subjectively justified knowledge as opposed to, e.g., 
reliable instinctive judgments) on the basis of a single instance. We would have to have 
observed many times that whenever we are in pain, we try to avoid it, unless we have 
another reason not to. But it seems we can know immediately, from experiencing pain 
just once, that this is something that we will systematically try to avoid. The number of 
repetitions does nothing to increase our confidence in this.  
Not only do we know directly that pain and avoidance are connected, we also seem 
to have substantial insight into why they are connected. In order to understand this, we 
107 
 
only need to consider pain in terms of how it feels. There is something about how pain 
feels that seems sufficient to explain avoidance in a way that does not give rise to further 
questions. If someone genuinely wants to know why people tend to avoid painful 
experiences, the answer would be to let them know what a painful experience is 
intrinsically like. In this way, with the feeling of pain we have an experience of something 
with the power to explain regularities in the way powers or dispositional essences are 
supposed to. It cuts off the explanatory regress intelligibly and non-arbitrarily. With other 
laws or regularities of nature, we can never find such an answer to the question as to why 
they hold.  
Why would the connection between pain and avoidance attempts be a matter of 
natural necessity, as opposed to merely analytic or conceptual necessity? Analytic 
functionalism notwithstanding, it does not seem to follow logically from any explication 
of the concept of pain that it would be impossible to experience it without trying to avoid 
it when there is no other reason not to. The thought of pain that does not make us try to 
avoid it when there is no reason not to is not like the thought of a square circle – a 
combination of concepts that generates a logical contradiction. The impossibility of pain 
that does not make us try to avoid it seems rather to have its source in its nature – given 
that the nature of pain is its phenomenal character, or what it is like to be in pain. Only 
when we consider pain in terms of how it feels, by either imagining it or having an 
experience of it, do we understand why it disposes us toward avoidance and why this 
could not have been otherwise.  
Perhaps one could say that avoidance attempts in a sense follows with conceptual 
necessity, once we think of pain under a pure phenomenal concept. Chalmers defines pure 
phenomenal concepts as concepts that pick out phenomenal properties directly in terms of 
their intrinsic phenomenal nature (2010: 256), and my claim is that only when thinking of 
pain in such a way does the necessary connection appear. But necessity in virtue of 
phenomenal concepts is not like ordinary conceptual necessity, which can be argued to 
only reflect how we think about things, and not how things really are. Chalmers claims 
that for pure phenomenal contents, the quality of the experiences they refer to play a role 
in constituting the content of the concept, so that “one might say very loosely that in this 
case, the referent of the concept is somehow present inside the concept’s sense […]” 
(2010: 265–266). A necessary connection in virtue of concepts seems to strongly indicate 
a necessary connection in virtue of the constituents of the concepts. If pure phenomenal 
concepts are in some sense constituted by the phenomenal nature of the property they 
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refer to, a necessary connection in virtue of such concepts strongly indicates a necessary 
connection also in virtue of phenomenal natures.
9
 
3.4 Veridical Experience of Necessary Connections  
So far, I have shown how the experience of our own motivated agency seems to contain 
distinct features of dispositional causation. But why should we think that this experience 
accurately represents reality? I will give two different reasons, one pragmatic and one 
theoretical, to think our phenomenology of agency actually reveals natural necessity and 
does not merely seem to, i.e., to think the experience is veridical or true and not just 
illusory. Firstly, it could be said that if our core phenomenology of agency is not 
veridical, it follows that we are not really agents at all. This entailment is presupposed, or 
at least regarded as highly plausible, in much philosophical literature on agency, but it is 
not often argued extensively for as its own thesis. Esfeld, as quoted above (p. 96), seems 
to take it for granted that it follows from (1) “Humean metaphysics cannot admit our 
experience as acting beings (agents) in the world as being veridical”, that (2) “there is no 
room for agents in a Hume world” (2007: 212). Horgan (2007) makes the same 
assumption. He claims that: 
[…] the right agenda to be pursuing, with respect to the generic philosophical project of 
defending our belief in our own agency, is the agenda of providing viable philosophical 
defenses of the various claims that jointly comprise [a position asserting (i) that humans 
are indeed agents of the sort they experience themselves to be …]. (Horgan 2007: 185) 
Helen Steward (2012) argues extensively that our ordinary concept of agency needs to be 
satisfied in order for there to be agency at all. It is plausible that our ordinary concept of 
agency is in large part based on our phenomenology of agency. Steward holds, however, 
that our ordinary concept presupposes a certain kind of freedom, rather than necessity (a 
point I will return to in chapter 4, section 2.3, when considering objections). The point 
here is that she defends the entailment from an unsatisfied ordinary concept of agency to 
the denial of agency altogether, even though she may disagree about the essential content 
of the concept. Recall also Schiller, who defended that we have experience of causation 
                                                 
9
 Chalmers claims phenomenal concepts of qualities that we are not experiencing right now, but rather only 
have a memory of, are constituted by something like a faint Humean copy of the phenomenal quality 
(2010:272), but a connection in virtue of such a copy would still indicate a connection in virtue of the 
original.  
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on the basis that otherwise one result would be “the utter cancellation of agency” (chapter 
2, p. 76).  
That we are in fact agents is perhaps not theoretically self-evident. But having to 
deny it would clearly be a pragmatic disaster; a consequence that would be impossible to 
live with. As Jerry Fodor puts it:  
[...] if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and 
my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally 
responsible for my saying.... if none of that is literally true, then practically everything I 
believe about anything is false and it’s the end of the world. [10] (Fodor 1989)  
Secondly, the hypothesis that there are in fact necessary connections between pain and 
avoidance efforts, and pleasure and efforts toward pursuing it, has the power to explain 
what would otherwise look like an incredibly fortunate coincidence of evolution. 
Consider this argument James gives against epiphenomenalism: 
It is a well-known fact that pleasures are generally associated with beneficial, pains with 
detrimental, experiences. All the fundamental vital processes illustrate this law. […] Mr. 
Spencer and others have suggested that these coincidences are due, not to any pre-
established harmony, but to the mere action of natural selection which would certainly kill 
off in the long-run any breed of creatures to whom the fundamentally noxious experience 
seemed enjoyable. An animal that should take pleasure in a feeling of suffocation would, 
if that pleasure were efficacious enough to make him immerse his head in water, enjoy a 
longevity of four or five minutes. But if pleasures and pains have no efficacy, one does 
not see […] why the most noxious acts, such as burning, might not give thrills of delight, 
and the most necessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony. (James 1890/1981: 143–
144) 
This is an argument not only against supposing that pleasures and pain have no causal 
power at all, but also, more importantly, against supposing that pleasure and pain could 
cause any kind of behavior. In other words, it supports the view that not only is there 
actually a causal connection, in some sense, between pain and avoidance, and pleasure 
and pursuit of it; this connection must be necessary. 
                                                 
10
 As I will argue below, if more attention is given to phenomenology it is arguable that Fodor’s description 
here actually rules out agency; that is, insofar as he is taken to claim that itching directly causes scratching, 
without an agent as an intermediary. Nevertheless, the quote serves to highlight the importance of real 
agency, or at least mental causation. 
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It seems like sound scientific reasoning to suppose that evolution shapes us to find 
certain experiences enjoyable and others noxious because these experiences will then be 
necessarily connected to pursuit and avoidance, respectively, and therefore selecting these 
motivations is a way of selecting the corresponding behavior. If this were not the case, if 
any motivational feeling could in principle give rise to any behavior, then evolution could 
just as well have linked pain and pleasure to different behavior, and as a result we could 
have creatures for which it felt terrible to breathe, as in James’ example, but they still 
voluntarily did it, and it felt very pleasurable for them to suffocate, but they completely 
abstained from this after learning how pleasurable it felt.  
Those who deny that there are necessary connections between pain and avoidance, 
and pleasure and pursuit, ceteris paribus, cannot explain why this is not the situation that 
obtains in nature. One would have to suppose that it is just an extremely fortunate 
coincidence that we find ourselves avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure, when these 
correlations could just as well be switched around if evolutionary history had been 
different.
11
 Accepting that motivation and the behavior it motivates are necessarily 
connected explains this correlation and saves us from the implausible hypothesis that it is 
just a coincidence.
12
 
An objection might go as follows: the disposition to avoid pain and seek pleasure is 
partly constitutive of rationality in general, and it is no mystery that there would be 
evolutionary pressure toward rationality. It can be granted that avoiding pain and seeking 
pleasure is in some sense rational, from the subjective and ethical point of view. But if so, 
it would follow that there would be very little evolutionary pressure toward rationality. In 
the scenario under consideration, pain is correlated with behavior or stimuli which is 
beneficial, and pleasure with behavior or stimuli which is detrimental. Therefore, 
avoiding pain and seeking pleasure would decrease chances of survival, and creatures 
who were rational enough to avoid pain would be selected against. Could avoiding pain 
and seeking pleasure be constitutive of rationality in any other respect, respects that 
                                                 
11
 Is this switching not precisely what obtains for patients with strong obsessive compulsive disorder? 
People with obsessive compulsive disorder often find themselves doing what they do not want to do. I think 
this is more of a problem of second-order motives losing to first-order motives; that is, of finding oneself 
with unwanted urges. It does not seem that compulsive behaviour is accurately described in terms of actions 
being caused solely by the desire not to perform the action.  
12
 Reductive functionalists can explain it too, of course, although in a certain sense they rather explain the 
problem away by reducing the phenomenal quality of motivational states. So the argument must be 
supported by the kind of arguments against type-A physicalism discussed in chapter 1.  
111 
 
evolution could select for? If pain and pleasure is only contingently connected with 
avoidance and pursuing, respectively, then it should be equally contingently correlated 
with behavior and capacities which are rational in other respects, such as the capacity for 
logical reasoning and planning – so it is hard to see how this could be.  
Another objection would be to say that the connection between events such as pain 
and avoidance could not really have been otherwise because it supervenes on the basic 
laws of nature, or alternatively, one might posit that the connection itself is a basic law of 
nature. Assuming the view that the basic laws of nature are metaphysically contingent, 
this would avoid the conclusion that the connection between pain and avoidance is 
metaphysically necessary, which is what the Mental dispositionality premise requires. But 
if so, the fact that such laws of nature actually obtain in our world could still be regarded 
as an extremely fortunate coincidence. The problem would have a lot in common with the 
problem of cosmic fine-tuning. Not only would we wonder: why do the physical 
constants happen to have values that make life possible? – but also: why do we happen to 
have laws that make the experience of being alive not completely absurd and hopeless? 
Or: why is it not the case that living creatures find themselves pursuing pain and avoiding 
pleasure for its own sake, or otherwise motivationally mismatched?  
Now, the ceteris paribus necessary connection between pain and avoidance effort 
does not alone explain the correlation – there must also be a ceteris paribus necessary 
connection between avoidance efforts and actual avoidance. However, the connection 
between motives and efforts would still be a necessary condition for the connection 
between motives and successful action.  
3.5 Experience of Mental Causation 
Why does the causation that we experience in agency, according to the arguments so far, 
constitute mental causation? Or why are the causal and dispositional properties we 
experience to be regarded as mental properties? 
One way in which the causation we experience in agency appears to be mental is in 
virtue of involving phenomenology – the experience shows that there is something that it 
is like to be a cause or part of a causal process. But it could then be objected that 
causation itself might be separable from the phenomenology. Since we have mentality, it 
could be held, we represent our own causal activity to ourselves through phenomenology. 
In inanimate nature, on the other hand, causation exists as something continuous with 
agency, but it is not represented. Therefore, causation involves phenomenology only in 
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our case, but it does not essentially involve phenomenology. This objection takes 
phenomenology of agency as a kind of perception of causation, insofar as perceived 
objects are generally regarded as existing independently of perceptual phenomenology. 
The view that causation is perceived in agency is expressed, though not explicitly 
defended, by Mumford and Anjum, who hold that “causation can be perceived within 
one’s own body” (2011b: 209), and Timothy O’Connor, who speaks of “perception of the 
agent-causal relation” (O’Connor 1995: 196–7).  
As seen in the previous chapter, Leibniz and Schopenhauer both emphasized that 
experience of causation is not a matter of perception, which is indirect and mediated, but 
rather a matter of direct acquaintance. The view that experience of causation is a kind of 
perception is problematic in and of itself. One central difficulty with it, it seems to me, is 
that it is incompatible with any causal theory of perception. If we assume that perception 
is a matter of being causally affected (in the right way) by the perceived object, as many 
naturalists would suppose, then perception of causation would require that causation itself 
causally affects us. This is metaphysically problematic in a number of ways.  
However, I will not attempt to develop this objection any further, because the 
perception hypothesis, even if coherent, would not help avoid the conclusion that we 
experience causation as mental anyway. The reason is that, if the account I have offered 
so far is correct, the causation we experience in agency must be regarded as mental not 
mainly in virtue of being represented by phenomenology, but rather, mainly in virtue of 
what this phenomenology represents or contains.  
Firstly, the phenomenology contains phenomenal qualities – not (primarily) as a 
representational vehicle, but as causal content. I have argued that the phenomenal nature 
of pain, what it is like to feel it, is what grounds the disposition to avoid it, and that in 
virtue of which we can understand why regularities such as “pain tends to lead to 
avoidance attempts” hold in a way that does not engender a regress of further why-
questions. Therefore, even if it is granted that the causation that is revealed in agency 
could exist without being represented to the agent by phenomenology, this causation 
would still in involve phenomenal qualities, because it is grounded in them. 
Qualitativeness, or the what-it-is-like-ness, of experiences such as pain, is typically 
regarded as a paradigmatically mental phenomenon.  
Secondly, implicit in the account I have defended is a reference to a subject of 
experience. Motives such as pains do not directly connect with efforts to avoid them. 
They are connected by a subject which constitutes a causal nexus between them. The 
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subject constitutes a nexus in virtue of experiencing the pain and having the power to 
make an effort toward avoidance. If the pain is not experienced by a subject, or the 
subject that experiences it does not have the power of agency, the power to try to avoid it, 
then there would be no experienceable necessary connection. Additionally, 
experienceable necessary connections obtain only when it is the same subject that 
experiences the pain that also exerts the effort. Thus the necessity that we experience is 
conditional on the existence of an agentive subject of experience, which is yet another 
paradigmatically mental phenomenon. 
I am now making explicit that our phenomenology of agency is phenomenology of 
agent-causation, the kind of phenomenology I quoted Ginet and Horgan as describing in 
chapter 2 (p. 87). According to the agent-causal view, it is not the case that mental states 
such as pain cause actions directly. Rather, the agent causes the events that count as their 
actions (or together with their efforts constitute their actions, as some prefer to say) in 
view of motives. Some find agent-causation metaphysically problematic and I will 
consider some objections to it in chapter 4 (sections 2.3-2.5). For now, I will 
provisionally note that I take agent-causation to be fully compatible with both a 
deflationary (though not an eliminative) view of subjects and a lack of libertarian free 
will.  
Now, if the phenomenal qualities of motives, subjects of experience, as well as the 
intentionality of efforts, are all parts of constituting that which explains regularities, or of 
what instantiates necessary connections, there is a clear sense in which these necessary 
connections are mental phenomena. If there are any mental phenomena at all, i.e., 
phenomena which either constitute or essentially carry a mark of the mental, it seems at 
least one of these elements must qualify. Intentionality might be excluded, if Molnar and 
Place are correct, but it is implausible to exclude both qualia and subjects of experience as 
well.  
In summary, my argument that we know dispositional properties that are mental 
properties has been as follows: Dispositions are supposed to ground necessary 
connections in virtue of the natures of things, and we experience necessary connections 
between motives and efforts, such as pain and avoidance attempts, in virtue of the 
phenomenal nature of motives and the capabilities of subjects of experience. These are 
both paradigmatically mental phenomena, and when causal necessity obtains in virtue of 
them, this causal necessity should be regarded as mental. This experience should be 
regarded as veridical, because if our phenomenology of agency is illusory, then there is 
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no agency, and agency is something that we know, or at least pragmatically speaking 
need to believe is real. Furthermore, if there are no necessary connections between 
motives and efforts, such as pain and avoidance, the fact that evolution has still connected 
them would seem like an extraordinarily fortunate coincidence.  
3.6 Other Experiences or Concept ions of Causation 
Premise 3b, Mental dispositionality, does not just say that we know dispositional 
properties that are mental properties, it also says that the only dispositional properties we 
know, or have a positive and coherent conception of, are mental properties. Establishing 
this might start from establishing either one of these theses:  
(1) There are no other experiences, and no other positive and coherent 
conceptions, of causation. 
(2) There is only one kind of causation. 
In order to establish thesis (1) one would have to seek out every other account of how we 
know, or may positively conceive of, causation and argue against these accounts. Firstly, 
there are other direct realists views, according to which causation can be experienced, but 
other places than in agency, such as the interactions between external things. This view is 
associated with G. E. M Anscombe (1971).
13
 Secondly, there are various forms of 
conceptual primitivism, according to which the concept of causation is not grounded in 
experience, but is necessarily prior to experience. An example of conceptual primitivism 
is Kant’s transcendental idealism.  
Establishing thesis (2) – there is only one kind of causation – would be easier. It 
would be defensible largely on the same basis as one could argue for monist views in 
general, such as physicalism and Russellian monism, mainly the argument from the 
causal closure of the physical (which I discuss in more detail in chapter 5, section 3). If 
there are two or more kinds of causation, it would amount to interactionism or 
overdetermination. Establishing the final part of Mental dispositionality on the basis of 
thesis (2) might seem just as effective as going via thesis (1). If there is only one kind of 
causation, and we experience it – veridically – in agency as mental, then it seems any 
other experiences which do not represent causation as mental, and any other non-mental 
                                                 
13
 As I read Anscombe, she actually defends a version of conceptual primitivism, but direct realism is often 
attributed to her. 
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concepts of causation, must be either non-veridical experiences or unsatisfied concepts, or 
incomplete experiences or concepts that leave out something essential to causation. 
Hence, no positive conceptions actually refer to non-mental causation.  
However, this simple defense involves a big as of yet unjustified presupposition, 
namely that the mental causation we experience is irreducibly mental. Only if we 
experience irreducibly mental causation can we really say that mental causation as 
experienced in agency is distinct from physical causation, so that they constitute separate 
kinds, in violation of thesis (2), or at least any reading of it that is supported by arguments 
from physical causal closure. Physicalists think that mental causation is reducible to a 
kind of physical causation, and therefore mental and non-mental causation existing side 
by side would not violate the causal closure of the physical. According to physicalism, 
mental and physical causation would not be different kinds in a sense ruled out by a 
plausible reading of thesis (2). In other words, for the defense to work, thesis (2) must be 
read as stating that there is only one irreducible kind of causation, and mental causation 
must be regarded as irreducible.  
Have I not already argued that we experience irreducibly mental causation? Above, I 
did presuppose that subjects, qualia or intentionality (one or more of these) are marks of 
the mental, and I argued that the causation we experience carries all of these marks. But 
something can be, or carry, a mark of the mental and still be reducible to the physical. 
Physicalism only has a problem if fundamental things carry marks of the mental, and I 
have not argued that the mental causation we experience is fundamental, i.e., irreducible.  
 Can it be argued, then, that the kind of causation we experience in our 
phenomenology of agency is irreducibly mental? Agent-causation, the kind of causation 
our phenomenology represents, is associated with dualism, and many take agent-
causation to contain significantly more obstacles for reduction than mental causation 
construed in some other way. However, with a mere appeal to the apparent irreducibility 
of mental elements involved in agent-causation, the problem that a veridical 
phenomenology of agency constitutes for physicalism will be more or less reduced to the 
problem of consciousness in philosophy of mind. Consequently, the argument from 
causation would, in having to presuppose that this problem for physicalism in philosophy 
of mind cannot be solved, end up not constituting much of a distinct argumentative 
strategy for panpsychism after all. Therefore, I will not presuppose the irreducibility of 
subjects, qualia, intentionality, or other elements of agent-causation, or defend it with 
appeal to considerations from philosophy of mind. I will rather try a different argument to 
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show that agent-causation is problematically different from physical causation as it can be 
positively conceived. 
Even if it is granted, in order not to beg the question against physicalism, that mental 
causation of the kind we experience could be a kind of physical causation, it would still 
entail panpsychism if all physical causation is mental, i.e., if no physical causation is non-
mental. Physicalists, in order to avoid this conclusion, would have to give a positive 
account of non-mental physical causation which is continuous with mental agent-
causation. Non-mental physical causation should be as similar as possible to agent-
causation, apart from not involving its mental elements; otherwise, one cannot expect 
agent-causation to reduce to it. The best prospect for coming up with an account of non-
mental physical causation which is continuous with mental (and, by hypothesis, physical) 
causation, is to take the account that fits our experience of mental causation, and then 
remove, or abstract away, the mental elements from that account. But does abstracting 
away the mental elements of agent-causation yield a positive conception of non-mental 
causation to which agent-causation may reduce?  
3.7 Abstracting Away the Mental  
I have argued that causation as experienced is mental not in virtue of being experienced or 
being represented by phenomenology. I experience many physical things, and that does 
not prove that they are mental. Rather, what is experienced is itself mental. It seems like 
mental elements like pain qualia and subjectivity are part of constituting, realizing or 
instantiating necessary connections, rather than merely representing them. The proposal 
now under consideration, on behalf of physicalism, is whether the causal properties 
revealed in phenomenology can be abstracted away from their particular mental realizers.  
In general, it seems that abstraction is an operation that yields abstract structure. The 
argument from non-structural properties is looking for non-structural properties in order 
to avoid Pythagoreanism (and spatiotemporal structuralism, which suffers similar 
problems), and by abstracting away the mental realizer we are perhaps left with nothing to 
realize physical structure after all. But it could be claimed that we can abstract away 
something which is not structural in the logico-mathematical (or purely spatiotemporal) 
sense. Perhaps we can abstract away the pure modal or metaphysical structure of agent-
causation? This would presumably be the metaphysical structure that dispositional 
theories of causation already describe, given how it matches agent-causation.  
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Now, the experience of agency, if what I have said about it so far is correct, reveals 
that dispositional causal structure does not exist uninstantiated or on its own. It exists in 
virtue of some concrete mental realizers – qualia, subjectivity and effort. Presumably, 
non-mental physical causation would consist in the same metaphysical structure with non-
mental physical realizers. The question for physicalists, then, is: what would the non-
mental realizers of dispositional causal structure be? 
Via the process of abstraction from causation as experienced in agency one could 
only arrive at an answer like: “the kind of properties which are non-mental and ground 
necessary connections in virtue of their natures”. This does not count as a positive 
conception and is therefore incompatible with premise 4 – Anti-mysterianism – of the 
argument from non-structural properties. Therefore, one cannot get to a positive 
conception of non-mental causation via abstraction from the experience of agency.
14
 
It is still possible that one might acquire a positive conception of the relevant type of 
non-mental properties in a different way than via abstracting from the experience of 
agency. A complete defense of premise 3b would therefore have to establish something 
like thesis (1), listed above, after all, the thesis that there are no other experiences, and no 
other positive and coherent conceptions, of causation. But at this point the number of 
alternatives that need to be refuted has been narrowed down. Only the theories of 
causation that offer a positive account of a kind of properties which are non-mental and 
ground necessary connections in virtue of their natures, resulting in a structure analogous 
to agent-causation so that agent-causation may reduce to it, must be taken into 
consideration, and no such theory obviously suggests itself. Varieties of causal 
dispositionalism would have been the obvious candidates, but as I have now argued, the 
fact that we experience the metaphysical structure this theory describes as instantiated by 
mental phenomena in agency reveals that this kind of theory in and of itself is too abstract 
to be a basis for such a positive account.  
Therefore, if my arguments so far are correct, I take myself to have shown that 
premise 3b is quite plausible, even though establishing the now restricted thesis (1) would 
make it even more so. The premise should at least seem much more plausible in view of 
this than it does to most philosophers prima facie. Hopefully, though, I would have shown 
                                                 
14
 This reply takes inspiration from Schopenhauer, as quoted in chapter 2: “If, on the other hand, we 
subsume the concept of will under that of force, as has been done hitherto, we renounce the only immediate 
knowledge of the inner nature of the world that we have, since we let it disappear in a concept abstracted 
from the phenomenon […]” (Schopenhauer 1859/1966a: 111–112). 
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it to be plausible also to the extent that the onus would be on the physicalist (or other non-
panpsychist) to show that the now restricted thesis (1) is false, i.e., that there are positive 
conceptions of non-mental causation of the relevant kind.  
4 THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION: SUMMARY 
In chapter 1, I showed that the argument for panpsychism from categorical properties is 
threatened by dispositionalism, dispositional essentialism and certain conceptions of the 
identity view, according to which irreducibly dispositional properties can realize all or 
most physical structure. Dispositionalism and dispositional essentialism entail the falsity 
of the premise that physical structure must be instantiated by categorical properties, and 
the identity view could entail the falsity of the premise that all the categorical properties 
we know or have a positive conception of are mental. I have argued that instead of 
attempting to refute dispositionalism, dispositional essentialism and the relevant versions 
of the identity view, panpsychists can argue that they entail panpsychism. In chapter 2, I 
showed that an argument of this kind has been put forth by a number of philosophers 
since the early modern era, both in support of the conclusion, panpsychism, and as 
reductio of the premises.  
In this chapter, I have shown that there is an argument of this kind, an argument from 
dispositional properties, which can be put in same form as the argument from categorical 
properties and would thereby be valid if the latter is. Both arguments can be combined 
into a stronger and more general argument for panpsychism, an argument from non-
structural properties, where all premises – expect for one – are either easily seen to be 
defensible, or defensible on the basis of arguments discussed in chapter 1. The remaining 
premise is that the only dispositional properties we know, or have a positive conception 
of, are mental properties.  
I have defended this premise by showing, first, how in our phenomenology of agency 
we seem to experience necessary connections, of the kind dispositional essences are 
supposed to ground, between motives and efforts, such as pain and avoidance attempts. 
This experience should be accepted as veridical, for theoretical reasons, such as James’ 
evolutionary argument, and for pragmatic reasons, insofar as a non-veridical 
phenomenology of agency entails that agency itself is illusory. The dispositional 
properties known in this way would be mental, because the necessary connections 
experienced in phenomenology are grounded in or instantiated by phenomenal qualities, 
agentive subjects of experience and the intentionality of efforts – and at least one of these 
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must qualify as a mark of the mental. This knowledge of mental dispositional properties 
constitutes our only positive conception of dispositional properties, because, firstly, there 
is good reason to hold that there is only one fundamental kind of causation, and if our 
phenomenology of agency is veridical, then the mental dispositional causation we 
experience through it must be of this kind. Secondly, we seem to have no basis for a 
positive conception of non-mental causation of such a kind that the mental dispositional 
causation we experience in agency could reduce to a species of it.  
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4 
Objections to the Argument from Causation 
 
In this chapter, I will consider various objections to the argument from causation – first 
some that are based on psychology and pathological cases and then some based on the 
philosophical presuppositions or implications of the argument. Answering the final two 
philosophical objections will require considering the combination problem, and my full 
response can therefore only be provided in chapter 7, after having discussed the 
combination problem in chapters 5 and 6.  
1 OBJECTIONS FROM PSYCHOLOGY AND 
PATHOLOGICAL CASES 
1.1 Pain Asymbolia  
Theories of pain often distinguish two aspects of pain. The sensory-discriminatory aspect 
is that in virtue of which we can discriminate pain from other sensations and phenomenal 
qualities in general – other bodily sensations, such as tickles, other sensations, such as 
visual qualities, and other uncomfortable experiences, such as negative emotions. The 
affective-motivational aspect is the negativity of pain, that aspect in virtue of which we 
are compelled to avoid it. We tend to believe that these two aspects are necessarily 
connected – that pain has negative affective value in virtue of its sensory quality, or in 
other words, that feeling like pain and feeling bad amounts to one and the same thing. But 
some medical cases seem to show that the sensory-discriminatory and the affective-
motivational aspects of pain can come apart. Nikola Grahek (2007) has argued that there 
is one (and only one) case where we see the complete disassociation between the sensory-
discriminatory and the affective-motivational aspects of pain, or in Grahek’s terms, 
between pain and painfulness: 
Pain without painfulness is found in patients who suffer from a rare neurological 
syndrome known as pain asymbolia. Characteristically, these patients feel pain upon 
harmful stimulation, but their pain no longer represents danger or threat to them. These 
patients do not mind pain at all; indeed, they may even smile or laugh at it. (Grahek 2007: 
3).  
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Does this show that the necessary connection between pain and avoidance efforts is 
illusory? It clearly threatens to show this – here we have the sensory quality of pain 
without any avoidance effort, where this cannot be explained by any interfering motives. 
However, if we go into the detail of this phenomenon, it can be seen that Grahek’s 
account of pain arrived at on this basis does not in fact contradict my account.  
The first lesson to learn from pain asymbolia, according to Grahek, is that the unity 
of the pain phenomenon, which is often taken for granted, is an illusion:  
[…] although pain appears to be a simple, homogenous experience, it is actually a 
complex experience comprising sensory-discriminative, emotional-cognitive and 
behavioral components. These components are normally linked together, but they can 
become disconnected and therefore, much to our astonishment, they can exist separately. 
(Grahek 2007: 2) 
If the emotional-cognitive component, corresponding to the affective-motivational 
painfulness or unpleasantness of pain, were to be revealed as purely functional, while the 
inert sensory aspect retains all the phenomenology, and function and phenomenology 
come completely apart, then it looks like the dispositionality of pain phenomenology must 
be an illusion. But if the emotional-cognitive component also involves phenomenology, 
the pure affective-motivational phenomenology of painfulness, negative tone, or 
unpleasantness, then there is no problem. The correct thing to say then would be that it is 
the painfulness part of normal pain experience which is necessarily connected to 
avoidance attempts. It is just because it is always, in normal cases, mixed with the 
sensory-discriminatory aspect that we fail to notice the distinction between them, and do 
not see that only one disposes toward avoidance.  
Grahek endorses the latter view that enables the problem to be thus dissolved. “On 
the one hand,” he claims, “there is pure pain sensation, and on the other hand, there is the 
pure feeling of unpleasantness, defying any further sensory specification”. (Grahek 2007: 
111, my emphasis). What kind of feeling is pure unpleasantness or painfulness? Given 
that there can be (sensory) pain without painfulness, it must also be possible to experience 
painfulness without pain – and Grahek shows that such a case has actually been 
documented. The case involves a patient who cannot feel sensory pain, and is subjected to 
cutaneous laser stimulation, which would normally be very painful:  
[...] the patient spontaneously described a “clearly unpleasant” intensity dependent feeling 
emerging from an ill-localized and extended area “somewhere between fingertips and 
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shoulder,” that he wanted to avoid. The fully cooperative and eloquent patient was 
completely unable to further describe the quality, localization, and intensity of the 
perceived stimulus. (Ploner, Freund, and Schnitzler quoted in Grahek 2007: 108–109 ) 
His dislike of the feeling of cutaneous laser stimulation and his accompanying wish to 
avoid it were not motivated by the quality and intensity of the sensation felt, by that 
distinctive and insistent quality which distinguishes pain from other sensations. Rather, 
the patient was motivated by the pure unpleasantness of the experience. Paradoxically 
enough, in this bizarre case of pain affect without pain sensation, his only answer to the 
query – “Why do you dislike that sensation?” – was “Because it is unpleasant.” It is true 
that to give such an answer is really to give no answer, but merely to reaffirm one’s 
dislike of the sensation. It tells us nothing new. But the point is that in this case, this was 
all the information available to the subject. (Grahek 2007: 111) 
According to my account defended in the previous chapter, some substance can be read 
into the patient’s answer after all – what he could mean to say is that he is disposed to try 
to avoid the experience (by expressing the wish to avoid the laser) because of its intrinsic 
unpleasant phenomenal character, and that if one knew what it was like, one would 
understand.  
If pain is actually separable into two aspects in this way, is the sensory-
discriminatory aspect revealed as inert and completely non-dispositional? Grahek assigns 
this aspect an important function: 
[…] the sensation of pain (pain quality) plays an important role in the total human 
experience of pain. […] its central role is to distinguish pain sensations from nonphysical 
pain, and from other unpleasant sensations, as well as from other sensations that may be 
qualitatively similar to it but are of different modality. (Grahek 2007: 103) 
So, as far as the two basic components of human pain experience are concerned, it is 
obvious that both of them are necessary, but neither of them is a sufficient condition for 
pain. The two phenomena give us real pain only when they work together. This is how it 
should be, if Mother Nature devised the pain system to serve its primary biological 
function: to give an organism information concerning threatening or damaging stimuli 
and simultaneously to move it to self-preservation. (Grahek 2007: 111–112) 
On this basis, it could be held that sensory-discriminatory pain quality is also 
dispositional, but not by disposing toward avoidance. It might rather, for example, 
dispose toward activities such as thinking about the source of the pain, or thinking about 
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the difference between this quality and other qualities, and – in combination with the 
affective-motivational aspect – toward a certain manner of avoidance.  
In conclusion, then, pain asymbolia is compatible with my claim that ordinary pain 
disposes toward avoidance in virtue its intrinsic phenomenal character. It only turns out 
that normal pain phenomenology has two components, both of which are experiential, but 
only one of which disposes in this way. The other component of pain that does not 
dispose toward avoidance might still dispose toward other kinds of activities than 
avoidance in virtue of its intrinsic phenomenal character, so the phenomenon of pain 
asymbolia does not show that some phenomenal qualities are non-dispositional and inert. 
Below (section 2.1) I will discuss whether this would have been a problem.  
1.2 Illusions of  Agency I –  Libet  
Another empirical problem for my account would be cases of apparent illusions of 
agency, where subjects report that they acted, but there are empirical reasons to conclude 
that they did not act at all. This is in tension with the claim that phenomenology of agency 
provides immediate acquaintance with causation, as opposed to indirect awareness 
analogous to perception, because with acquaintance comes at least some degree of 
infallibility. 
Benjamin Libet (1985) conducted some famous experiments that constitute such a 
challenge. These experiments purport to show – though the interpretation of the data is 
controversial – that certain brain events, readiness-potentials, systematically occur 
seconds before our conscious decisions. If these brain events are interpreted as 
unconscious decisions, then it seems natural to take the subsequent conscious decision as 
not another real decision predetermined to occur by the unconscious decision, but rather 
as a passive coming to be aware of the decision that has already unconsciously been 
made. Our phenomenology of making a decision, which can be regarded as a mental 
action, would according to this interpretation not really be an awareness of mental 
causation but at best an epiphenomenal (with respect to the outcome of the decision) 
representation of prior physical causation.  
One response to this problem is to claim that there is no reason to interpret the 
preceding brain events, the readiness-potentials, as unconscious decisions – they could 
rather be interpreted as conscious urges to make a decision (Nahmias 2002: 532), or 
simply as unconscious antecedents of the decision with no appropriate description in 
psychological terms. If so, the experiment only confirms that our decisions have causal 
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antecedents, mental or physical, and this would not be in conflict with any claims about 
our phenomenology of agency that the argument from causation relies on. 
Another response would be to grant that readiness-potentials are unconscious 
decisions, and that our conscious decisions are determined by these unconscious 
decisions, but then claim that the conscious decision could still be a real decision. What 
happens, it could be held, is basically that the unconscious mind
1
 decides that the 
conscious mind should decide. If this sounds odd, I think it is mostly because it is odd that 
there could, strictly and literally, be such things as unconscious decisions in the first 
place. The oddness should therefore, if anything, be taken as a reason to reject the 
interpretation of readiness-potentials as unconsciousness decisions, in favor of 
interpretations of them as urges or non-psychological causal antecedents, rather than as a 
reason for doubting that the conscious decision is real.  
It could be held, though, that there is nothing wrong with unconscious decisions, but 
that the idea that our conscious decisions are determined by unconscious decisions would 
still be objectionable, because the notion of deciding to decide is incoherent. In response, 
it could be granted that deciding to decide is not something we often, or perhaps even are 
able to, do consciously. However, when the first decision is unconscious, deciding to 
decide could make more sense – the unconscious could decide to produce a conscious 
reason, motive or urge that determines conscious decision, for example. This 
interpretation is also consistent with the phenomenology and would be available as long 
as it is not shown that the conscious decision (or brain event involved in it) is not even on 
the causal path toward the action – and Libet’s experiments do not show this. 
1.3 Illusions of  Agency II –  Wegner 
Another challenge comes from Daniel Wegner, who has argued for a theory of apparent 
mental causation:  
According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, 
is consistent with the action, and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the 
action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. 
Experiences of conscious will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself 
– not from processes whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, in this view, is an 
                                                 
1
 Which according to panpsychism would in a sense be conscious, but it would probably be a system 
constituted by an aggregate of microsubjects and not a macrosubject of its own. 
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indication that we think we have caused an action, not a revelation of the causal sequence 
by which the action was produced. (Wegner 2004: 649) 
Wegner claims that it is common to see illusions of agency in cases of flipping coins and 
rolling dice: when someone is intensely hoping and intending for a certain outcome, and 
the outcome then occurs by coincidence, they may feel like they made it happen. Given 
that I do not claim that we are acquainted with causal relations between intentions or 
efforts and outcomes, there being a possibility of an illusion here is no problem. A 
problem would arise only if someone distinctly experiences the phenomenology of doing 
something, but from the outside it looks like they are doing nothing. Being deluded about 
what one is doing, remains fully possible on my account. In the dice and coin-flipping 
cases, the subjects were doing something, namely hoping and intending – and thereby at 
least firing some neurons. The subjects are just very much mistaken about the possible 
effects, or the appropriate description, of these mental actions, i.e., about what they were 
doing.
2
 Since actions are always described in terms of their (typical) effects or outcomes, 
the fact that we do not have a priori knowledge of the effects or outcomes of actions 
entails that we cannot have a priori knowledge of the appropriate descriptions of our 
actions either. 
But Wegner presents another case where subjects report that they acted, while it 
really seems they were doing nothing, not just something else. This is the so-called I Spy 
study, here summarized by Bayne and Levy:  
[…] participants and an experimental confederate had joint control of a computer mouse 
that could be moved over any one of a number of images on a board (e.g., a swan). On 
certain trials the confederate forced the pointer to land on a target image while 
participants were primed with the name of the image via headphones at a certain temporal 
interval either after or before the pointer landed on the image. When the prime occurred 
immediately before the pointer landed on the target image participants showed an 
increased tendency to selfattribute the action, that is, to claim that they had intended to 
land on the image. Wegner and Wheatley argue that the prime creates an experience of 
agency in the absence of an exercise of agency. (Bayne and Levy 2006: 54) 
This case is difficult to interpret. Firstly, one must be clear about what the participants are 
reporting. The study asked the participants to rank how much they had intended to make 
                                                 
2
 I assume that intensely hoping or intending are activities, not something one passively undergoes, so the 
subjects of the illusion are doing something.  
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the pointer stop on the image on a scale from 1–100 (Wegner 2003: 75), and the highest 
rating reported, when the prime occurred between 1 and 5 seconds before, was around 63 
(Wegner 2003: 77). It is not clear whether reporting 63 % intentionality equals reporting 
actually having acted or tried. However, let us grant that it does; that the participants were 
self-attributing action. In what sense, then, did they feel that the action was theirs? Are 
they reporting to have experienced the distinct phenomenology of trying to move the 
pointer to the image? Or are they just reporting, for example, a feeling of being 
responsible for the movement of the pointer, the same kind of feeling one may attach to, 
say, the actions of one’s children, or the actions of a group one is part of, even though 
strictly speaking they are not one’s own actions (something one might easily even 
forget)? The participants might not have been clear about the many ways in which we can 
feel that an action is ours, ways which may only be distinguishable on reflection, and 
therefore not really be reporting what they seem to report.  
But even if the participants are reporting having had the phenomenology of trying to 
move the pointer, this would not be a problem as long as this phenomenology was not 
present at the moment that the pointer was being moved by the confederate, but rather 
only present in a memory that they confabulated later. My account does not rule out post 
hoc confabulation or errors of memory, only that we can be mistaken about whether we 
are acting, i.e., exerting effort or power, as it is happening. Wegner himself points to the 
ubiquity of confabulation of agency after the fact:  
Studies of the confabulation of intention following action show that people often invent or 
distort thoughts of action in order to conform to their conception of ideal agency. People 
who are led to do odd actions through post-hypnotic suggestion, for example, often 
confabulate reasons for their action. Such invention of intentions is the basis for a variety 
of empirical demonstrations associated with theories of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 
1957) and the left-brain interpretation of action (Gazzaniga 1983). (Wegner 2004: 659)  
In summary, then, I would have to assume that the findings of the I Spy study can be 
explained as results of post hoc confabulation or misremembering, or as results of 
misinterpreting the reports of the participants as reports of actual phenomenology of 
trying instead of a more general feeling of being responsible, or of having in some sense 
intended without actually having acted.  
Wegner presents a number of cases in support of his theory of apparent mental 
causation, and I cannot discuss them all here. In general though, the main thesis he is 
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interested in refuting seems to be the thesis that we have a priori knowledge of causal 
relations between will and its physical results, and it bears repeating that I fully agree that 
there is no reason to assume this. He also wants to refute the idea that we experience will 
in an especially metaphysically demanding sense, a view of will which:  
At the extreme […] makes the scientific study of [will] entirely out of the question, and 
suggests instead that it ought to be worshiped. Pointing to will as a force in a person that 
causes the person’s action is the same kind of explanation as saying that God has caused 
an event. This is a stopper that trumps any other explanation, but that still seems not to 
explain anything at all in a predictive sense. Just as we can’t tell what God is going to do, 
we can’t predict what the will is likely to do. (Wegner 2003: 12–13)  
While I am defending a view according to which the nature of will is to a certain extent 
outside the scope of scientific explanation (given that it belongs to the Russellian intrinsic 
natures of things), I am not claiming that will is a stopper for scientific explanation of any 
empirical phenomena. Since I am not defending any of the main theses Wegner is out to 
refute, many of the cases he presents are not relevant. Those that are relevant seem like 
they must all be approached along the lines of the responses just suggested. 
1.4 The Transparency of  Motivation  
The two previous sections hinted at ways in which our own motivations are not always 
transparent to us. We cannot tell whether pain motivates as a whole, or just in virtue of 
one of its aspects. We may also confabulate and misinterpret our own motives and 
intentions. Does the Mental dispositionality premise presuppose that our own motives are 
always transparent to us? If so, it would be inconsistent with a host of evidence from 
psychology.  
Schopenhauer famously claims that the will is groundless or arational – it want what 
it wants, and that is all there is to it. How come we can then explain it in terms of 
motives? When we explain our actions by their motives, we are, according to 
Schopenhauer, imposing the forms of representation on the will. We are no longer 
looking at the will directly, but rather comparing and relating one representation of the 
will to other representations of it. Therefore, we can make mistakes about our motives, 
while being infallibly in contact with the will.  
I think of Schopenhauer’s point as being that all we can infallibly know, in the case of 
every particular action, is that I tried to do this action now because I felt like it, because I 
felt the urge or compulsion to, or because I just wanted to. This is not an empty truism, 
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because the particular feeling, urge or want is concretely experienced and, by 
Schopenhauer’s hypothesis (and mine), it actually reveals the nature and ground of 
causation. However, nothing scientifically interesting follows from it. When we 
conceptualize our feelings, urges and wants as being of a certain type (as opposed to just 
“this feeling”) we can get something scientifically interesting, but we can also make 
mistakes. Conceptualizing a feeling involves comparing it to other particular feelings, 
which are not immediately present for comparison, and thereby the possibility of error 
enters.  
Take the example of smoking. It is not always obvious to smokers why they are 
smoking – whether it is for the taste, the feeling, the stress relief, the addiction or 
something else. Consider trying to find out why you are really smoking a cigarette. Is it 
for the sake of enjoyment, in and of itself, of for example the taste of the tobacco or other 
feelings or sensations that come with it? Or is it in order to distract from negative 
emotions, such as stress, boredom or perhaps withdrawal symptoms? In other words, what 
is your motive? Finding the answer involves paying attention to the feeling of wanting to 
smoke, to other simultaneous feelings, reflecting on them and comparing them to 
representations of other feelings and urges you have experienced or can imagine which 
fall under some of the concepts in question, such as addition, relief, enjoying something 
for its own sake, and so on. This is clearly a difficult task, in which there is a lot of room 
for error. It does not, however, contradict the view that you are (or were, as it occurred) 
immediately acquainted with the feeling you are trying to find the proper concept for, and 
that you have infallible knowledge that this feeling (regardless of how it is properly 
described) ultimately explains this particular action. 
This model explains how we can be acquainted with causation without being able to 
infallibly conceptualize our motives, and thereby makes plenty of room for confabulation 
and error of the kind psychologists have amply documented.  
2 PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Now I will consider some philosophical presuppositions and implications of the argument 
(apart from panpsychism!) that some might find objectionable. 
2.1 Are All  Experiences Motivational?  
Does the argument presuppose that necessary connections are present in all motivation or 
just with pain and pleasure? If pain and pleasure were the only experiences that ground 
necessary connections, a hedonistic theory of motivation would follow – a theory many 
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find reason to resist. It would also be problematic if many phenomenal qualities were 
inert and non-dispositional on their own, and only became efficacious by being 
contingently connected with dispositional qualities, pain and pleasure. How could 
physical structure be systematically and intelligibly grounded in mental properties, and 
how could all mental properties have a causal role, if only some are intrinsically 
dispositional and some are purely categorical? If both categorical and dispositional 
aspects play a role in grounding the physical, it is hard to see how it could be that not all 
of the mental grounding properties have both aspects. If only one aspect plays a role in 
grounding the physical, it is hard to see what could be the causal role of the mental 
qualities that are without this aspect. 
These problems, hedonism and a worrisome complication of the Russellian 
grounding relation, would not follow if all phenomenology, not only pain and pleasure, is 
intrinsically motivating and thereby dispositional. Hartshorne (1934) argues that all 
possible experiential qualities form an affective continuum. On his view, all qualities have 
an intrinsic affective aspect: “in feeling, ‘striving’ is implicitly incarnate […] (Hartshorne 
1934: 37). For some qualities, like colors and sounds, this aspect is just not so noticeable. 
Hartshorne claims that “the ‘gaiety’ of yellow […] is the yellowness of the yellow” 
(1934: 7) – i.e., emotional tone is intrinsic to yellowness. Other possible examples are 
how blue seems calming and red seems energizing. These emotional aspects might be so 
weak that they are always drowned out by stronger motivations in our actual experience. 
But we can imagine that if they were properly isolated we could clearly experience their 
emotional tone and dispositionality.  
I have already suggested that the sensory-discriminatory aspect of pain, the 
component that does not dispose toward avoidance, is not inert and non-dispositional on 
its own, but rather disposes one more weakly toward, e.g., thinking about the source of 
the pain quality, or thinking about the difference between this quality and other qualities. 
The dispositionality of these qualities would be weak in the same way the dispositionality 
of colors is weak. The role of such weak dispositions would perhaps usually be to 
combine with stronger disposition, such as an avoidance disposition, as modifiers or 
them. Sensory pain together with a pure unpleasantness would result in a different manner 
of avoidance than, say, the sensory quality of anxiety together with a pure unpleasantness 
(assuming that the unpleasantness in anxiety and bodily pain is similar). 
If a theory like Hartshorne’s, according to which all experiences are at least weakly 
dispositional, is plausible, then the argument would not entail hedonism and problems 
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with Russellian grounding. All qualities could be intrinsically motivating and 
dispositional without being coupled with pain and pleasure. The dispositional aspect of 
qualities could be regarded as essential to Russellian grounding, and any categorical 
aspects as necessarily connected to the dispositional aspect and thereby essential as well 
(I will discuss whether or not it follows that mental properties are also categorical in the 
next section). I find Hartshorne’s theory very plausible, and will indirectly defend it by 
pointing to some further advantages of the continuum of qualities in chapter 5 (section 
4.5). If such a theory cannot be made to work, however, perhaps a sophisticated version 
of hedonism can be found which escapes the most serious objections. Perhaps also a way 
of integrating both dispositional and purely categorical mental properties as grounds, 
systematically and intelligibly, can be found, even though how it would work is not 
immediately obvious.  
2.2 Implications for Theories of  Properties  
I have argued that mental properties are dispositional. In chapter 1, I discussed some 
arguments that mental properties are categorical. The arguments can all be sound if the 
identity view of properties is true: if the categorical and the dispositional are two aspects 
of every single property. Considering how mental properties are arguably both categorical 
and dispositional could help to render the identity view more intelligible.  
In principle, if the identity view is rejected, then some of the arguments must be 
mistaken. As I have shown, panpsychism would still follow if only one type of argument 
is correct. According to the argument from non-structural properties, only one of these 
premises needs to be (non-vacuously) true: 
3a) Mental categoricity: The only categorical properties (whose nature) we 
can know, or positively conceive of, are mental properties. 
3b) Mental dispositionality: The only dispositional properties (whose 
nature) we can know, or positively conceive of, are mental properties. 
Because the conclusion follows anyway, the argument from causation, or dispositional 
properties, can in principle leave open the question of whether mental properties are 
purely dispositional or categorical as well (but their being purely categorical is ruled out). 
Given that there is room for error when applying concepts to our experiences (see section 
1.4 above), this is not in tension with the presupposition that we are acquainted with the 
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nature of our experience (in some respects), as per The Partial Revelation Thesis and 
phenomenal essentialism (see chapter 1, p. 16 and 46). 
2.3 Agent-Causation and Freedom 
I have argued that our phenomenology of agency reveals necessary connections between 
motives and efforts in virtue of a subject of experience that experiences the motives and 
exerts the effort. This is the phenomenology of agent-causation. 
Although, as noted, agent-causation is often associated with incompatibilist 
libertarianism about free will, agent-causation of the kind I have claimed we experience is 
perfectly compatible with determinism – in particular, determinism by reasons.3 It would 
be bad news if phenomenology of agency seemed to reveal only libertarian agent-
causation. I argued that we experience the kind of necessitation that could underlie the 
regularities of nature. Libertarian agent-causation involves no necessitation, because 
libertarian agents are uncaused causes, or partially uncaused causes, and this kind of 
spontaneous causation is more suited to underlie irregular behavior.  
But with this rejection of libertarian freedom an objection may come up. The notion 
of libertarian freedom, regardless of its philosophical plausibility, is often held to have its 
source in our phenomenology of agency. A hard determinist might think that even though 
there is no such thing as libertarian freedom, we do still (non-veridically) experience 
ourselves as free in this way, and that this is perhaps the reason for the appeal of 
libertarianism in spite of its arguable philosophical problems. How can agency be where 
we experience necessary connections, and at the same time be the source of the notion of 
libertarian freedom, the opposite of necessity? 
Whether we actually directly experience ourselves as free in the libertarian sense is 
debatable. It might be an inferred hypothesis or interpretation. Eddy Nahmias, Stephen 
Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Jason Turner have conducted a survey on the limited 
                                                 
3
 There can be no threat to free agency from physical determinism when it turns out that the laws of nature 
are grounded in mental properties, i.e., the intrinsic nature of phenomenal reasons. Determinism by reasons 
(i.e., motives of all kinds) has the advantage of being compatible with more views of freedom than physical 
determinism is, for example, the Kant-inspired view that freedom consists in being determined by rational 
motives, like moral imperatives, as opposed to arational or irrational motives, like desires and inclinations. 
Many find that rational determination is threatened by physical determination being fundamental, but on my 
view, physical determination is not fundamental so there is no such threat. A rational determination view of 
freedom is not only compatible with the view that there are necessary connections between motives and 
efforts but also requires it: an agent is free in this sense when their efforts are necessitated by rational 
motives. Rational motives could be experiential and motivate in virtue of their phenomenal natures 
assuming that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology.  
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data that exists documenting whether people in general take themselves to directly 
experience free will, with the following result: 
The data seem to support compatibilist descriptions of the phenomenology more than 
libertarian descriptions. We conclude that the burden is on libertarians to find empirical 
support for their more demanding metaphysical theories with their more controversial 
phenomenological claims. (Nahmias et al. 2004: 162) 
This indicates (though very inconclusively) that phenomenology of agency alone is at 
least not the whole source of the libertarian notion of freedom.  
However, if the indications would turn out to be misleading, if it is shown that we do 
actually experience ourselves as free in the libertarian sense, this would not necessarily be 
a serious problem for my argument as long as we do not experience ourselves as free all 
of the time. In particular, this phenomenology would have to be absent from some cases 
where pain motivates avoidance. Perhaps I could modify the ceteris paribus clause, and 
reformulate my claim as: there are necessary connections between motives and efforts in 
the absence of (1) interfering motives and (2) any capacity for spontaneous free action.
4
  
2.4 Agent-Causation and the Persisting Subject  
Agent-causation is also associated with the view that the subject, or self, is a persisting 
substance – which, again, many find reason to resist. But, just like with freedom, agent-
causation does not entail that subjects persist over time. There is no reason to think only 
persisting things can be causes. However, some think that subjects are by nature 
necessarily persisting – unless they are annihilated by external forces they will naturally 
go on existing – and that by positing agent-causation we are forced to accept them. But 
this is not a given. Strawson defends a deflationary view of subjects (Strawson 2009, 
2008b), according to which subjects do not persist through time for very long at all, but 
only last as long as a moment of experience – the reason being that subjects are not really 
distinct from the totality of their experiences. If Strawson’s view, or another theory that 
                                                 
4
 The absence of the free capacity, as opposed to just the absence of the exercise of a free capacity, is 
required because it seems that if we (feel that we) have a capacity for free choice that we do not exercise, 
we (feel that we) freely choose not to exercise it. Many libertarians argue that the capacity for free choice is 
not always present, i.e., that free choice is possible only in certain cases and not always: in cases where 
desires and motives are closely balanced, but not in cases where desires or motives strongly point in one 
direction. Therefore, the clause is relevant to some, but not all, actually held views about how libertarian 
freedom works.  
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explains how subjects can be transient, is plausible, then we are not forced into accepting 
persisting subjects by accepting agent-causation.  
Rejecting persisting subjects also lets the argument from causation avoid another 
potential problem. Empiricists, e.g., Hume, often claim that we have no impression of a 
self as something that persists in the background while experiences change. If we have an 
impression of causation, and causation is (partly) instantiated by a subject, then the 
subject cannot be equal to the unobservable persisting self because then there would be no 
impression of causation after all. If we accept a view whereby subjects are as transient as 
experiences, then this problem is avoided and there will be no need to argue against 
Hume (again) that there actually is an impression of something persisting.  
In chapter 5 (section 4.1), I explain Strawson’s view in more detail and argue that it 
might also be required in order to bypass the combination problem. I will discuss a further 
problem related to it in chapter 7 (section 1), concerning whether there could be proper 
causal relations of the kind I have described within a transient and deflated subject. 
2.5 Agent-Causation and the Unified Subject  
Agent-causation does not require that agentive subjects persist, i.e., are unified over time. 
What it does seem to require, however, is that subjects have a momentary unity as they 
exist. Firstly, this is because subjects are fundamentally characterized by a unity of 
consciousness within which all its experiences are contained. Acceptance of the 
momentary unity of subjects may be what fundamentally distinguishes deflationary views 
of the subject from eliminative views such as the bundle theory, and the agent-causal 
view is clearly not compatible with an eliminative view. Secondly, while agentive 
subjects can be complex in the sense of experiencing many different motives at the same 
time, when causally acting it only exerts one single effort at a time. Therefore, agentive 
subjects seem unified also in virtue of the structure of the power exerted by them.  
As discussed in chapter 1 (section 3.1), panpsychism faces a combination problem. It 
has to explain how complex macrosubjects can either be constituted by a number of 
microsubjects, or strongly emerge from them. Agents being strongly unified in the way 
just described suggests that macrosubjects, who are agents, must result from strong 
emergence and not constitution. In particular, the unity of the powers or efforts exerted by 
agents seems too strong to be merely a result of aggregation of individual powers. 
In this way, accepting agent-causation intensifies the combination problem for 
constitutive panpsychism. If we accept panpsychism on the basis of the argument from 
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causation we also accept a further reason to think macrosubjects cannot be explained via 
constitution. It may also be seen to somewhat intensify the empirical aspect of the 
combination problem for emergent panpsychism. As discussed in chapter 1 (section 
3.1.2), a principle of microphysical, as opposed to mere physical, causal closure might 
entail that emergent macrosubjects are epiphenomenal or overdeterminers if their parts 
are still taken to be microsubjects. If one accepts panpsychism on the basis of the 
argument from causation, it becomes even clearer that this is the case and that 
epiphenomenalism is not an option. Agentive macrosubjects must have emergent causal 
powers, powers that are not constituted by the powers of its parts. If this is correct, then 
the argument from causation is dependent on there being a coherent theory of 
combination in terms of strong (but not brute) emergence of macrosubjects that supplant 
their parts, i.e., a fusion account. But – fortunately enough! – in the next two chapters, I 
will propose and defend a theory of combination of this kind.  
2.6 Transeunt Causation  
I have argued that we only experience necessary connections between motives and efforts 
within a subject that acts as a causal nexus. But on what basis can we understand causal 
relations between different subjects? This is the problem of inter-substantial, inter-
subjective or transeunt causation. As noted in chapter 2, Leibniz thought this was 
impossible, and replaced real transeunt causation with a pre-established harmony.  
In order to avoid this outcome, there are three main options for my position: (1) to 
take a mysterian, or skeptical realist, attitude toward transeunt causation, (2) to argue that 
we can infer a positive conception of the nature of transeunt causation from our 
acquaintance with the nature of powers in effort, and (3) to argue that we can abstract 
away from immanent causation, i.e., causation within a subject, a positive account of 
transeunt causation.
5
 I think all three options are acceptable. They could also all be true at 
the same time, if some aspects of transeunt causation can be rendered partially intelligible 
in virtue of thesis (2) and (3), but other aspects remain mysterious.  
                                                 
5
 A fourth option is to say that for all transeunt causation there is an overlapping subject containing the 
experiences of both interacting subjects. Relative to the overlapping subject the causation is then immanent 
and intelligible. I think this is ultimately untenable for reasons such as: (1) Overlapping agentive subjects 
would give a serious exclusion problem. (2) Sharing of experiences is incompatible with phenomenal 
essentialism and phenomenal holism, both of which I find plausible (see Basile’s argument discussed in 
chapter 1, p. 46). 
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According to the anti-mysterian premises from the different versions of the argument 
of causation (premise 4 from the arguments from dispositional and non-structural 
properties and premise III from the first formulation), the nature of causation is not 
unknown. But this does not necessarily rule out option (1), the view that we cannot know 
the nature of transeunt causation. One might read the premises as requiring only that the 
nature of causation is not wholly unknown. If the transeunt aspect of causation is 
unknown, but the immanent aspect is known, this makes the nature of causation partially 
known. However, one might find it objectionable that transeunt causation should be 
regarded as an aspect of causation and not as its own property or phenomenon, or that 
there is a distinction between aspects and properties with this kind of significance in the 
first place. Another way of looking at it, then, which does not rely on this subtle 
distinction, is seeing how positing unknown transeunt causal properties is at least 
compatible with the motivation of the anti-mysterian premises. The premises are 
motivated on pragmatic, methodological or anti-skepticist grounds according to which we 
should avoid positing unknown or not positively conceivable properties when possible, 
i.e., when theories in terms of knowable or positively conceivable properties are 
available. If options (2) and (3) fail, then there might be no positive conceptions of 
transeunt causation available and mysterianism or skeptical realism with regards to it 
cannot be avoided (given that Leibnizian eliminativism about transeunt causation is 
regarded as unacceptable). As discussed in the context of the first formulation of the 
argument from causation (chapter 3, p. 92), this reasoning could be made explicit in 
modified versions of the arguments, which would then be formally compatible with 
mysterianism or skeptical realism about transeunt causation.  
It might be objected that if transeunt causation has a wholly unknown nature, it is not 
mental in any non-trivial sense. The result would then be a dualism of mental immanent 
and non-mental transeunt causation. However, this is not the kind of dualism that gives 
overdetermination, epiphenomenalism or problematic interaction. Transeunt and 
immanent causation complement each other; they do not compete. This view could go 
well with impure panpsychism, the kind of panpsychism according to which some 
physical properties are not grounded in mental properties (see chapter 1, p 9), because 
physical properties can then be understood as the properties that enable transeunt causal 
relations. 
It is possible that even though we cannot directly experience necessary connections 
between efforts and result, our acquaintance with the nature of powers in making efforts 
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lets us infer a positive conception of the necessary connection between them, as per 
option (2). According to causal dispositionalism, powers necessarily produce the effects 
they are directed at if there is no interference. This could be a substantial truth and not a 
mere conceptual truth. If it is a substantial truth, our acquaintance with the nature of 
powers could be the source of our knowledge of it. 
Some support can be found for the claim that the connection between efforts and 
results in the absence of interference or resistance is real, a priori knowable and 
substantial. James Woodward (2005) has developed and defended an influential theory of 
the epistemology
6
 of causation known as interventionism or manipulability theory. An 
intervention, in Woodward’s terminology, is basically an ideal experiment, where we take 
control over a causal variable by isolating it from all other causal relationships except the 
one we are going to test. Interventions cannot be defined in non-causal terms, but are 
essential to uncovering causal relationships, according to Woodward; if we start from 
mere correlations that we cannot assume in advance have the underlying causal structure 
of an intervention, we can never infer causation. 
Woodward claims that we all have a primitive, i.e., a priori, belief that our actions 
have the causal structure of an intervention, and are causes of the effects that immediately 
follow them:  
[…] human beings (and perhaps some animals) have (i) a default tendency to behave or 
reason as though they take their own voluntary actions to have the characteristics of 
interventions and (ii) associated with this a strong tendency to take changes that 
temporally follow those interventions (presumably with a relatively short delay) as caused 
by them. (Woodward 2007: 29) 
This a priori belief is also reliable: 
[…] it seems plausible that many voluntary actions do, as a matter of empirical fact, 
satisfy the conditions for an intervention. (Woodward 2007: 29) 
Its reliability as well as its practical usefulness in being a starting point for causal 
inference strongly indicate that the belief is not only a priori but also true and substantial.  
Interestingly, Woodward claims that it is our phenomenology of agency which 
triggers the primitive belief that our actions are interventions: 
                                                 
6
 Woodward mainly considers how we arrive at knowledge about particular causal relations and leaves open 
the metaphysical question of the nature of the causation.  
137 
 
[…] subjects must have some way of determining (some signal that tells them) when they 
have performed a voluntary action and this signal must be somewhat reliable, at least in 
ordinary circumstances. […] human subjects do have a characteristic phenomenology 
which is associated with voluntary action – they typically have a sense of agency or 
ownership of their behavior that is not present when they act involuntarily. (Woodward 
2007: 29)  
There is a sense in which our phenomenology of agency tells us, then, that our actions are 
likely to be successful interventions, i.e., that our efforts do tend to produce the results 
they are immediately aimed at.  
Although Woodward does not mention it, it seems clear that if we experience the 
feeling of resistance we will not take our voluntary actions to be interventions after all. If 
we experience resistance, we will infer that something is in the way of our taking sole 
control of the causal variable we were trying to isolate, and that we are less likely to be in 
the process of making a successful intervention. On this basis we could infer that 
interferers, even when not experienced as resistance, will block interventions.  
If Woodward’s theory is correct, then, it would be plausible to say we have a priori 
substantial and reliable beliefs about whether our actions are likely to succeed in what 
they aim at, and that these have their source in our phenomenology of agency, including 
the phenomenology of our efforts being resisted. One way of explaining this is by saying 
that evolution has set us up so as to automatically and instinctively judge that our actions 
are interventions whenever we experience the phenomenology of unresisted efforts. This 
would mean that the phenomenology does not subjectively rationalize and justify the 
belief – it is a mere causal trigger of the belief. Another way of explaining it is by saying 
that the phenomenology of agency and resistance lets us become acquainted with the 
nature of powers and understand that this is how they work. On this explanation, the 
trigger of the belief also rationalizes and justifies it.  
If it is already accepted that we are acquainted with causation in agency, maybe the 
latter type of explanation would be the best one. If so, there would be an argument for 
thesis (2) available on the basis of Woodward’s theory. I will not go further into reasons 
for thinking this explanation is really the better one, or reasons to accept Woodward’s 
theory. This has been only to indicate how an argument for thesis (2) could proceed. 
Thesis (3), that we can abstract away from immanent causation a positive conception 
of transeunt causation, is (as already mentioned) not excluded by thesis (2), and they 
could also helpfully complement each other. In the next chapter, I will suggest some 
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principles by which transeunt causation, considered as either mental or physical, would be 
partially intelligible, in order to enable an account of mental causation as a causal process 
which avoids the intelligibility aspect of the combination problem. In chapter 7, where I 
discuss how the argument from causation and my account of combination as causation 
relate in general, I will explain how these principles can perhaps be seen as abstractions 
from immanent agent-causation, and thereby arrive at yet another possible answer to the 
objection from the intelligibility of transeunt causation. 
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5 
Combination as Causation: 
the Intelligibility Problem 
 
The combination problem threatens to undermine the line of argument for panpsychism 
from philosophy of mind. In the following two chapters, I will argue that understanding 
mental combination as a causal process enables a solution to it. This chapter will be 
concerned with the intelligibility aspect of the combination problem, and the next chapter 
with the empirical aspect. I will begin by reviewing and extending my analysis of the 
combination problem from chapter 1. 
1 FURTHER ANALYSIS AND OUTLINE OF MY SOLUTION 
According to the Hegelian argument, panpsychism avoids the main problems of both 
physicalism and dualism. Physicalism mainly has an intelligibility problem: how can the 
mental be grounded in the physical, given the epistemic gap between them? Dualism 
mainly has an empirical problem: how can the mental be causally efficacious when 
evidence tells us that the physical is causally closed? Physicalism additionally has an 
empirical problem of exclusion: if not only the physical but the microphysical is causally 
closed, how can macrophysical mental properties be causally efficacious? Dualism and 
emergentism additionally have an intelligibility problem: how can the mental be produced 
by the physical, either as an emergent phenomenon, or as mental effects of physical 
causes? Panpsychism appears to avoid all these problems. But so do other versions of 
Russellian monism, such as mysterianism and neutral monism. Panpsychism can be 
regarded as preferable to these on the basis of either the demonstration of an epistemic 
gap between neutral or mysterian and mental properties relevantly similar to the gap 
between physical and mental properties, or the principle that positive theories which 
actually give explanations are to be preferred over theories that appeal to unknown or 
unknowable properties or only provide a schema for explanation. This latter principle can 
also be regarded as the main motivation behind the Anti-mysterianism premise from the 
arguments from causation and from categorical/dispositional/non-structural properties.  
140 
 
Therefore, I proposed to understand the argument from philosophy of mind as the 
claim that panpsychism has the advantage of being compatible with the following 
principles, which are jointly incompatible with any other (so far suggested) view: 
(i) There is an epistemic gap between mental and physical properties that 
is not closable in principle. 
(ii) Epistemic gaps that are not closable in principle entail ontological 
gaps. 
(iii) There is nothing about the physical in virtue of which the mental can 
non-brutely emerge. 
(iv) Brute emergence is impossible. 
(v) The mental is not epiphenomenal. 
(vi) There is no systematic overdetermination. 
(vii) The physical is causally closed. 
(viii) The mental is not grounded in or emergent from properties whose 
nature is unknown or not positively conceivable. 
The respective problems of the other views can be put in terms of these principles as 
follows: Physicalism’s intelligibility problem is its dilemma between inexplicable 
grounding and brute emergence. The first horn requires the denial of (i) or (ii), and the 
second horn requires the denial of (iii) or (iv), as well as an arguable collapse into 
dualism. Dualism’s empirical problem requires the denial of (v) by affirming 
epiphenomenalism, the denial of (vi) by affirming overdetermination, or the denial of 
(vii), by affirming interactionism. Physicalism’s empirical problem, the exclusion 
problem, also requires the denial of (v), (vi) or (vii); however, this presupposes a strong 
reading of (vii) as stating the principle of not only physical but microphysical causal 
closure.  
All non-panpsychist forms of Russellian monism will be in conflict with (ii) or (iv) 
given that one endorses the strong principle, defended by Strawson, according to which 
the mental cannot be grounded in or necessitated by the non-mental. However, this 
principle is controversial among defenders of panpsychism. Somewhat less 
controversially, one could accuse non-panpsychist Russellian monism, except positive 
neutral monism, of having to deny (viii) by positing unknown non-mental Russellian 
properties. Positive neutral monist views can be eliminated via the independent 
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demonstration of an epistemic gap between them and the mental, in combination with 
principle (ii). 
The combination problem is the problem of explaining how macromentality arises 
from micromentality without facing problems strongly analogous to those it is claimed to 
solve. In other words, it is the problem of accounting for mental combination without 
running into conflict with some of the principles (i)–(viii), and thereby cancelling 
panpsychism’s advantages according to the overall argument from philosophy of mind. 
There is reason to believe that the main kinds of panpsychism, constitutive and emergent, 
both run into such conflict, and that each inherits both an intelligibility problem and an 
empirical problem.  
Constitutive panpsychism’s intelligibility problem is analogous to the inexplicable 
grounding horn of physicalism’s dilemma, and this constitutes conflict with either (i) or 
(ii). There is an epistemic gap between the micromental and the macromental that can be 
demonstrated in the same way that the gap between the physical and the mental can be 
demonstrated. If it is closable in principle, the fact that it is not actually closable must 
mean that we are ignorant about either the nature of our own macromentality in some 
respects (as Strawson suggests) or about the nature of micromental properties or the 
relations between them (as Chalmers and Goff suggest). Specific, perhaps indecisive, 
worries can be raised about each proposal, but both face the general objection that appeal 
to ignorance is in tension with principle (viii). 
Emergent panpsychism’s intelligibility problem is an analogue of the brute 
emergence horn of physicalism’s dilemma and this constitutes conflict with (iv). The 
emergence of the macromental from the micromental looks just as brute as the emergence 
of the mental from the physical – or at least, the intuition some have that it is not brute 
has not been properly spelled out and defended.  
Constitutive panpsychism’s empirical problem is an analogue of the exclusion 
problem and this constitutes conflict with (v), (vi), or the strong reading of (vii) which 
affirms microphysical causal closure. If the microphysical is causally closed, then the 
micromental should also be causally closed, and the micromental would thereby threaten 
to causally exclude the macromental.  
Emergent panpsychism’s empirical problem is an analogue of dualism’s problem of 
physical causal closure, except that it only arises for emergent panpsychism if the 
microphysical is causally closed. It constitutes conflict with (v), (vi), and the strong 
reading of (vii). If the macromental is an emergent phenomenon distinct from its 
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micromental base, but there are no emergent macrophysical phenomena, then 
macromental emergent phenomena must either be epiphenomenal, overdeterminers, or, if 
they supplant their micromental bases, it is hard to see how they can ground physical 
structure which does not clearly exhibit such patterns of emergence. 
In this chapter and the next, I will not argue that all the principles (i)–(viii) are 
certainly true. Neither will I argue that physicalism, dualism, and non-panpsychist 
Russellian monism are unavoidably in conflict with some of them and that the arguments 
discussed in chapter 1 in particular succeed in showing this. My aim is only to defend 
panpsychism against the charge that if physicalism, dualism, and non-panpsychist 
Russellian monism indeed face such problems, as the arguments discussed in chapter 1 
would show if they are sound, then so does panpsychism. In other words, I will argue that 
panpsychists can in fact account for mental combination without facing any problems that 
are strongly analogous to the main problems of physicalism, dualism and non-panpsychist 
Russellian monism, and that panpsychism therefore cannot be accused of merely moving 
and repeating the problems that it is argued to solve.  
The account I will propose is a version of emergent panpsychism. Most panpsychists 
seem to prefer constitutive panpsychism over emergent panpsychism, and I am ready to 
grant that if constitutive panpsychism can be made to work, it would clearly have some 
advantages over an emergent version.
1
 My own suspicion, though (for what it is worth), is 
that constitutive panpsychism cannot avoid its combination problems because it preserves 
too many of the features of physicalism – not only the monism, but also the reductionism. 
Getting entirely away from the anti-reductionist arguments usually directed against 
physicalism (or strong analogues thereof) requires not just changing the reduction base 
from non-mental matter to mental matter, but freeing panpsychism of reductionism 
altogether. Not only will mentality have to be fundamental, but, in a certain sense, our 
variety of it will have to be as well – as will be the result of emergent panpsychism.  
In this chapter, I will argue that the macromental can emerge from the micromental 
while avoiding the intelligibility problem. In the next chapter, I will argue that it can 
avoid the empirical problem. Emergent panpsychism’s intelligibility problem is its 
                                                 
1
 These might include the advantage of making macroconsciousness fully intelligible relative to 
microconsciousness (on my emergent account, it is only partially intelligible, as will be explained shortly), 
and causally integrating it in a more systematic way given that the microphysical and not only the physical 
is causally closed (as will be discussed in chapter 6). 
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apparent conflict with (iv), the principle that rules out brute emergence. Solving it 
requires explaining how the emergence of the macromental can be non-brute.  
Examples of non-brute emergence are often really matters of highly complex or 
otherwise epistemically impenetrable constitution. The emergence of liquidity of non-
liquid elements, patterns generated by cellular automata, such as the Game of Life, and 
phenomena that result from deterministic chaos are all examples of in principle 
intelligible constitutive grounding, or weak emergence.
2
 As mentioned, strong, non-
constitutive, emergence is when the properties of a whole are not predictable in principle 
from complete knowledge of the properties and configuration of its parts as these 
properties manifest in isolation or in different wholes. There are various accounts of what 
kind of non-constitutive determination relation would have to underlie strong emergence. 
I will suggest that when it comes to the emergence of the macromental the nature of the 
determination relation must be causal, i.e., that micromentality causes macromentality. 
This is helpful with respect to the intelligibility problem, because causation is arguably a 
partially, but not fully, intelligible relation. On an account where macromentality is 
caused in a partially intelligible way, then the coming into being of our consciousness 
would be less intelligible than on a constitutive account, but more intelligible than on an 
account that offers only brute emergence. Bruteness equals complete absence of 
intelligibility, and demonstrating partial intelligibility is therefore sufficient to avoid brute 
emergence and thereby the conflict with principle (iv), which constitutes the intelligibility 
problem.  
This chapter will proceed as follows: I first explain why, and in what sense, we 
should think that causation is partially intelligible in the first place. Then I will offer an 
account of the partial intelligibility of causation, as well as the unintelligibility of radical 
emergence – the kind of emergence that would have to underlie the psychophysical 
relation given physicalism, according to the arguments for panpsychism – in terms of a 
broadly Aristotelian theory of change. This suggestion might sound obscure, but I will 
defend it by pointing to how it seems already to some extent implicitly presupposed 
within philosophy of mind, and showing that it fits well with science. After having thus 
spelled out and defended the account of the partial intelligibility of causation on a general 
                                                 
2
 Some patterns and events that emerge from cellular automata and deterministic chaos are in principle not 
predictable except by simulation; however, simulation is a form of prediction, and therefore the emergence 
counts as weak/constitutive. There are principled reasons besides complexity for why they are not (always) 
predictable except by simulation (see, e.g., Seager 2012: 79–80). 
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basis, I will show how mental combination can be construed as a causal process that 
complies with it. It seems this is possible only if we adopt a deflationary view of subjects, 
aspects of which have been defended by Strawson and Parfit. I will show that when 
understood in such a way, it is possible for microsubjects to combine into macrosubjects 
through a causal process of fusion or blending – in a way more akin to how rivers 
combine into a sea than to how bricks combine into a wall.
3
 
My argument will not be based on the account of the intelligibility of causation 
defended in chapters 3 and 4. There I argued that causation as experienced in agency is 
intelligible – we understand why motives such as pain tend to lead to efforts such as 
avoidance attempts. However, this was an account of immanent causation, causation 
within the same subject, only. If microsubjects cause macrosubjects to come into being, 
this would be a matter of transeunt causation, causation between different subjects. I will 
therefore propose a different account of the intelligibility of causation, considered as 
transeunt and with any mental aspects abstracted away. This account can be accepted 
independently of the arguments and theses defended in the previous chapters. As 
mentioned already, in chapter 7 I will explain how my accounts of immanent and 
transeunt causation nevertheless systematically relate. Until then, I will set aside the view 
that causation can be experienced in agency in a way that reveals it as intelligible and 
mental. In chapter 6, however, where I will discuss emergent panpsychism’s empirical 
problem, the view that we experience our own causation in agency will play a role, but 
not the role of revealing it as intelligible or mental.  
2 THE PARTIAL INTELLIGIBILITY OF CAUSATION –  WHY AND 
IN WHAT SENSE? 
Why should we think that causation (that is, transeunt causation which is not necessarily 
mental), is partially intelligible? In the context of the combination problem, mainly 
because it seems to be a presupposition of the argument of which the intelligibility 
problem from emergent panpsychism is an analogue, namely the argument from non-
emergence, put forth by Strawson and Nagel. According to this argument, consciousness 
appears brutely emergent relative to the physical, and brute emergence is impossible (as 
per principle (iv)). However, according to reductionism about causation, causation itself 
is a metaphysically brute relation, i.e., in principle unintelligible: effects follow causes for 
                                                 
3
 Basile (2010: 189) offers this comparison as a suggestion for how to think of mental combination.  
145 
 
no underlying reason (cf. chapter 3, section 1.1, p. 93-95). If, as reductionists are 
committed to (given that causation is ubiquitous), the great majority of dependence 
relations between distinct properties are brute, it can hardly be objectionable that the 
psychophysical relation is one of them, as emergentists are accused of affirming. There is 
no reason to think brute emergence is impossible if brute causation is possible.
4
 
Therefore, the argument from non-emergence (as well as the justification for principle 
(iv)) must depend on causation not being metaphysically brute. 
Strawson clearly hints to it being a presupposition of the argument that causation is 
not metaphysically brute, claiming that the process by which the notion of brute 
emergence has gained currency: 
[…] is underwritten by the wild radical-empiricism-inspired metaphysical 
irresponsibilities of the twentieth century that still linger on (to put it mildly) today and 
have led many, via a gross misunderstanding of Hume, to think that there is nothing 
intrinsic to a cause in virtue of which it has the effect it does.
[footnote omitted] 
(Strawson 
2006b: 19) 
At the same time, Strawson holds that causation, while not metaphysically brute, is 
entirely epistemically brute – referring to “Hume’s wholly correct, strictly 
epistemological claim – that so far as we consider things a priori ‘any thing may produce 
any thing’” (Strawson 2006b: 19, footnote 34). This is the skeptical realist view about 
causation, according to which causation has a nature beyond regularities (and similarity 
relations across possible worlds), but this nature cannot be known.  
Now, full commitment to skeptical realism about causation does not seem entirely 
compatible with the argument from non-emergence. If we have absolutely no insight into 
the nature of causation, into what may produce what, how can we say with certainty that 
the physical (i.e., the narrowly/t-/physicSal) cannot causally produce the mental? The 
negative knowledge that certain phenomena could not be causally related must constitute 
or be based on some limited insight into the nature of causation. Those who reject brute 
emergence are thereby committed to causation being actually (not just in principle) 
partially intelligible. If causation were entirely epistemically brute, if we knew nothing at 
all about its nature or inner workings, then what basis could there be for the negative 
                                                 
4
 To be precise, there would be no reason to think brute strong (non-constitutive) emergence impossible. 
There would still be reason to think that brute weak (constitutive) emergence is impossible, namely that 
weak constitutive emergence is not brute by definition.  
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judgment that the argument from non-emergence depends on, i.e., the judgment that the 
non-experiential cannot produce, causally or otherwise, the mental? 
If the argument from non-emergence presupposes that causation is (actually, 
epistemically) partially intelligible, then its analogue, the intelligibility problem for 
emergent panpsychism, presupposes it too. If causation is not partially intelligible, then 
both problems would dissolve. The outcome for emergent panpsychism would be more or 
less neutral, dialectically speaking: it would lose one important argument in its favor, but 
also one if its most serious problems. It would still have the support of the arguments 
from mental causation – insofar as it can get around its empirical problem – and 
categorical/dispositional/non-structural properties. Therefore, I will not attempt to defend 
the view that causation must be partially intelligible. I will instead just hedge the 
question: if causation is partially intelligible, in what does its intelligibility consist?  
2.1 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Intelligibil ity  
In a sense, everyone, even reductionists and skeptical realists, agree that causation is 
actually intelligible, or confers intelligibility to its relata: giving the causes of a 
phenomenon constitutes explaining it, and explaining something means rendering it 
intelligible. Also, independently of their views about causation, most philosophers find 
the idea that something physical can produce something mental more mysterious than the 
idea that something physical can produce something else that is physical. If ordinary, 
physical causation is comparatively non-mysterious in contrast with the psychophysical 
relation, it must also in a sense be partially intelligible. 
But this is not necessarily the same sort of intelligibility that is presupposed by the 
argument from non-emergence. The intelligibility of causation, as well as the comparative 
unintelligibility of the psychophysical relation, can be acknowledged by reductionists and 
(fully committed) skeptical realists if it is accounted for in purely extrinsic terms. An 
account of the extrinsic intelligibility of causation, and the extrinsic unintelligibility of 
psychophysical emergence, would go roughly as follows: A causal relation obtains when 
two events or entities are correlated in a way that fits into a unified system of laws, and 
being thus integrated constitutes being rendered intelligible. Highly extrinsically 
intelligible causal relations are instances of laws or generalizations with universal 
validity, laws that are part of a simple set of laws which subsume many phenomena. The 
psychophysical relation, on the other hand, is not very well integrated with other causal 
relations. The mental looks like a nomological dangler, causal dead-end or otherwise 
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inelegant complication. It would be an instance of a law or generalization that seems to 
apply to only one domain, e.g., the biological or neurological, so it is not universal. 
Furthermore, it explains just one phenomenon, consciousness, and nothing else, so it does 
not increase systematicity and unity in exchange for expanding the set of fundamental 
laws. This constitutes its lack of intelligibility and explains why it is often categorized as 
not causal, in the ordinary sense, but emergent.  
If this were really all there was to the intelligibility of causation and the 
unintelligibility of the psychophysical relation, then the argument from non-emergence, 
which is a complaint about the intrinsic bruteness of the psychophysical relation, would 
also dissolve, or collapse into arguments from mental causation. The argument from non-
emergence implies that the mental emerging from the non-mental is unintelligible in and 
of itself, regardless of how often and systematically it tended to happen, and is thus a 
worry about intrinsic, not extrinsic, intelligibility. In turn, the intelligibility aspect of the 
combination problem for emergent panpsychism would also dissolve, or collapse into its 
empirical problem. Demonstrating the extrinsic intelligibility of the micro–macromental 
relation requires only integrating it into the causal structure of the world as science 
reveals it, and solving the empirical problem amounts to the same. Again, the outcome for 
emergent panpsychism would be neutral, dialectically speaking. Therefore, I will hedge 
the question again: if causation is partially intrinsically intelligible, in what does its 
intelligibility consist?  
2.2 Ordinary and Emergent Causation; Radical and Br ute Emergence 
Before proceeding to suggest an answer to the question just posed, I will clarify my use of 
some terms, and introduce some distinctions. The distinction between extrinsic and 
intrinsic intelligibility enables a distinction between two types of emergence, radical 
emergence and emergent causation, as follows: 
 
 Intrinsic intelligibility (to us) Extrinsic intelligibility 
Radical emergence None (not defined) 
Ordinary causation Some/partial High 
Emergent causation 
(strong, but not radical, 
emergence) 
Some/partial Low 
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Radical emergence is the relation that, according to the argument from non-emergence, 
would have to underlie the psychophysical relation given physicalism or emergentism. I 
will understand radical emergence as a relation which is wholly intrinsically 
unintelligible, in principle, for creatures like us
5
 – in terms of facts we are equipped to 
grasp, there is nothing about the base in virtue of which the emerger results. The reason 
for understanding radical emergence in terms of unintelligibility to us is so that radical 
emergence will not by definition be brute, and hence always impossible, according to 
principle (iv) above. Brute emergence I will understand as wholly intrinsically 
unintelligible full stop, or even to God, as it were
6
 – there is nothing whatsoever about the 
base in virtue of which the emerger results. I take it that in at least some cases, as in the 
case of the psychophysical relation, it is reasonable to infer that an instance of radical 
emergence would also be an instance of brute emergence.
7
 For the purposes of this 
chapter, it could readily be granted that all radical emergence is brute, because I will 
argue that micro–macromental emergence is neither,8 but the distinction will still be 
useful to have available. 
                                                 
5
 In what respects must creatures be like us? Intelligibility to us is supposed to contrast with (the 
metaphorical) intelligibility to God. In order to be minimally restrictive, but preserve the contrast, one could 
substitute “finite or natural creatures” for “creatures like us”.  
6
 Strawson explains brute emergence in these terms, but emphasizes that “‘intelligible to God’ isn’t really 
an epistemological notion at all, it’s just a way of expressing the idea that there must be something about 
the nature of the emerged-from (and nothing else) in virtue of which the emerger emerges as it does and is 
what it is” (2006b: 15).  
7
 Roughly, it seems to me these would be the cases where there is reason to think we have an adequate grasp 
of the base, the emerger or both, so if their relation were intelligible at all, it should be intelligible to us. For 
the psychophysical relation, the inference from radical to brute emergence is licensed by our grasp of what 
physical (qua structural or fundamentally non-mental) properties are supposed to be, and our acquaintance 
with the nature of mental properties.  
For reasons to be discussed below, there are other scenarios that could also qualify as radical 
emergence, such as divine creation or the Big Bang (when understood in a certain way). In these cases, it is 
arguable that we cannot infer that the radical emergence is also brute: since we have no adequate grasp of 
the base (either God or the nothingness prior to the Big Bang) we cannot conclude that there is nothing 
whatsoever about them in virtue of which the emerger, in this case the universe, can emerge. On the other 
hand, it is also arguable that these types of emergence would also be brute. Perhaps we have a good enough 
grasp of divine properties such as omnipotence to say that it would lead to contradictions (such as the 
problem of evil), or of the nothingness that some suppose precedes the Big Bang, to say that there is no way 
in which the universe could emerge from that. 
8
 If one admits that micro–macromental emergence is radical, it seems unavoidable that it is also brute (for 
reasons of the kind discussed in the previous footnote 7). Also, even if it were arguably radical but not 
brute, this theory would be a version of McGinn-type mysterianism and conflict with principle (viii). 
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Causation, on the other hand, can (for the reasons discussed so far) be assumed to be 
partially intrinsically intelligible for creatures like us,
9
 and thereby not brute – there is 
something intrinsic to the cause, of which we have at least a partial grasp, in virtue of 
which the effect results. Within partially intrinsically intelligible causal relations, 
however, one can distinguish highly extrinsically intelligible relations from less 
extrinsically intelligible ones – or relations that fit very systematically in with other causal 
relations from relations that would fit in less systematically. I will use the term ordinary 
causation for the former type and the term emergent causation for the latter type.  
Emergent causation is an important notion, because emergent causation is a kind of 
strong, but not radical, emergence. If the only kind of strong emergence that emergent 
panpsychism is committed to is non-radical emergent causation, which is partially 
intelligible, then it avoids the intelligibility aspect of the combination problem. Emergent 
causation still represents an empirical problem – what would be its particular structure, 
and how can it be integrated into the causal structure of the world as science reveals it? – 
but this has been set aside until the next chapter. In this chapter, I will only consider 
whether mental combination can be intrinsically intelligible to us – whether it can occur 
without radical emergence. From now on, I will use the term intelligibility, unless 
otherwise noted, to mean intrinsic intelligibility to us.  
3 THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF CAUSATION AND 
THE UNINTELLIGIBILITY OF RADICAL EMERGENCE 
If causation is a least partially intelligible (again, considered apart from the view defended 
in chapters 3 and 4), then how or by what principles is this so? What makes it more 
intelligible than radical emergence – while at the same time not as intelligible as 
constitution? 
There are many ways of differentiating various notions of emergence from causation. 
For example, causation is often supposed to be diachronic (causes preceding effects), and 
emergence synchronic (the emerger being simultaneous with its base). However, 
philosophers have defended both diachronic emergence (e.g., Humphreys 1997; Stephan 
2002; O’Connor and Wong 2005) and synchronic causation (e.g., Kant – see chapter 7, 
section 1), so these do not seem to be essential characteristics and, in any case, not 
                                                 
9
 And presumably fully intelligible to God.  
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something that confers intrinsic intelligibility. In general, structural differences seem 
relevant to extrinsic intelligibility only.  
Strawson makes a few further claims about the nature of radical emergence. It 
requires that real physicalists (who think that experience is real and physical) “throw 
away the conservation principles and say that brand new physical stuff (mass/energy) is 
produced or given rise to when experiences are emergent from the non-experiential” 
(Strawson 2006b: 23–24). Non-radical, acceptable emergence, in contrast, is “essentially 
conservative in the sense of the conservation principles” (Strawson 2006b: 24). Radical 
emergence is emergence from non-existence – and “ex nihilo nihil fit, whatever anyone 
says (Nobel Prize winners included)” (Strawson 2006b: 19, footnote 34).  
This brings to mind Aristotle’s theory of change, which he offers in response to 
Parmenides. Parmenides was the first to argue that nothing comes from nothing – ex 
nihilo nihil fit. He holds that creation out of nothing is not only unintelligible but also 
impossible. Furthermore, according to Parmenides, all change is necessarily creation out 
of nothing, and therefore change is impossible. The reasoning behind this seems to be that 
if a state constitutes a change at all, it would have to be a result of its own negation. 
Change is when A comes from non-A, which is nothing relative to A. If A comes from A, 
it does not come from nothing, but then there is no change after all.  
Aristotle agrees with Parmenides – and Strawson – that creation out of nothing is 
impossible, but offers a tripartite analysis of change according to which change can occur 
without it. Change involves not two elements, a state and its negation, but three: two 
forms and one portion of matter. A change consists in the same matter passing from one 
form to another. If A and non-A are both forms of the same matter B, they would not be 
nothing relative to each other after all, because they have B in common, but neither would 
they be identical, so that change is negated.  
According to Aristotle, all substances are composites of matter – hylē – and form – 
morphē, hence hylomorphism. In most changes, a substance remains persistent, and 
thereby both form and matter, as when a man turns from being unmusical to being 
musical. In some changes, the substance itself is transformed and only matter remains, as 
when a seed transforms into a tree. In this change, however, some primary body or 
element remains persistent. But Aristotle further holds that the primary bodies, earth, air, 
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water and fire, are also transformable into each other (Cohen 2012: 219). What remains 
persistent in this change is prime matter.
10
  
Aristotle claims that prime matter is not perceptible, but is knowable only “by 
analogy” (Aristotle 1984: 191a9). Many interpreters have taken it as a kind of pure 
potentiality (Cohen 2012: 220), unable to exist alone, without a particular form that 
actualizes it. Prime matter, and only prime matter, is ultimately permanent; no forms or 
substances, composites of matter and form, are fundamental and incorruptible. He seems 
to derive a conservation law for prime matter (Aristotle 1984: 192a25–34, 318a24–25). 
The dispositional theory of causation, discussed in the previous chapters, derives 
from Aristotle. It should therefore not be too surprising if also this aspect of Aristotle’s 
view has its place in contemporary non-reductionist metaphysics of causation. I will now 
argue that an Aristotelian, hylomorphic theory of change could be the basis for the 
distinction between radical emergence and causation, and that on such a basis causation 
would be partially intelligible.  
3.1 Causation as Conservation of Matter and Continuity of Form  
I will propose the following distinction between causation and radical emergence: 
causation always relates, or is always ultimately grounded in relations between, different 
determinates of the same fundamental determinable, or different forms of the same kind 
of matter or stuff. Matter should be understood as a fundamental and concrete 
determinable, which does not necessarily have any properties of actual physical matter, 
such as extension, mass or inertness. A form should be understood as any determinate of 
such a determinable – such as a structure, arrangement, configuration, shape or quality. 
Causation is the kind of change through which matter in this sense remains persistent, 
while form varies. Radical emergence, on the other hand, is the kind of change through 
which nothing remains persistent. It is when a new fundamental determinable, or new 
matter or stuff, comes into existence. This gives rise to three important features of 
causation: qualitative conservation, quantitative conservation and continuity. Radical 
emergence will have none of these features.
11
  
                                                 
10
 Prime matter is, as was already remarked by Alter and Nagasawa as quoted in chapter 1, a controversial 
notion. Many interpreters claim that it is incoherent, but nevertheless, it is clear that Aristotle posited it in 
some sense (Cohen 2012: 220). 
11
 Pat Lewtas (2012) has also argued (in a conference presentation) that the notion of conservation is needed 
in order to distinguish acceptable modes of combination from radical emergence. He offers various 
suggestions as to how combination can work within this and other constraints, however, his overall 
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3.1.1  Qualitative Conservation of Matter  
Matter is a fundamental determinable, and a fundamental determinable is a determinable 
which cannot also be conceived as a determinate of another determinable. For example, 
color is a determinable but not a fundamental one. It is a determinable relative to redness, 
but can also be conceived as itself a determinate of, say, sensory or secondary qualities. A 
molecule is a determinate organization of atoms,
12
 which are again determinate 
organizations of quarks, and quarks are determinate forms of whatever fundamental 
physical stuff there is, the stuff which is either identical to or transformable into energy. 
Energy, or the stuff which is in some way a duality of mass and energy, is where the 
regress of physical determinables end. It is that of which everything physical is a 
determinable or form, and which is itself a form or determinable of nothing else. Physical 
causation, causation which relates physical phenomena, would trivially, by definition, 
always relate determinates of the same determinable if physical energy-matter is a 
determinable out of which all physical phenomena are constituted. However, on the 
account I now suggest, causation could not occur at all between the physical and the non-
physical if they are not revealed as actually having some deeper determinable in 
common.
13
 This would rather constitute radical emergence.  
Radical emergence is when a new kind of matter comes into existence, an entity 
which is not a determinate of physical energy-matter, and of which physical energy-
matter could also not be regarded as a determinate. Radical emergence, whereby a non-
physical thing stands in a dependency relation with a physical thing, is closer to creation 
than causation. An example of radical emergence of the physical from the non-physical is 
a non-physical God producing a physical world.
14
 The reverse relation, the emergence of 
the mental from the physical, is similarly sometimes likened (e.g., by Strawson, as seen 
above) to creation ex nihilo. The first feature of the account, then, is that new kinds of 
matter, stuff or determinables are created or radically emerge, while forms or 
                                                                                                                                                  
approach is different from mine in many respects, most importantly in assuming constitutive rather than 
emergent panpsychism.  
12
 It might seem incorrect to say that a molecule is a determinate organization of atoms, because atoms are 
already fully determinate objects. But organization of atoms is not fully determinate, because atoms can be 
organized in different ways. So I take the indeterminacy to be in the organization, not necessarily in the 
atoms organized. 
13
 Neutral monism would be a view according to which the physical and the mental have a deeper 
determinable in common, the neutral determinable.  
14
 This is not necessarily brute emergence, because it is arguably in principle intelligible (but not to us) how 
God can create the physical, namely in virtue of divine attributes such as omnipotence, infinity, etc.  
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determinates are caused. In other words, causation is qualitatively conservative when it 
comes to matter; radical emergence is not.  
3.1.2  Quantitative Conservation of Matter  
Causation furthermore requires that not only the same qualitative kind but also the same 
quantity of matter or a determinable remains constant throughout a change. If a change 
involved the production of more matter, it would also amount to radical emergence, even 
if the new matter were of the same kind that the thing it emerged from was made of. An 
example of radical quantitative emergence would be perpetual motion machines, physical 
machines that create more physical energy-matter. The second main feature of the 
account is thus: causation is quantitatively conservative; radical emergence is not.  
3.1.3  Continuity of Form 
There are indications that all the possible forms of a kind of matter form a continuum, and 
that any form of a kind of matter could in principle be transformed by gradual steps into 
any other form. For many determinables, such as color and geometric shape, their 
determinates form a continuum. In many respects, this seems to also be the case for 
physical matter. For example, not only can one gradually transform a lump of gold into, 
say, a gold coin; gold itself can be gradually transformed into other elements such as lead 
– in principle, any element can be transformed into any other by gradually “rearranging” 
the subatomic particles of atoms to form different ones. However, it seems one cannot 
demonstrate that all determinates of any determinable form a continuum, and furthermore, 
physics provides some possible examples of necessarily non-gradual transitions that are 
still conservative (to be discussed in section 3.4 below). So a principle of continuity of 
form must perhaps allow for exceptions or approximations (that will also be discussed 
below).  
However, it will still provide for an important contrast with radical emergence, 
because for radical emergence there will be no exceptions: discontinuity is a necessary 
feature of it. Consider first radical qualitative emergence, an event which violates 
qualitative conservation. One could not gradually transform one fundamental kind of 
matter into a different kind, because the two portions of matter would have nothing in 
common that they would both be degrees of. Consider then radical quantitative 
emergence, which violates quantitative conservation. There is no way for additional 
quantities of matter of the same kind to come gradually into existence either. A quantity 
of matter can come into being portion by portion, but the individual portions, no matter 
154 
 
how miniscule, would have to appear suddenly, because there is no intermediate state 
between existence and non-existence. The existence/non-existence distinction is strictly 
binary – something either exists or it does not.15 With different forms of the same matter, 
there are (almost) always intermediate states (as with colors), or, with absolute 
distinctions, vague, borderline states in between (as with baldness/non-baldness).  
Radical emergence thus entails discontinuity, but the entailment might not go both 
ways – it could be that discontinuity sometimes has other explanations. If there is 
discontinuity, then the default hypothesis, one might say, should be that the explanation is 
radical emergence, a crossing of the absolute boundary between non-existence and 
existence. However, if another explanation can be provided of the discontinuity, or if 
other signs of the persistence of the same type and quantity of underlying matter or 
determinable are clear and numerous, then one need not conclude that there is radical 
emergence. Other signs of persistence of matter could be, for example, that the forms are 
continuous across many dimensions but not all, or that the forms can be ordered on a 
spectrum which is discrete but clearly much more fine-grained than the binary spectrum 
of existence/non-existence.  
Therefore, the third main feature, is that causation tends to relate possibly continuous 
states, while radical emergence relates necessarily sharply discontinuous states. In other 
words, discontinuity is to be regarded as a defeasible indicator of radical emergence.  
3.2 Hylomorphic Change as the Ground of Causation  
Can hylomorphic change, where forms change but matter remains, constitute or ground 
all causation? Our ordinary concept of causation allows causation by absence, as when 
the death of a plant is caused by nobody watering it, which entails that there are causal 
relata which have no matter at all. It also does not require that causes are always 
transformed into their effects. For example, when we say that smoking causes cancer, 
there is no transformation of smoking to cancer. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to 
think that hylomorphic change, i.e., transformations of energy-matter, underlies all causal 
relations. 
Energy, as already hinted at, seems to have a number of features in common with 
Aristotelian prime matter, the substratum of all change: it is imperceptible – not directly 
                                                 
15
 Some philosophers dispute this, and claim that there are degrees of existence. If so, my account could 
perhaps still work, if one could find some other criterion for recognizing radical emergence than 
discontinuity. But as it stands, my account is premised on there not being degrees of existence. 
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measureable, it always exists in a certain form and can never be found alone, it is always 
conserved – never created or destroyed, and it is a kind of pure potentiality. Theories of 
causation in terms of transference of conserved quantities, such as energy (see, e.g., Fair 
1979; Dowe 1992), arguably have a number of shortcomings as reductive analyses of 
causation (see Dowe 2008: sect. 6), but it is more plausible that transference of conserved 
quantities non-reductively underlies all causal relations. Conserved quantities include 
energy, momentum and charge. It could be that all the conserved quantities together 
constitute prime matter or are different aspects of it, or that a conserved quantity theory of 
causation can be formulated only in terms of energy. 
How is it plausible that transference of conserved quantities, energy in particular, 
underlies all causation just as prime matter would? It could underlie causation by absence, 
insofar as an absence can only cause an event if there is some energy transference in the 
effect that this absence allows to occur. An absence cannot cause something unless there 
are further positive causes present as well. To see how energy transformation can underlie 
causation more generally, consider how the total state of the universe at a moment can be 
regarded as the total cause of the total state of the universe at the next moment. For this 
causal relation, the most general one of all, it would be correct to say that the total cause 
is transformed into the total effect. It is the very same energy-matter that made up the 
universe a moment ago that makes it up now – in this way its transformation underlies the 
sum of all causation. More particularly, one might think that all direct, productive 
causation by concrete positive causes, as opposed to absences, involves the cause being 
partially transformed into its effect by transferring some of its energy to it. In this way it 
could underlie the causal relation between smoking and cancer, insofar as they are linked 
by a mechanism that would involve the transfer of some of the energy of smoke particles 
to lung cells, in virtue of which the lung cells are changed in a way that ultimately leads 
to cancer. If (productive/positive) causation is partial transformation, this means that an 
object will eventually be wholly transformed, and thereby disappear, if it keeps on 
causing changes (productively/positively) without being causally affected in return. This 
is what happens according to physics: if something loses all its energy, it must also have 
lost all its mass and disappeared.  
3.3 Partial Intelligibility in Virtue of Hylomorphic Principles  
How does the hylomorphic theory make causation intelligible? And how does it account 
for the unintelligibility of radical emergence? 
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If causation is fundamentally a matter of things being made into other things, or 
states being transformed into other states, we can to a certain extent understand how a 
cause produces its effect: by letting itself, or a part of itself, be transformed into it, or by 
providing the matter for it. We cannot on this basis understand how a cause is 
transformed in exactly the way that it is, but we can understand how there can be a 
transformation of some kind. With two things that are made out of different stuff, on the 
other hand, as in radical emergence, we correspondingly understand why they cannot be 
transformed into each other. A cause cannot provide the matter for an effect if it does not 
already possess the kind, or quantity, of matter required. Some think creation out of 
nothing is still possible, for example, because they think this is what God does. But 
nobody claims to understand how God could do this, and it cannot be by transformation.
16
  
Hume posits as a criterion of causal intelligibility that it enables a priori derivation of 
effects from causes. A corresponding criterion of partial intelligibility would be that it 
enables a priori derivation of some, but not all, facts about effects from causes. The 
hylomorphic theory does seem to enable this. Firstly, we can derive from the theory that 
effects must be made of the same prime matter as their causes.
17
 There are no clear 
empirical counterexamples to this. Furthermore, if we take energy to be prime matter or a 
fundamental aspect of it, as it seems we should, and prime matter can neither be created 
nor destroyed (as per the criteria of qualitative and quantitative conservation), only 
transformed, then the law of conservation of energy follows a priori. There are no clear 
empirical counterexamples to this either.  
It might sound suspicious that a law of physics suddenly becomes partly a priori on 
the basis of a metaphysical theory. It could indicate the theory is not really a priori after 
all, but is covertly derived a posteriori. However, it is already widely held that the law of 
                                                 
16
 As already noted (footnote 14), divine creation is not necessarily brute emergence, because, in divine 
creation, there is clearly something about the “base” in virtue of which the emerger is produced, e.g., 
omnipotence, infinity, or other divine attributes. Insofar as omnipotence and infinity and so on cannot be 
grasped by finite creatures like us, divine creation would be in principle unintelligible to us and therefore 
still an example of radical emergence. If divine creation were demonstrably metaphysically brute (as some 
would argue), it too would be ruled out by principle (iv) above, but there is nothing in this discussion that 
clearly indicates or depends on this being so (that is to say, the arguments for the bruteness of the 
psychophysical relation would not be analogous to the arguments for the bruteness of divine creation, and 
so one can accept the former type of argument and reject the latter). No emergentist would claim that brains 
literally have a divine power to produce consciousness out of nothing, so not saying anything to rule out the 
possibility of divine creation should not be a problem for the argument for panpsychism from non-
emergence.  
17
 Insofar as the causes and effects are made of something, i.e., are not absences. 
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conservation of energy is not purely a matter of empirical discovery, but that it is better 
regarded as in part being a regulative principle, an a priori truth, or even a tautology. 
Barbara Montero discusses this view and recounts some events in the history of science 
that render it plausible: 
About a century ago, Poincaré claimed that we would never reject the conservation law 
for energy because any apparent violation would be rectified by positing a new form of 
energy. Poincaré took this to show that the law of the conservation of energy is ‘outside 
of the reach of experiment and reduces to a sort of tautology’. And in 1930, to some 
extent bolstering Poincaré’s view, Wolfgang Pauli rectified certain apparent violations of 
the laws of conservation of energy and momentum by positing a new, virtually 
unobservable form of energy, the neutrino. Eventually, empirical support did emerge 
when in 1956 huge detectors revealed that neutrinos exist. Nonetheless, the history of the 
neutrino indicates that the conservation of energy law, if not tautologically correct, will 
most likely not be given up easily. (Montero 2006: 391–392) 
One might think that the idea that some quantity is conserved throughout all change is the 
regulative, a priori, or – as Poincaré thinks – tautological part of the law of conservation 
of energy, whereas how to define and empirically measure the conserved quantity is an a 
posteriori, empirical matter. At least this is what the history of science seems to show. 
The identification and measurement of the conserved quantity has been a long and 
difficult process. Scientists have considered candidates such as vis viva (mv
2
), force (ma), 
and many others, before settling on energy (as well as charge and momentum). But many 
have been explicitly motivated by a priori considerations, metaphysical or theological, in 
their search for the conserved quantity, including Descartes, Joule, Faraday and 
Helmholtz (Coopersmith 2010). One could also mention Kant, who aimed to clearly 
demonstrate, in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786/2004), how 
conservation of matter was partially an a priori truth – in Kant’s view, conservation of 
substance is a priori, but the concept of matter is empirical. At the same time, he also 
argued for a dynamical theory of matter, according to which all its fundamental properties 
arose from the interplay of forces, so altogether this clearly approximates the law of 
conservation of energy. 
3.4 Hylomorphism and Science 
I have already pointed to a number of ways in which the hylomorphic theory of change 
fits well with science – especially via the conservation criterion. I will now add some 
further considerations to substantiate this, and address some possible counterexamples.  
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Patrick Suppes has argued that Aristotle’s basic doctrine of matter and change “is 
correct in a strong sense: it can be used as a basis for interpreting the results of modern 
science” (Suppes 1974: 27). He argues that other concepts of physical matter, Descartes’ 
and Boscovich’s, are inadequate, and that Aristotle’s concept (and to an extent Kant’s, 
which he claims is very close to Aristotle’s) is supported by, among other things, the 
following developments in physics:  
As quantum mechanics developed […] it was also recognized that matter was not 
indestructible, contrary to ancient ideas of an atomic sort, but that it could be converted 
into energy. […] The pursuit of particles continued and as the energy levels became 
higher it became apparent that the world is full of particles that are continually 
undergoing processes of generation and corruption, as Aristotle would put it. Methods for 
observing this generation and corruption were brought to a fine point by bubble-chamber 
apparatus and other related methods. […] The empirical evidence from macroscopic 
bodies and also from high energy particles is that the forms of matter continually change. 
[…] The collisions of electrons and other particles to produce new particles as observed, 
for example, in cloud-chamber and other experiments is simply good Aristotelian 
evidence of the change of form of matter. The cloud-chamber data especially support 
Aristotle's definition of matter. As we observe change there must be a substratum 
underlying that which is changing. What is the substratum underlying the conversion of 
particles into other particles, or the conversion of particles into energy? The answer seems 
to me clear. We can adopt an Aristotelian theory of matter as pure potentiality. The search 
for elementary particles that are simple and homogeneous and that are the building blocks 
in some spatial sense of the remaining elements of the universe is a mistake. There is a 
continual conversion of the forms of matter into each other; there is no reason to think 
that one form is more fundamental than another. The proper search at a theoretical level is 
for the laws that describe these changes of form, and not for the identification of 
elementary particles that are in some fundamental and ultimate sense simple and 
homogeneous. (Suppes 1974: 46–47) 
Suppes here emphasizes the impermanence of individual substances or things. On the 
hylomorphic view, substances or things, like atoms and particles, are composites of 
matter and form. Since forms are impermanent, substances must be as well. Science has 
shown many times that particles first thought to be indestructible, first atoms, then 
subatomic particles, are impermanent forms of energy which can be transformed into 
other forms of energy.  
Does physics support that all possible forms of energy-matter can be ordered on a 
continuum? I will argue that it at least supports the more moderate claim that most 
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possible forms of matter can be ordered on an approximate
18
 continuum, i.e., a discrete 
but very fine-grained spectrum. This preserves the contrast with radical emergence – the 
relata of an instance of radical emergence can never be ordered on even an approximate 
continuum: the binary spectrum of existence/non-existence is maximally coarse-grained. 
The moderate claim can be upheld in view of some of the most significant indications of 
discontinuity in physics, which I take to be the following: (1) the possible discreteness of 
space or time, (2) quantum jumps and (3) phase transitions. 
If space or time is discrete, as some theories in physics entail, then it would not be 
possible for spatiotemporal states to be ordered on a continuum. But it would be possible 
to order them on a discrete but very fine-grained spectrum, which is compatible with the 
approximate continuity principle.  
At the quantum level, quantum jumps seem to represent discontinuous events. Bound 
particles, for example electrons in an atom, have discrete energy levels. The transition of 
an electron from one energy level to another can therefore not be gradual. However, the 
energy levels of electrons are not ordinary determinate (i.e., classical) states. They are 
related to wave functions that give the probability of finding the electron at different 
locations. In a “jump” between states A and B involving different energy levels, the 
location of the electron during the transition may be a place in space and time where the 
probability for finding the electron is non-zero, independently whether the electron is in 
state A or B. Thus, it is in principle possible that the movement of the electron can be 
completely continuous both in time and space while the transition from state A to B takes 
place, even if their energy levels change discontinuously.
19
 In other words, a discontinuity 
between indeterminate, non-classical states does not entail, nor suggest,
20
 discontinuity 
between any determinate states. 
If nothing entails discontinuity, if it is in principle possible that the movement of the 
electron is completely continuous during the quantum jump, this still marks a great 
difference with radical emergence. With a “jump” between non-existence and existence, 
                                                 
18
 I intend this term in an informal, loose sense. Mathematically, a discrete spectrum of countably many 
states, even if infinite, cannot really approximate a spectrum of uncountably infinite states, i.e., a 
continuum.  
19
 I have confirmed this with associate professor Arnt Inge Vistnes, Dept. of Physics, University of Oslo.  
20
 This is fundamentally because quantum theory, unaccompanied by any metaphysically motivated 
interpretations, does not suggest anything about whether the movements of jumping electrons are 
discontinuous or continuous; it only gives probabilities of where they are to be found upon measurement.  
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as in radical emergence, there is no sense in which this could have happened 
continuously, and discontinuity is entailed.  
In thermodynamics, phase transitions, such as the transition of water from liquid to 
gaseous form (vapor), are mathematically modelled as singularities, which are sharp 
discontinuities. However, as has been debated in philosophy of physics, this model cannot 
possibly be fully realistic, because it actually leads to a paradox. The paradox appears 
when the definition of phase transitions from thermodynamics as singularities is 
combined with statistical mechanics. As Craig Callender puts it: “The problem is that 
phase transitions as understood by statistical mechanics can only occur in infinite systems, 
yet the phenomena that we are trying to explain clearly occur in finite systems” (2001: 
549). Callender recommends that we should therefore not treat phase transitions as 
singularities, i.e., discontinuities, after all: “we should say that real finite systems give rise 
to the sort of behaviour associated with phase transitions in thermodynamics even when 
the partition function is not singular. After all, the fact that thermodynamics treats phase 
transitions as singularities does not imply that statistical mechanics must too” (Callender 
2001: 550). But what if it turns out the paradox must rather be dissolved in a different 
way, and the discontinuity of phase transitions is confirmed? Since most physical changes 
are not phase transitions, this would be compatible with the principle that most possible 
forms of the same matter can be ordered on a continuum, or that all possible forms can be 
ordered on a spectrum which is mostly continuous but has some gaps. It also seems 
different phases will be discontinuous only along some property dimensions, but 
continuous along many other property dimensions, so the gaps are in this sense not big 
gaps. 
I have assumed that radical emergence does not occur within the domain of physics 
or physical sciences, and therefore it is important to show that the criteria I have proposed 
for radical emergence does not indicate it. However, there is one event posited in physics 
that would qualify as radical emergence, namely the Big Bang, insofar as the Big Bang is 
really preceded by nothingness (as opposed to, say, a Big Crunch following a previous 
Big Bang and so an ad infinitum). If one holds that brute emergence is impossible, but is 
not prepared (as seems reasonable) to reject the hypothesis that the Big Bang could be 
preceded by nothingness on that basis, one could argue that this is an instance of radical 
emergence which is not brute, i.e., that how the universe could emerge from nothing is 
perhaps in principle not intelligible to us, but it would be intelligible to God, 
metaphorically speaking. Admitting the possibility of radical emergence in the Big Bang 
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would presumably not threaten the argument from non-emergence for panpsychism, 
because it would not be a plausible defense of emergentism to say that consciousness 
emerges systematically out of nothing in the same way that the whole universe emerged 
from nothing. If physical–mental emergence is claimed to be analogous to the Big Bang, 
it would, if anything, make emergentism seem more implausible, not less.  
3.5 Hylomorphism and Philosophy of Mind 
I have now shown how hylomorphic criteria of causation map onto the kind of changes 
we find in physics, where radical emergence does not take place – except perhaps with 
the Big Bang. Now I will show that the opposite criteria of radical emergence map well 
onto physicalism’s problems with consciousness. Many problems concerning 
consciousness that arise from assuming physicalism can be expressed by saying that 
within this metaphysics its appearance would have all the characteristics of radical 
emergence. Correspondingly, if consciousness could be construed as coming into being in 
the way that had the characteristics of causation as I have defined it, it seems physicalism 
would have no special problem with it, in spite of there being an epistemic gap between it 
and the non-mental.  
One problem with consciousness is that it cannot be conceived as nothing but 
physical matter (as it is ordinarily understood) in a certain form. It rather appears like a 
new kind of matter – qualifying it as radically emergent. As William James puts it: 
The point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is that all the new forms of 
being that make their appearance are really nothing more than results of the redistribution 
of the original and unchanging materials. The self-same atoms which, chaotically 
dispersed, made the nebula, now, jammed and temporarily caught in peculiar positions, 
form our brains; and the ‘evolution’ of the brains, if understood, would be simply the 
account of how the atoms came to be so caught and jammed. In this story no new natures, 
no factors not present at the beginning, are introduced at any later stage. 
But with the dawn of consciousness an entirely new nature seems to slip in, 
something whereof the potency was not given in the mere outward atoms of the original 
chaos. (James 1890/1981: 149) 
If physicalists could make clear that consciousness is just physical matter in a certain 
form, there would be no big mystery about it, even though it still would not be intelligible 
why there exists a law such that physical matter ever enters that configuration, and the 
appearance of this configuration of matter would be accompanied by an epistemic gap 
between it and its causes.  
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The discontinuity criterion of radical emergence is also relevant for many arguments. 
Consciousness is often held to be the kind of thing that cannot come gradually into being; 
its appearance constitutes a discontinuity in nature. Dim or weak consciousness is still 
consciousness, not an indeterminate state in between. James also characterizes the 
problem of consciousness in these terms:  
The demand for continuity has, over large tracts of science, proved itself to possess true 
prophetic power. We ought therefore ourselves sincerely to try every possible mode of 
conceiving the dawn of consciousness so that it may not appear equivalent to the irruption 
into the universe of a new nature, non-existent until then. 
Merely to call the consciousness ‘nascent’ will not serve our turn.[footnote omitted] […] 
It is true that the word signifies not yet quite born, and so seems to form a sort of 
bridge between existence and nonentity. But that is a verbal quibble. The fact is that 
discontinuity comes in if a new nature comes in at all. The quantity of the latter is quite 
immaterial. The girl in ‘Midshipman Easy’ could not excuse the illegitimacy of her child 
by saying, ‘it was a very small one.’ And Consciousness, however small, is an illegitimate 
birth in any philosophy that starts without it, and yet professes to explain all facts by 
continuous evolution. […] (James 1890/1981: 151–152) 
Discontinuity figures in many anti-physicalist arguments. One widespread worry is that 
there must be a definite point in the evolutionary continuum where consciousness shows 
up, but any point we select will look arbitrary (William K. Clifford (1874/1886) is 
regarded as the originator of this problem). There are also worries that consciousness 
cannot be identified with a function or computation, because it can be vague or 
indeterminate whether something realizes a function or computation, but not whether 
something is conscious (Searle 1990). All such arguments have as a premise that 
consciousness is an either/or-phenomenon, while nothing physical stands out from the 
continuum in the same way.  
Finally, as already mentioned, in much of the literature in philosophy of mind, it is 
presupposed or argued that the coming into being of consciousness constitutes a deeper 
mystery than physical causation. When philosophers pose the hard problem of 
consciousness, the question of how or why the mental can arise from the physical, they 
generally do not assume that the same how/why-question must be asked about ordinary 
causation, even though an epistemic gap is present there as well. Just as we cannot, 
according to the knowledge argument, deduce the mental from the physical, we cannot 
deduce effects from their causes, and just as we can, according to the conceivability 
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argument, conceive of any physical configuration without phenomenal consciousness, we 
can also conceive of causes occurring without their usual effects. But most philosophers 
find that these respective gaps are still not of the same type, and they also tend to regard 
the problem represented by the former gap, the hard problem of consciousness, as 
somehow more serious than the problem represented by the latter gap, the problem of the 
intelligibility of ordinary causation.  
As discussed, some might hold that the difference is one of mere extrinsic 
intelligibility, of fitting the psychophysical relation systematically in with all other causal 
relations, which would mean that the mystery of consciousness reduces to the problem of 
mental causation alone. If the problem of mental causation is solved by identifying mental 
properties with physical properties, one can explain the preoccupation with the mental–
physical gap by the fact that identity, as opposed to causation, is a relation in which 
epistemic gaps do not belong. But it seems many think the coming into being of 
consciousness is also intrinsically mysterious, much more so than ordinary causation, and 
furthermore, it is regarded as mysterious in this way also (and perhaps in particular) by 
those who do not accept the identity theory. This could be explained by causation already 
being partially intelligible in a way that the relation between the mental and the physical 
cannot also be intelligible, as would be accounted for by the hylomorphic theory. 
Otherwise, it seems hard to justify that the mental–physical gap is systematically treated 
as intrinsically more problematic than the gap that is present in all causation.  
4 COMBINATION AS CAUSATION  
According to the hylomorphic theory of change, the fundamental problem of physicalism 
when it comes to consciousness is the following: (1) physical (prime) matter is 
fundamentally non-mental,
21
 (2) mentality is not merely a form of non-mental matter, 
therefore, (3) the mental will have to radically emerge from the physical – which is at best 
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 In chapter 1 (section, 2.2, p. 36), I quoted Alter and Nagasawa as mentioning Pereboom’s suggestion that 
prime matter could be the non-mental Russellian inscrutable, and claiming that the notion was notoriously 
obscure. I have now claimed that the notion of prime matter should not be so dismissed, and it may then 
seem that the suggestion could be the basis for a non-panpsychist Russellian monism which is nevertheless 
compatible with the problem from non-structural properties after all. But this would not be the case. 
Physical prime matter has so far been specified either schematically as “that which underlies physical 
change (and which is non-mental)” or “the determinable which all physical states have in common”, which 
does not positively characterize it, or as pure potentiality, which is not distinguishable from pure 
dispositionality and would therefore be vulnerable to the arguments from dispositional properties (and non-
structural properties).  
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unintelligible and at worst impossible. Assuming panpsychism and hylomorphism, on the 
other hand, matter itself – prime matter – is fundamentally mental. This fits Strawson’s 
statement that: “energy is experientiality; that is its intrinsic nature” (Strawson 2006a: 
234), if energy is identical to or an aspect of the prime matter of the actual universe. If 
macroconsciousness can be construed as a form of mentality and mentality itself as prime 
matter, it is possible that it is caused by microconsciousness being transformed into it. 
Microconsciousness would have to be regarded as a form of mentality as well, and 
thereby as fit for going through “generation and corruption” just as the fundamental 
particles of physics. Their transformation into macroconsciousness would then not 
constitute an intelligibility problem. It might, as mentioned above, constitute an empirical 
problem, but, as noted, this is set aside until the next chapter. 
However, microconsciousness belongs to microsubjects and macroconsciousness to 
macrosubjects. How can subjects be reduced to a form of mentality, or a determinate of 
an experiential determinable? Traditionally, subjects are regarded as the most 
fundamental mental element. Subjects are that in which mental properties inhere, the 
havers of experiences and that which remains constant while experiences change. They 
seem more like what all other mental properties or elements are forms or determinates of, 
and thereby as though they should be in the position of matter. If so, their coming into 
being would constitute radical emergence. The coming into being of subjects also looks 
like radical emergence according to the discontinuity criterion. Subjects are not the kinds 
of things that seem able to come gradually into being – they either exist or do not exist.  
Is this just another illustration of how panpsychism only succeeds in moving a 
physicalist problem and of how the combination problem is after all inescapable? I will 
argue that it is not, because the problem can be avoided by rejecting the view of 
subjectivity that gives rise to it. The view of subjects that I will propose should replace 
the traditional conception is the view defended by Strawson that I already discussed 
briefly in chapter 4 (section 2.4) as a way of avoiding some metaphysical difficulties with 
agent-causation. It involved construing subjects as less substantial by taking away their 
permanence. Now I will explain this view more fully, and show how I think it enables 
subjects to be finally reduced to pure form, with mentality or experientiality as their 
matter.  
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4.1 The Identity View of Subjects and Experiences  –  or: 
“Das Ich ist Unrettbar”22 
The common view of subjects as permanent things or containers with changing 
experiences as properties or contents puts the subject in the position of matter or 
substance – as something which is not a determinate or accident of something else. The 
alternative view I suggest is that experience, consciousness or what it is like-ness is matter 
or basic determinable stuff, and that particular experiences are forms that experiential 
matter can take. Experientiality, like matter, can be thought of as a determinable that 
cannot exist undetermined, without any particular form. It seems there cannot be 
experience without any particular quality,
23
 just as there could not be Cartesian matter 
without a particular extension, or energy without a particular form of energy. 
It is not unnatural to treat experientiality as such as a general determinable. We seem 
to be doing it all the time. When we think that there is something that it is like to be a bat, 
but cannot imagine what it is like in particular, we seem to be thinking that being a bat 
involves the determinable experientiality, without thinking about any determinate 
experience. If we could not treat experientiality as a determinable, this thought and 
similar ones would not make sense.  
If experientiality is matter and particular experiences are its fundamental forms, 
where does this leave subjects? Strawson has argued for the view that subjects are 
identical to their experiences (Strawson 2009; 2008b, and other places). If experiences are 
forms of experiential matter, it follows, if Strawson’s view is correct, that subjects would 
also be forms of experiential matter.  
I will now explain what happens to particular aspects of subjectivity when this view 
is accepted. My aim with this is only to show that the view can account for the main 
aspects of subjectivity which are phenomenologically apparent – as opposed to present in, 
e.g., intuitive judgments or presuppositions of ordinary language – and that it does so 
prima facie without incoherence. I will not argue that it should be adopted on any other 
basis than that it helps solve the combination problem. Many will have objections to the 
view, but for the purposes of a solution to the combination problem, as I have defined it, 
it does not need to be defended from all kinds of objections. It must only be the case that 
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 “The ego is unsalvageable” (Mach 1886: 18, footnote 12). 
23
 Even in meditation, where some people claim to experience pure consciousness, this is described as a 
positive emptiness or openness, which does not sound like the absence of any quality but rather a very 
general quality.  
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the view is not clearly false and that it does not conflict with principles (i)–(viii) listed 
above. If my account of combination ends up replacing the problems of physicalism, 
dualism and non-panpsychist Russellian monism with different, non-analogous problems 
concerning the identity view of subjects and experiences, this would constitute progress 
(as opposed to the regress that characterizes the combination problem). 
4.1.1  The Subject as the Experiencer  
Subjective experiences have two aspects: one the one hand, there is the content and the 
phenomenal qualities; on the other hand, there is the fact that there is some point of view 
on these contents or qualities, an experiencer. Some think the experiencing subject is a 
distinct entity, which must be posited in addition to experiential content in order to yield 
an actual phenomenal experience. However, according to Strawson, it is not so clear that 
the experiencer and the content of experiences are really distinct. He holds that it is a 
necessary truth that there can be neither such a thing as experiential content without an 
experiencing subject, nor a subject of experience without an actual experience with 
experiential content. What ultimately makes this mutual dependency true, Strawson 
argues, is that the terms subject and content do not really pick out distinct portions of 
reality. They pick out aspects or poles of something that is fundamentally unified, namely 
a single experience. On reflection, we can see that subjects can be regarded as nothing 
over and above their experiences and contents, meaning that the relation between a 
subject, the contents of its experience and the experience itself could be identity. The 
distinctions only exist in our concepts and result from different ways of regarding the 
experiential unity. The result is that experiences really have themselves. An experience is 
its own subject.  
This view avoids certain difficulties of the cruder bundle theory of subjects, as the 
bundle theory in effect eliminates the unified subject pole of the experience and leaves 
only the multitude of the content pole. “What bundles the bundle?” then remains the 
question. Strawson’s identity view affirms the reality of both poles and claims that on 
reflection their necessary co-existence can be grounded in them being aspects of the same 
phenomenon. If the identity claim is coherent and phenomenologically adequate (as 
Strawson argues at length in his (2009)), this would seem to be the simplest and most 
parsimonious explanation of what underlies their co-dependence.  
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4.1.2  The Subject as  the Unifier of a Multitude of Experiential Content  
It is difficult to see how the multitude of experiential content can be straightforwardly 
identical to a fundamentally single subject. It is often supposed that a distinct subject is 
required to explain the unity of consciousness, the fact that a multitude of contents is 
unified into a single experience where different contents are all co-conscious. If the 
subject is something that produces a unity out of a priorly disunified collection of 
contents, it must indeed be distinct. In order to avoid this conclusion, one must reject the 
idea that there is such a thing as a prior multitude of contents. Rather, the total 
experiential field must be prior to its parts, meaning that, fundamentally speaking, we are 
always having one experience, not many. Individual qualities within the experience, such 
as redness, blueness, noises and moods are not priorly carved out building blocks but 
rather posterior delimitations of a holistic experiential field. Concepts of individual 
experiences are ways of carving up an intertwined whole that does not have clear joints 
already built in.  
The result is not that individual qualities have no unity and that the experiential field 
can be carved up into individual qualities in any way we like. There are objective 
relations of similarity and difference between qualitative fields that constrain how they 
can be carved into contiguous sections or groups. But the precise divisions between 
individual qualities can be vague and depend on conceptual schemes. In some cultures, 
for example, there is no distinction between blue and green, so where I would count two 
colors, blue and green, they would count only one. Relative to my conceptual scheme, 
they would be wrong and I would be right, but they would be right relative to theirs, and 
it is hard to say that my conceptual scheme is correct – or that there is one scheme that 
carves the color continuum at its joints.  
The boundaries between simultaneous total experiential fields (the experiences of 
different organisms and entities), on the other hand, seem absolute. There is only one 
correct way of counting the number of total experiential fields that exist right now. In this 
way, it seems that the total experiential field has a much stronger unity than the individual 
qualities contained within it. 
If we accept this view, whereby the unity of a total experiential field is prior to and 
stronger than the unity of its parts, then the unity of consciousness does not have to be 
explained by appealing to the unifying power of a subject acting on a multitude of 
individual qualities. Rather, the unity of consciousness would just be the unity of the 
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experiential field, which can be regarded as fundamental to it, and therefore there will be 
no need to posit a distinct subject to explain it.  
The identity of the unity of subjects and the unity of total experiential fields is also 
part of Strawson’s view: 
The unity or singleness of the (thin) subject of the total experiential field in the living 
moment of experience and the unity or singleness of the total experiential field are aspects 
of the same thing. (Strawson 2010: 81) 
He also puts it more strongly as “two aspects of the same unity” (Strawson 2010: 91), and 
is open to their being fully identical.  
4.1.3  The Subject as the Grounder of Personal and Diachronic Identity 
The view has so far eliminated subjects as distinct experiencers and unifiers of 
synchronically co-conscious qualities. A third aspect of subjects is their role as diachronic 
unifiers, something that makes it the case that temporally separate experiences belong to 
the same temporally extended person or self. If a subject is identical with an experience, it 
would mean that every time we have a new experience, which we do at every moment, 
we also have a new subject, and so it cannot account for the persistence of a self. The 
only thing that remains constant when an experience changes is experientiality itself, but 
if this is supposed to account for the idea of the persisting subject or self, it could not be 
unique to any human being; in fact there could only be one self in the whole universe 
insofar as there is only one experiential determinable, and it would be the subject of every 
particular experience of every person (and every thing, given panpsychism).  
Strawson argues that individual experiences are temporally extended – and that 
subjects, being identical with them, would last as long as experiences do. But experiences 
cannot last anywhere near long enough to preserve the kind of permanence entailed by the 
traditional conception of subjects.
24
  
As already discussed in chapter 4 (section 2.4), there are many empirical problems 
with the notion of persisting subjects. Nothing permanent is apparent to introspection, 
according to empiricists such as Hume, only impermanent perceptions:  
                                                 
24
 Strawson makes the empirical bet that experiences only last for up to two seconds in the human case 
(Strawson 2008b: 161). See chapter 7, section 1, for further discussion of the duration of experiences. 
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For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on 
some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception. (Hume 1739–40/1995: para. 3/23 p. 252) 
Furthermore, no physical counterpart can be found in organic bodies which is strongly 
and fundamentally permanent in the way subjects are on the traditional conception. That 
there is nothing fundamentally permanent about persons, neither physically not mentally, 
in which personal identity can be grounded, and that personal identity must hence be 
regarded as a non-fundamental property constructed out of relations of similarity and 
causal continuity, is a view that has been defended by Derek Parfit and has won many 
adherents. Further support for abandoning the permanence of everything related to the 
subject, except experientiality itself, can be found in some Buddhists traditions, where a 
central doctrine is that the persisting self when considered in one way is an illusion, but 
when considered in another way is universal.
25
 This view is held not as a religious dogma, 
but as something that can be seen through arguments or upon reflecting on it in 
meditation, which is partly a phenomenological investigation.  
I think panpsychists will have to join this group and let go of the diachronic subject 
or self as something fundamentally permanent. The diachronic subject or self must reduce 
to a sequence or stream of momentary (i.e., at most very briefly temporally extended) 
total experiential fields, connected by causation and similarity, in line with Parfit’s 
psychological criteria for personal identity. In the following, I will use the term subject 
(and micro/macrosubject) to mean subjects that can persist for longer than an individual 
experience, but it will be presupposed that they are not fundamentally persisting, but 
rather reducible to a sequence of short-lived fundamental subjects identical to their 
experiences. I will sometimes use Strawson’s term thin subject to refer to subjects in the 
latter, fundamentally unified and short-lived sense. 
4.2 Combination as Experiential Fusion  
With this account of subjects, where all their properties can be identified with properties 
or aspects of experientiality itself, it is possible to construe mental combination as a 
process where there is no radical emergence. Combination could simply be thought of as 
a kind of Parfitian psychological fusion, a fusion of streams of total experiential fields. 
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 In the Mahayana tradition, it is held that the true nature of the self is Buddha-nature, which is the same in 
all sentient beings (see O’Sullivan 2010). 
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Parfit imagines someone who has control over the fibers that connect our two brain 
hemispheres, the corpus callosum (Parfit 1971: 18–19). The brain hemispheres are 
disconnected, and each starts performing different parts of a long calculation, one writing 
it down with the left hand and the other with the right, as though they were separate 
persons. Each brain hemisphere will have its own stream of psychologically connected 
experiential moments, but the two streams will not be psychologically connected to each 
other – each hemisphere having no idea of what the other hemisphere is thinking. Then 
the hemispheres are reunited, and this results in an experience in the whole brain of 
remembering both calculations. A single, twice as informed, stream, will then replace the 
two individual streams, but the new stream will also be psychologically connected with 
both of the previous streams by remembering them, so the temporarily distinct subjects of 
each of the calculations would both survive. This seems like a case of two subjects 
combining into one.
26
  
Combination of microsubjects could be analogous to this scenario of unification of 
hemispheres, where two streams of experiences fuse. In a simple case of combination, we 
would have two microexperiences in separate streams constituting individual 
microsubjects. Combination happens when two experiences at some point jointly cause a 
single new experience that is equally similar and equally strongly causally connected to 
both of them, so that they both count as “surviving” as it.27 The new experience will, in 
some sense, have to be twice as rich and complex as the two previous experiences, having 
similarities to both of them. Let us say that each of the streams consist of experiences that 
are simple in the sense of having one quality. One is the experience of, say, pure red and 
the other is the experience of pure blue. The experience they jointly cause would be an 
experience of red fading into blue with some purple in between.
28
  
Such a process prima facie (I will examine it in more detail in section 4.4 below) 
fulfills all the criteria for causation devised above. Microexperiences and 
macroexperiences are both forms of the same kind of matter, or determinates of the same 
fundamental determinable. The fact that two experiences jointly cause one experience 
                                                 
26
 Not necessarily an empirically possible case, of course, but that should not matter.  
27
 The identity of a microsubject could probably not be defined in terms of continuity of personality and 
memories, but we may assume that there are other kinds of similarities that would be relevant. 
28
 Insofar as we can speculate about the character of microexperience at all, I do not think this is realistic. In 
line with the argument from causation, something like pain and pleasure, or comfort and discomfort, are 
better candidates. 
171 
 
should not be any more mysterious than two physical events jointly causing a single 
subsequent event. There is no discontinuity, because there are no new subjects being 
created, nor old ones annihilated. The microexperiences that jointly cause a new 
macroexperience do go out of existence, but this is not radical annihilation (which is the 
reverse of radical creation/emergence and just as bad) because their matter remains and is 
transformed into other experiences. On the view of subjects presupposed, it is only 
metaphysically possible for a subject to survive by being followed by a stream of 
experiences that is continuous with its current experience, and in this sense the original 
subjects do persist; they evolve into the macrosubject instead of being annihilated and 
replaced by it.  
Coleman argues, as already quoted in chapter 1, that combination requires that all 
subjects involved survive, because: “If one subject is left where formerly we had two, this 
means at least one subject has gone out of existence, which is not combination but a fight 
to the death” (Coleman 2013b: 14). If combination is like Parfitian fusion, Coleman’s 
paradox is avoided. It is a process whereby two subjects can both survive in one and the 
same successor subject, and in this way there can be a reduction of the number of subjects 
without a “fight to the death”. Instead, combination can now be understood according to a 
comparison offered (though not further developed) by Basile: “Very roughly, if 
composition of some sort has to be possible, then lesser experiences do not have to come 
together into a larger one like bricks in a wall, but like rivers in a sea” (2010: 189). 
Combination construed in this way is very different from constitution. In order for 
the criterion of conservation of experientiality to be respected, the microexperiences must 
disappear
29
 (or at least significantly diminish and descend to an even deeper level of 
microscopicness) as they produce the macrosubject by (fully or partly) transforming into 
it. If a macroexperience were produced by two microexperiences alone, and the 
microexperiential steams continued to exist (undiminished) as distinct from the new 
macroexperiential stream, it would look like a new portion of experiential matter had 
radically emerged. Microexperiences will therefore strictly speaking exist only in the 
causal history of the macroexperience. In constitution, on the other hand, it is absolutely 
required that the microexperiential constitutive parts continue to exist simultaneously 
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 When microexperiences disappear their identical thin subjects also disappear, but their diachronic 
subjects do not, because their identity is grounded in a stream of continuous experiences.  
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with the macroexperiential whole, because things cannot be constituted by no longer 
existing parts.  
Still, combination as causation would retain some similarity with constitution. It 
involves a kind of material, as opposed to material and formal, constitution, because the 
new macroexperience is constituted by the same matter as the microexperiences were, but 
not the same forms of the matter. For illustration, consider again how the combination of 
subjects on this account is more like the combination of rivers in a sea, as opposed to 
bricks in a wall. When rivers combine, they contribute their matter, the water they were 
made of, to the sea, but they lose their form.
30
 There will no longer be water in the form 
of rivers, and therefore no rivers, when the sea begins. When bricks combine into a wall, 
on the other hand, they contribute both their matter and their form; there will still be 
cement in the form of bricks, and therefore there will still be bricks, when the wall is up.  
One difference between water and experiential matter is that the forms of the latter 
are much more diverse. The different possible forms of water are mainly structural or 
geometric. The forms of experiential matter are both qualitative and structural – sensory 
qualities, emotional qualities, cognitive phenomenology, agentive phenomenology, etc., 
distributed in different ways within total experiential fields, would all be forms of 
experientiality. My claim is that both structural and qualitative forms are intelligibly 
related in virtue of continuity.  
Is continuity the only relation in virtue of which quality combination is intelligible? I 
will now consider some other principles – holism and blending – by which it is arguably 
intelligible, and see whether they are compatible with my account.  
4.3 Phenomenal Holism and Blending of Qualities  
In chapter 1 (p. 46), I discussed Basile’s argument that assuming three principles, 
phenomenal essentialism, phenomenal holism and sharing, combination as constitution 
would involve a contradiction. Phenomenal essentialism is the thesis that the essential 
nature of an experience is to feel a certain way, phenomenal holism is the thesis that the 
nature of a single identifiable experience is essentially determined by the other 
experiences occurring along-side it within a total experiential field, and sharing is the 
thesis that many subjects can share a numerically identical single experience. My account 
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 In order for the example to bring out the important contrast, it must be imagined that water is an infinitely 
divisible homogenous substance. Actually, river combination is just like bricks-in-a-wall combination, 
because H2O molecules retain their form, just like bricks. 
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of combination rejects sharing, by having macrosubjects transform into macrosubjects 
instead of having them overlap. Thereby I avoid the contradiction, but also abandon 
constitution, since, as Basile says, sharing is required to make sense of this (Basile 2010: 
110). Phenomenal holism and phenomenal essentialism can both be retained.  
Phenomenal holism concerns what happens to individual qualities as they come 
together in an experiential whole. Here is Basile’s explanation of the principle and its 
motivation:  
PHENOMENAL HOLISM – this is the view that, within a person’s total psychical whole, 
the nature of a single identifiable experience […] is essentially determined by the other 
experiences occurring along- side it – synchronically – within the whole.  
This principle involves a rejection of the traditional atomistic view of the mind, one 
typically exemplified by Hume’s notion of a perception as a self-subsistent, substance-
like entity that could, as a matter of sheer logical possibility, exist outside of the larger 
field of consciousness in which it actually occurs.
[reference omitted] 
According to James, a 
person’s psychical field at any one moment constitutes a non-decomposable unity; its 
several contents are to be viewed as ‘aspects’ mutually determining and interpenetrating 
each other rather than as ‘parts’ in any literal sense of this word. James’ commitment to 
this view is implicit in his remark that ‘each thought [a total moment of experience] is a 
fresh organic unity’.[reference omitted] The denomination ‘organic unity’ commonly refers to a 
totality whose parts are internally related, such that the nature of each essentially depends 
upon that of all others.  
For the sake of illustration, imagine what it would be like to drink a cup of coffee in 
Naples as opposed to drinking it in Edinburgh: isn’t it plausible to think that the different 
atmospheres of the two cities (the characteristically different colours, sounds, flavours etc. 
one experiences there) would make a difference to the coffee’s taste? The two tastes, as 
they occur in the total states ‘Coffee-in-Naples’ and ‘Coffee-in-Edinburgh’, would seem 
to be different – qualitatively, and therefore also numerically – experiential occurrences. 
(Basile 2010: 107–108) 
Phenomenal holism is a way in which the emergence of qualities is intelligible. It seems 
at least partially intelligible how a novel experience such as “coffee-in-Naples” can arise 
from the experiences associated with being in Naples and the experience of drinking 
coffee existing within one unity of consciousness.  
The account I have offered so far depends essentially on the view that total 
experiential fields are prior to their parts (as described in section 4.1.2 above) – I will call 
this experiential field holism. According to experiential field holism, the existence of the 
phenomenal parts depends on the phenomenal whole. According to phenomenal holism, 
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the mode of existence of the phenomenal parts, their character or how they feel, depends 
on the phenomenal whole. It seems to me these two principles not only go very well 
together; experiential field holism might entail phenomenal holism.  
Assuming bottom-up phenomenal constitution, where phenomenal parts are prior to 
phenomenal wholes, it seems clear that not only is the existence of the whole dependent 
on the existence of the parts; the character of the whole is also dependent on the character 
of the parts. For example, if one of the parts of a red field is changed to a blue, the field as 
a whole will no longer be red field, but a red field with a blue dot. One cannot (usually) 
change any part without at least very subtly changing the whole.
31
 Experiential field 
holism reverses one of these dependencies, the existential priority, by saying that the 
phenomenal whole is prior to the parts. It makes sense that one thereby also reverses the 
other kind of dependence; that the character of the parts should now depend on the whole 
as well, as per phenomenal holism. This would perhaps also make more sense of what 
existential priority for phenomenal entities really amounts to.  
Now, this is just a speculation that clearly falls short of demonstrating that 
experiential field holism entails phenomenal holism, but it hopefully shows that the 
principles can at least be easily and naturally integrated.  
Coleman has argued that phenomenal qualities, as opposed to subjects, can 
intelligibly combine, and that we witness this when colors blend in a painting and flavors 
blend in a meal. Blending, as he describes it, works holistically and not by aggregation. 
However, he thinks blending is still a kind of constitution, a non-aggregative kind. He 
writes:  
In painting, one deploys qualitative elements which can, in arrangement, alter one 
another’s intrinsic character. This mutual conditioning is part and parcel of the integration 
of the qualitative elements into a whole, with systemic powers all its own: the overall 
phenomenological upshot of all the composing elements. Qualitatively distinct elements 
can combine into a smoothly variegated qualitative whole. This, a painted canvas, is the 
model I suggest we have in mind when we think of phenomenal combination.
[footnote omitted] 
We are already perfectly well aware of phenomenal combination, if we care to think 
about it. One drinks a decent red wine with the Sunday roast beef because the flavours of 
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 One might think there can be multiple realization of phenomenal wholes, in the same way that the same 
color shade can be mixed from different sets of other shades. But this takes careful planning. Usually, when 
one changes a random part of a phenomenal whole, one gets a difference in the whole. There might, 
corresponding to this, be some ways of carefully altering a whole that leaves certain parts unchanged – 
multiple realization of parts by wholes.  
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roast beef and red wine pleasingly interpenetrate. Each flavour in isolation is a distinct 
phenomenal element. Their coming together yields a whole qualitatively distinct from 
either of the parts, though the combinatory upshot of their properties. This happens 
through the two elements fusing together, forming a genuine phenomenal unity which is 
the logical product of its ingredients. This is the model for a phenomenally composite, but 
not merely aggregative, state.
 [footnote omitted] 
[…] the phenomenal ultimates mutually condition one another, as they phenomenally 
fuse. They form a phenomenal unity, composed of a phenomenal multitude, where the 
quality of the whole is the logical product of the qualities of the ingredients.
[footnote omitted] 
(Coleman 2012: 157–158) 
In my view, colors and flavors blending is really an example of partially intelligible 
emergence, rather than fully intelligible non-aggregative but constitutive combination. It 
seems one cannot derive from having experience of, say, the taste of sugar and the taste of 
unsweetened cocoa how chocolate will taste. Hume claimed that one could derive the 
missing shade of blue in an otherwise continuous spectrum, and who knows whether one 
really could, but it sounds less plausible that one could derive what it is like to see green 
if one had only experienced yellow and blue. In other words, in between qualitative 
ingredients and their blended result, there is an epistemic gap that does not appear fully 
closable in principle. Therefore, if blending is indeed intelligible, it must only be partially 
so, and it therefore fits better into an emergent account.  
By my account, which I now take to include both experiential field holism and 
phenomenal holism, the correct thing to say is that the qualitative unity of a painted 
canvas is a result of the color patches (qua phenomenal, not qua paint on the canvas) 
jointly transforming into it. Qualities similar, but not identical (because of holistic 
influence), to the transformed colors exist within the qualitative unity we experience from 
looking at the painting, and because the continuity is thereby obvious, the relation 
between them strikes us as intelligible.  
In conclusion, then, holistic blending of qualities within a total experiential field is a 
mode of combination which can coexist with combination as causation, because it is 
actually an instance of it. The fundamental principles according to which blending works 
and is intelligible – phenomenal holism and continuity – are either already part of the 
account, or can be naturally integrated in it. Blending cases are therefore good 
illustrations of the partial intelligibility of combination as causation.  
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4.4 Conservation of Experientiality and Limits to Continuity  
So far, I have offered an account of combination as a process similar to Parfitian 
psychological fusion. This account should be examined in more detail to see whether it 
really satisfies the hylomorphic criteria of causation and can be partially intelligible on 
that basis. The criteria are qualitative conservation, quantitative conservation and 
continuity.  
In order to determine whether experiential matter is conserved we need a notion of 
quantity of experientiality. The basic idea is that a rich and complex experience is 
constituted out of a greater quantity of experientiality, or experiential energy-matter, than 
a simple experience.
 
A human experience takes more experientiality than an insect 
experience, which again takes more experientiality than an electron experience. For the 
same quantity of experientiality, we can either get many simple experiential fields or a 
few rich and complex experiential fields. This is in analogy with physical matter, where 
we can get many small (or low-energy) things or a few big (or high-energy) things out of 
the same quantity of matter. Hopefully this is somewhat intuitive – I am not sure how it 
could be more precisely specified.
32
  
In three figures below, I will illustrate some different specific models of an event of 
combination. As it turns out, all three models will involve either discontinuity or violation 
of the conservation of experientiality, and they seem to exhaust the basic options. 
According to my arguments so far, this indicates that combination must involve radical 
emergence after all. But discontinuity is only a defeasible indicator of radical emergence 
– sometimes discontinuity has other explanations. I will offer such an alternative 
explanation, and if it succeeds, the discontinuous models can be seen to not involve 
radical emergence and will therefore be acceptable. 
In the figures, one experiential field will be represented by a circle. The diameter of a 
circle represents the quantity of experientiality that goes into the experience. The quantity 
of experientiality is proportional to the degree of complexity and richness of the 
experience. The circles are filled with different color patterns to visualize different levels 
of experiential complexity and richness and also to visualize how the experiences are 
continuous or discontinuous with one another. The green arrows connect experiences that 
are formally continuous with each other; where there is actually a sequence of 
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 Lewtas (2012) spells out what conservation of experientiality amounts to in a similar way (but for the 
purposes of a constitutive account of combination).   
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incremental qualitative changes in between them. The red arrows represent discontinuity 
between experiences that are supposed to be connected states of the same diachronic 
subject (in the reducible sense). The black arrows represent causal influence.  
In the basic example of experiential fusion given in section 4.2 above, two simple 
streams of different color experiences joined to form a more complex, richer stream of 
color experiences. This involves a discontinuity. At the moment of combination, the 
moment of passing from two simultaneous experiences to one, there is also a sudden 
passing from two simple experiences to one with “twice” the complexity and richness 
(figure 1).
33
  
 
Figure 1: Symmetric and sudden combination 
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 In the example of red and blue combining into red + purple + blue, we have new qualities (purple) as well 
as more structure (a distribution of different colors, not just a homogenous field of one). Richness is meant 
to designate further qualities, not just a more complex combination of the same qualities. As I have just 
argued, purple cannot be derived from red and blue. Not being constituted by them, it cannot just be a 
matter of added complexity.  
Given phenomenal holism, however, even if the combined experience were just red alongside blue with 
no purple and no fading into each other, this would actually be a brand new quality anyway, not just a 
repetition of the exact same red and blue of the simple streams. The redness of a red + blue experiential 
field is not identical to the redness of the pure red experience, because they are influenced by different 
phenomenal contexts. The rednesses will be similar but not exactly the same. The total combined 
experience would be one of fundamental, irreducible red-and-blue(-distributed-in-such-and-such-a-way)-
ness. By phenomenal holism, complexity and richness are thus inseparable, as every time we get more 
complexity we also get new qualities. 
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In order for all qualitative transitions to occur gradually, complexity could gradually fade 
into both the streams. The process of combination would go as follows: experiences in 
two separate streams are causally interacting, causing each other to become gradually 
more and more similar. At a certain point they are just a step away from being 
qualitatively identical, and at that point they jointly cause the complex experience which 
is perfectly continuous with both of them (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Symmetric and gradual combination 
 
This model preserves continuity, but it violates conservation instead. At the moment 
where two almost identical experiences jointly cause one that is equally similar to both, 
we lose an amount of experientiality, because we replace two fairly rich experiences with 
one that is only slightly richer than each of them. If we replace two simpler experiences 
with a more complex one, it has to be “twice” as rich and complex in order for no 
experientiality to be lost. As the simple experiences gradually gain complexity before 
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combination, they will also gain experientiality from nowhere, which is another 
violation.
34
 
The final possibility is thinking of combination as being asymmetrical. As one 
subject gradually gets more complex and richer, the other subject gets gradually less 
complex and more impoverished. The moment of combination is when the diminishing 
stream completely fades out, having transferred all its experientiality to the other stream 
(figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Asymmetric combination 
 
In this figure, the middle experience on the right is supposed to be a dim version of the 
previous blue, so it is supposed to be qualitatively impoverished, but I could not make it 
less complex than a field of solid color.  
This model gives as much discontinuity as the first model. The last experience in the 
stream that fades out will be a contributing cause to the combined experience, which is 
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 If the process of combination is a closed system. If we solve the problem by assuming that the 
experientiality lost and gained is transferred to and from other parts of a larger system, it seems we will not 
get continuity in these transferring processes, so it will just move the problem.  
180 
 
discontinuous with it. The next state of that subject is having no experience (meaning it 
no longer exists). But this transition, from a very impoverished and simple experience to 
no experience, will also be discontinuous. There is no continuity between even the 
dimmest experience and no experience – that is part of what makes consciousness 
radically emergent given physicalism, as argued above.  
How can this be solved? The symmetric and gradual model in figure 2 clearly 
violates conservation and so must be rejected even though it gives perfect continuity. But 
there is hope for both the symmetric but sudden model and the asymmetric model, in 
figures 1 and 3 respectively, since discontinuity does not always indicate radical 
emergence.  
A discontinuous transition does not indicate radical emergence if the discontinuous 
states are connected by a continuum of possible states. If an actual discontinuity could 
possibly be filled in with states that would make the transition continuous, it is not an 
indicator of a strict metaphysical binary like existence/non-existence, where there are not 
even possible states in between. In figures 1 and 3, every individual transition is possibly 
continuous in this way – there are possible states that could fill in the discontinuity. 
However, it is still not possible for all the transitions to be continuous at the same time,  
as in figure 2, where it leads to violation of conservation. When the process of 
combination is considered as a whole, then, there is a sense in which there are no possible 
states, or sets of states, that can fill in the discontinuity gap. This remains as an indication 
of radical emergence (in the form of radical annihilation).  
I offer the following explanation: the impossibility of joint continuity has its source, 
not in radical emergence, but in the fact that experientiality comes in discrete quanta, i.e., 
in the form of fundamentally unified whole experiential fields. It is mathematically 
impossible to transition gradually from there being a certain whole number of experiences 
at one time to there being a different whole number of them at a subsequent time, if we 
have to add or take away one whole experience at a time – which we do because the idea 
of, say, half an experience does not make sense. In order to avoid discontinuity altogether 
we would have to accept an aspect of Leibnizian monadism, namely the idea that all 
subjects are indestructible, or that all streams of experience continue forever – they can 
fade to a minimum level of experiential complexity and richness, but never completely 
fade out. I see no reason to posit the conservation of the number of simultaneous 
experiential fields, as opposed to just the conservation of the quantity of experientiality. If 
the joint but not individual impossibility of continuity indicates only violation of 
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conservation of the number of simultaneous experiential fields, it would therefore be 
acceptable.  
4.5 A Continuum of Qualities  
In the figures above, colors represent experiences and it is clear how one can always fill 
in a transition between color combinations with possible in-between states. The color 
spectrum is a continuum that we can move around in without making any leaps. But are 
there always possible states between any experiences? The sensory modalities may appear 
to mark absolute distinctions between groups of qualities. How could you go gradually 
from, e.g., sight to smell? There are also other phenomenal groupings between which it is 
even harder to see that a gradual transition is possible, like sensory and cognitive 
phenomenology. It is clear that we cannot positively imagine a lot of such in-between 
states. If unimaginability suggests impossibility, it is even less plausible that there are 
possible in-between states that would allow us to pass gradually from basic electron 
experience to human experience, which would be even further apart.  
McGinn gives a version of the combination problem formulated in terms of qualities, 
the problem of how we get the rich qualities of human experience from the basic qualities 
of ultimate particles:  
We cannot […] envisage a small number of experiential primitives yielding a rich variety 
of phenomenologies; we have to posit richness all the way down, more or less. An easy 
way to see this is to note that you cannot derive one sort of experience form another: you 
cannot get pains from experiences of colours, or emotions from thoughts, or thoughts 
form acts of will. There are a large number of phenomenal primitives. Accordingly, we 
cannot formulate panpsychism in terms of a small number of phenomenal primitives. 
(McGinn 2006: 96) 
Richness all the way down is highly implausible,
35
 so the worry then is that qualitative 
richness radically emerges. This has become known as the palette problem.  
The account I have offered enables a reply to the palette problem: rich qualities are 
caused by basic qualities, not constituted, and therefore they need not be derivable. But in 
the absence of continuity between all possible qualities, it is not clear why the relation 
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 The main reason is that there is a limited number of fundamental particle types, which is much smaller 
than the vast number of primitive phenomenal types we would need according to the argument. This leads 
to a structural mismatch between the mental and the physical at the fundamental level, which is 
incompatible with Russellian monism and its solution to the problem of mental causation (which will be 
discussed in more detail shortly). 
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between types of qualities would not have to be classified as radical emergence; that is, it 
might appear that different phenomenal groupings constitute fundamentally different 
kinds of experiential matter, the forms of which cannot change into each other. Can the 
continuity of all possible states be defended, or would one have to accept discontinuity 
and attempt to explain why it does not indicate radical emergence? 
In defense of continuity, the first thing to point out is that lack of imaginability or 
positive conceivability is not a good indicator of impossibility in the case of phenomenal 
qualities. In general, we have a very limited capacity for imagining determinate 
experiences that we have not had already. All the time we have experiences that we had 
no chance of imagining before they actually occurred. 
In chapter 4, I mentioned Hartshorne’s view that all possible qualities form a 
continuum. Charles S. Peirce also defended the same view: 
Of the continuity of intrinsic qualities of feeling we can now form but a feeble 
conception. The development of the human mind has practically extinguished all feelings, 
except a few sporadic kinds, sounds, colors, smells, warmth, etc., which now appear to be 
disconnected and disparate. In the case of colors, there is a tri-dimensional spread of 
feelings. Originally, all feelings may have been connected in the same way [...] (Pierce, 
cited in Hartshorne 1934: v) 
Coleman (2013a) has highlighted the relevance of this view for contemporary 
panpsychism and neutral monism, and has pointed out how, surprisingly, there is in fact a 
state in between sensory modalities that we can experience. In hearing deep bass tones we 
are sometimes not sure whether we are hearing or feeling. This makes it seem more 
plausible that there could also be an experience that is between, e.g., sight and smell, even 
though we cannot imagine what it would be like, and our brains are perhaps not even 
capable of getting into a state of having such an experience.  
Furthermore, there is nothing that rules out a state that is halfway in between 
modalities or other groupings of qualities, in the same way that there is something that 
rules out a state halfway in between consciousness and non-consciousness, or existence 
and non-existence in general. There is no metaphysical or conceptual problem with 
qualities in between modalities. Hence panpsychists can assume that it is just a problem 
of imagination, and that states that would fill in gaps in our phenomenology are possible.  
In defense of the alternative view, that there is discontinuity but that this does not 
indicate radical emergence, it is perhaps arguable that all qualities can be recognized as 
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forms of the same experiential matter in spite of being divided into discontinuous 
groupings. Intuitively, discontinuity between phenomenal groupings does not seem as bad 
as the discontinuity between mental and physical properties, so maybe, like the 
discontinuities discussed in the previous section, it too can be explained in terms of 
something else than radical emergence. For example, one might think that the kinds of 
phenomenology we actually experience and can faintly imagine or conceive of can at 
least be seen to form a fine-grained spectrum. But the gaps between some kinds of 
phenomenology are perhaps so great and uneven that the spectrum will not be fine-
grained enough to strongly indicate absence of radical emergence. If so, more must be 
added to the explanation of the gaps, and it is not clear what it could be. Additionally, 
there is a further consideration in favor of the continuum: if, as I have claimed, it could 
turn out that all possible physical states actually form a continuum, a mental continuum 
would perhaps be required anyway in order to preserve structural match between the 
mental and the physical, in accordance with the requirements of Russellian monism.  
According to Russellian monism, the physical is the structural or relational aspect of 
mental intrinsic properties, and the structure of reality as revealed via the physical “from 
the outside” aspect must therefore match the structure as revealed from the mental “from 
the inside” aspect. The panpsychist solution to the problem of mental causation is 
premised on the relation between the mental and the physical being Russellian – if mental 
properties are the categorical grounds or realizers of physical dispositional structure, we 
can see how the physical and the mental can causally complement each other in such a 
way that the mental is neither redundant nor in competition with the physical.  
It is now time to consider whether combination as a causal process can respect all the 
requirements of Russellian monism, and thereby preserve the advantage it has over 
dualism with respect to mental causation. This is the empirical aspect of the combination 
problem.  
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6 
Combination as Causation: the Empirical Problem 
 
Emergent panpsychism’s empirical problem is its apparent conflict with at least one of 
these principles: 
(v) The mental is not epiphenomenal. 
(vi) There is no systematic overdetermination. 
(vii) The physical is causally closed. 
In the previous chapter, I made a number of claims about the structure of 
macroexperiences and the process by which they are formed. In this chapter I will show 
how this is compatible with these three principles.  
I will begin by considering a question which is indirectly related to this, namely 
whether the part–whole priority structure of macroexperiences is compatible with what 
science tells us about the brain and its structure. I argued that macroexperiences are 
wholes that are prior to their parts. Brains, on the other hand, seem to be wholes whose 
parts are prior. I will argue that this problem can either be relatively easily solved, or be 
seen to more or less reduce to the problem of macromental causation, i.e., the problem of 
avoiding conflict with the three principles above.  
The problem of macromental causation looks different depending on whether one 
accepts a strong or a weak reading of (vii); that is, whether one subscribes to the principle 
of microphysical causal closure or just physical causal closure. I will consider whether (v) 
and (vi) can be respected within the constraints of first a strong and then a weak reading 
of (vii), i.e., whether macroexperiences can be causally efficacious in a non-redundant 
way within microphysical and physical causal closure, respectively. I will conclude that 
this is possible in both cases. However, if microphysical causal closure is true, it is not 
possible in a very simple and elegant way, and this prima facie looks like a problem. In 
response, I will argue that if microphysical causal closure is true, then it is necessary for 
any theory to make a compromise between (macro-)mental causation and elegance, and 
that emergent panpsychism offers a better compromise than either physicalism, dualism 
and constitutive panpsychism.  
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If only physical causal closure is true, on the other hand, macroexperiences as I have 
construed them can be causally integrated in a very simple and elegant way. After having 
explained what the difference between these principles amounts to, I will argue that there 
is more evidence for physical causal closure than there is for microphysical causal 
closure. Then I will show how macroexperiences would have the same structure as the 
kind of emergent properties that are more likely to be found in biological organisms 
assuming microphysical causal closure is false, and that they are therefore perfectly suited 
for being the Russellian grounds of such properties. 
1 OBJECTS AND SUBJECTS 
Macroexperiences, according to the account I have offered, are fusions.
1
 Entities that go 
into a fusion lose their individual identities. They exist as proper individuals (with both 
form and matter intact) only in the causal history of the fusion. They also potentially exist 
in the future caused by the fusion, since fusions can be undone.
2
 They can, in a manner of 
speaking, actually exist within the fusion, if the fusion has parts or sections that resemble 
the entities that went into it. But these parts do not exist in same the fundamental sense 
that the fusion itself exists. A fusion is a whole that is existentially prior to its parts.  
The brain, or any brain area that could support our consciousness, does not look like 
a fusion. The microphysical particles that go into the brain do not seem to lose their 
individual identities. They seem to exist simultaneously with the brain as constituting it, 
not only in its causal history. Microphysical particles are normally regarded as more 
fundamental than macroscopic objects like brains, and if so, the parts of the brain would 
be prior to the whole.  
If we are correct to regard particles in the brain as prior to the wholes they constitute, 
and if a combined experience is, as is natural to think, the intrinsic nature of a relatively 
large area of the brain, one single experience will be the intrinsic nature of a big 
collection of different physical objects, i.e., particles. This would constitute a mismatch 
between the mereological structure of the physical and mental aspect of reality. What 
counts as an object from the mental point of view would not count as an object from the 
physical point of view – from there it would count as an aggregate of other objects.  
                                                 
1
The kind of fusion I have proposed roughly fits the notion of fusion developed by Humphreys (1997). 
Seager has also argued that mental combinations are fusions, as discussed in chapter 1 (p. 49).  
2
As would be the case in the death of a macrosubject, according to panpsychism, where death would be 
decombination. 
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That the whole is prior to the parts in an experiential field is essential to avoiding the 
radical and brute emergence of a subject that would otherwise have to be invoked in order 
to account for the unity of consciousness (see chapter 5, section 4.1.2). Also, in order for 
non-constitutive combination to be partially intelligible, microexperiences must transform 
into the macroexperience and thereby lose their fundamental individuality. Therefore, in 
order to restore a match in mereological structure between the mental and the physical, it 
will have to be questioned whether the parts must really be regarded as prior to the whole 
in the case of macroscopic physical objects like the brain. 
It is an open question in metaphysics what physical things are proper objects in their 
own right, and which ones are mere aggregates that do not fundamentally speaking exist. 
Some philosophers are mereological nihilists, claiming that the only proper objects are 
subatomic particles or simple substances (e.g., Sider forthcoming; Cameron 2002). 
Tables, chairs, brains, and other macro-objects do not fundamentally exist on this view. 
What fundamentally exist are just particles or simples with properties of being arranged 
table-wise, chair-wise, brain-wise and so on. Others are existence monists, claiming that 
only the whole universe fundamentally speaking exists, so that there are neither non-
cosmic macro-objects nor subatomic particles (Horgan and Potrč 2000). Then there are 
mereological universalists, who claim that every macroscopic aggregate we can think of 
is a proper object in its own right (e.g., Lewis 1986: 211–213). Others again seek the 
more intuitive middle position, according to which some macro-objects (e.g., organisms, 
persons or brains only, or most things we ordinarily regard as objects, such as tables) are 
also proper objects while others (e.g., undetached rabbit parts, or the sum of my nose and 
the planet Venus) are not (e.g., Merricks 2001; van Inwagen 1990). However, all 
proposed criteria for objectivity that would secure a restricted middle position are very 
controversial.  
That this discussion is going on in philosophy indicates that it is not a purely 
empirical question what counts as an object, fundamentally speaking, or in other words, 
that mereological structure is not something science unequivocally reveals. As discussed 
in chapter 1, science should, on the Russellian view, be taken to reveal at most 
spatiotemporal and causal structure, and it could be held that this does not determine 
mereological structure. If so, mereological structural match will perhaps not, strictly 
speaking, be a requirement of Russellian monism – but at the same time, it would be 
relatively easy to restore it. Physical mereology, not being fully constrained by science, 
could just be revised in order to make it fit emergent panpsychism. Emergent 
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panpsychism could be taken to entail the view that the particles constituting the brain area 
that supports our consciousness are not really objects in their own right. They were 
objects before they formed a new object, and they are still potentially objects in their own 
right, insofar as the brain will someday decompose back into separate particles. The 
conscious brain area, on the other hand, will actually be an object in its own right, simply 
in virtue of having a unified intrinsic mental nature. Having a unified intrinsic nature 
should be a respectable candidate for being the criterion of physical objectivity. Strawson 
(2010) argues that being a subject is a necessary and sufficient condition for being an 
object, on grounds independent of emergent panpsychism.  
However, even if the spatiotemporal and causal structure that science reveals should 
not be taken to fully determine mereological structure, it is normally taken to constrain or 
partially determine it. To be is to have causal powers, said Plato’s Eleatic Stranger.3 
Trenton Merricks has defended the claim that this is true at least as far as macroscopic 
objects go (2001: 81) – macroscopic proper objects should not be causally redundant. 
Regardless of how this criterion fares in metaphysics, in practice, at least, we tend to 
regard something as an object if it appears to act as an object. An important reason why 
we typically regard particles as proper objects without question, but wonder whether the 
brain or organism is just an aggregate (after reflection on information from science, that 
is, not pre-theoretically), is that it is not clear that the brain or organism acts as an object, 
in the sense of having causal powers that it does not possess merely in virtue of the causal 
powers of the particles that constitute it. In fact, it is not clear that any things outside the 
domain of physics possess causal powers that they do not possess in virtue of constituents 
that belong to the domain of physics. It is natural to think that fundamental laws relate 
fundamental objects, and insofar as the laws of physics are the only fundamental laws and 
they quantify over the subatomic parts of the brain, the brain is not a fundamental object.  
Many think the empirical premise on which this reasoning is based is clearly true. It 
expresses the principle of microphysical, as opposed to merely physical, causal closure, 
i.e., the strong reading of principle (vii). If it is true, it leads to a strong analogue of 
dualism’s empirical problem for emergent panpsychism: the problem of accounting for 
the causal relevance of the macromental to a distinct and apparently causally closed non-
macromental realm. If this problem can be solved by showing that the macromental has 
causal efficacy, and objecthood is tied to causal efficacy, the problem of mereological 
                                                 
3
 At least according to some translations. 
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structural match will be automatically solved along with it. If macroexperiences are 
fundamentally causally efficacious – which they have to be, if efficacious at all, given 
that on my account they have no constitutive parts in virtue of which they can be 
derivatively or non-fundamentally efficacious – they will ground the fundamental causal 
efficacy of the macro-objects of which they are the intrinsic nature. These objects can 
then be regarded as fundamentally existing in virtue of their fundamental causal efficacy.  
2 MICROPHYSICAL CAUSAL CLOSURE 
The principle of physical causal closure can be formulated as follows (according to, e.g., 
Stoljar 2009): 
Physical causal closure: Every physical event (that has a cause) has a 
sufficient physical cause.  
The parenthetical clause makes sure that the principle does not entail determinism. 
Indeterministic events are arguably uncaused.  
Assuming that the physical can be defined without reference to physics (which I will 
discuss in section 3 below), the principle of physical causal closure is compatible with the 
strong emergence of causally relevant macrophysical properties, i.e., properties which are 
physical but do not belong to the domain of physics (i.e., microphysics). It allows that 
some macrophysical objects, objects that belong to the domain of physical special 
sciences such as chemistry or biology, have irreducible causal powers or are the relata of 
fundamental and irreducible emergent laws. The principle of microphysical causal 
closure, or the closure of physics, on the other hand, rules this out.  
Microphysical causal closure: every physical event (that has a cause) has a 
sufficient microphysical cause. 
This principle entails that all laws or dispositions of the physical special sciences are 
grounded in and in principle derivable from the laws of (micro-) physics, or that all 
physical dispositions are grounded in and in principle derivable from microphysical 
dispositions.  
189 
 
The laws of physics can be regarded as the laws that are derivable from studying the 
simplest physical entities as they behave outside of complex wholes,
4
 and microphysical 
causal powers or dispositions can be regarded as those dispositions of the simplest 
physical entities that are detectable from studying them as they behave outside of 
complex wholes. If the world obeys the principle of microphysical causal closure, then 
the laws of physics or the dispositions catalogued by physics, together with initial 
conditions, in principle predict the behavior of all complex wholes (insofar as their 
behavior is predictable in principle, i.e., is not indeterministic). It means that looking at an 
electron as it behaves in a particle accelerator and other relatively isolated situations 
should in principle be sufficient for finding out how it behaves when it is no longer 
isolated, like when it forms part of a brain or another macroscopic object. The behavior of 
macroscopic objects, like brains, may not ever actually be predictable from physics, but 
supporters of microphysical causal closure would regard this unpredictability as merely 
epistemic, a matter of macroscopic objects being so complex that we cannot see how their 
behavior is fully accounted for by the laws of physics, even though it really always is. 
Whether empirical evidence more strongly supports microphysical or merely physical 
causal closure is debatable – I will discuss this in section 3.1 below. But if microphysical 
causal closure is true, what are the consequences for macromental causation? I will argue 
that microphysical causal closure does not threaten macromental causation given 
emergent panpsychism and combination as fusion in the same way that physical or 
microphysical causal closure threatens mental causation given dualism. Microphysical 
causal closure does not preclude non-overdetermining macromental causation; it only 
precludes the possibility of having non-overdetermining macromental causation in a 
highly elegant way. Then I will argue that the moderate inelegance of this hypothesis is 
acceptable in view of the advantages it offers. 
2.1 Macromental Causation Within Microphysical Causal Closure 
On the account I have offered, macroscopic objects like brains have a single 
macroexperience which supplants the individual microexperiences that belonged to the 
parts of the brain before combination. Let us say that the macroexperience of the brain 
results directly from the fusion of the microexperiences of subatomic particles, although 
                                                 
4
 Except wholes that are, for some reason (which I will not try to identify), regarded as microphysical even 
though relatively complex, like sets of entangled particles. 
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there could be intermediate levels of combination in between. Subatomic particles would 
normally, when not forming a brain, have their own individual microexperiences. As 
these particles end up spatially arranged and interacting as a brain, their microexperiences 
will jointly cause a single macroexperience which belongs to all of the particles as a 
whole. But if microphysical causal closure is true, this change in the experience of the 
particles will make no difference to their behavior. They will still go on behaving as they 
always did, in accordance with the laws of microphysics. According to microphysical 
causal closure, everything always behaves according to the laws of physics, in complex 
wholes that result in combination as well as outside of them. Macroscopic brains with a 
single macroexperience will behave in the exact same way as the subatomic particles that 
went into it would if they had not produced a macroexperience but rather went on having 
their own individual microexperiences. Does this mean that macroexperience is 
epiphenomenal? 
Macroexperience is clearly not epiphenomenal or an overdeterminer in the way that a 
mental substance would be given dualism and either microphysical or physical causal 
closure. According to dualism, mental substances or properties do not replace physical 
substances or properties and it is the competition with the physical that gives rise to the 
dilemma between epiphenomenalism and overdetermination. With panpsychism and 
combination as fusion, there is no such competition. Macroexperience has to be doing 
non-overdetermining causal work because it has supplanted the microexperiences. When 
the brain has a macroexperience, there will no longer be any microexperiences belonging 
to individual particles of the brain that could be the proper categorical grounds for the 
dispositions of the brain, or realizers of its causal structure. 
However, there is still a sense of redundancy. It appears that the causal work of the 
brain could in some sense have been done by the parts of the brain instead, if their 
experiences had not combined. If the streams of microexperiences belonging to each 
individual subatomic particles that went into the brain had not at some point evolved into 
a single stream of macroexperience belonging to a whole brain area the physical behavior 
of the brain would have been no different. But the sense of “could” and “would” whereby 
this is true is not merely counterfactual, but counternomic. The fundamental causal laws 
dictate that the simple streams will combine into a complex stream as the brain forms. 
These would admittedly be some odd causal laws; they are not very simple and elegant. 
They result from the odd fact that the same physical structure or behavior can be 
grounded in two kinds of mental natures, amounting to a kind of inverted multiple 
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realization or multiple categorical grounding. A particle behaving in a certain way outside 
a brain will be realized by a microsubject; a particle behaving in the exact same way 
inside a brain will be realized by a part of a macrosubject.
5
  
This would mean that the structure of reality as it can be discerned from the mental 
aspect is not isomorphic to the structure of reality as it can be discerned from the physical 
aspect. Still, the structure that is discernible from the physical aspect is embeddable in the 
structure that is discernible from the mental aspect, so they are fully compatible, as 
Russellian monism requires (see chapter 1, p. 10). It would still be true that science 
reveals the structure of reality, it only turns out that it cannot reveal its complete structure 
– that science constrains but underdetermines mental structure. Only via phenomenology 
can we know that the brain area that supports consciousness is really in a sense a simple 
thing (in virtue of having a single unified experience as its intrinsic nature), as its 
behavior does not reveal it. 
In summary, my account of combination in conjunction with microphysical causal 
closure entails something very far from both epiphenomenalism and overdetermination. 
There is no question that macroexperience is causally efficacious and non-redundant. But 
its efficacy is secured by an inelegant and odd set of causal laws which result from the 
multiple categorical grounding of physical dispositions or multiple realization of physical 
structure.  
In chapter 1 (p. 20), I explained the sense in which physical or microphysical causal 
closure can be respected in spite of having non-physical metaphysical underpinnings, 
which should perhaps be reviewed here. It is only the empirical content of the principle of 
microphysical causal closure that Russellian monism needs to respect. The empirical 
content is here assumed to be that physical causal structure is most systematically 
interpreted as being closed under microphysics. The “causal” in “causal structure” in this 
context should be taken to refer only to certain kinds of dependency relations – relations 
that we can use for prediction, manipulation and control – without implying (much) about 
their metaphysical underpinnings, because such implications would go beyond the 
domain of science. If emergent panpsychism, combination as fusion and microphysical 
causal closure are all true, the metaphysical underpinnings of physical causal structure are 
                                                 
5
 The particle inside the brain which is realized by the part of the macrosubject is not really a particle 
anymore: it has lost its status as an object because it is no longer a subject (it is now rather a part of a 
subject). But this is not detectable from the outside – it will still look like an object. Also, note that the part 
of the macrosubject that realizes it is a derivative part, not a constituent.  
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not microscopically (or micromentally) closed, but via multiple categorical grounding or 
realization they still result in a physical causal structure that is most systematically 
interpreted as being closed under microphysics.  
Emergent panpsychism, with combination as fusion, can thus respect principles (v), 
(vi) and the strong reading of (vii). But is the posit of multiple categorical grounding or 
realization, and the resulting odd laws, so inelegant that it is not worth these advantages? 
After all, an important part of the motivation behind principle (vi) – no systematic 
overdetermination – and perhaps to some extent (iv) – no epiphenomenalism – as well, is 
that theoretical virtues such as elegance and parsimony are to be given much weight. 
Therefore, it could look like emergent panpsychism and its level of inelegance is 
incompatible with the underlying spirit these principles. However, I think this will look 
different when put in a broader perspective. There are reasons to believe that no theory 
can secure macromental causation, in every desirable respect and in a perfectly elegant 
way, if microphysical causal closure is true. Therefore, the solution proposed is as elegant 
as it is reasonable to demand.  
2.2 Mental Causation and Elegance: A  Necessary Compromise  
It might seem that the problem of inelegant mental causation does not fundamentally 
result from emergent panpsychism, but rather from the conjunction of two theses that 
every main theory of macromental (i.e., what non-panpsychists would normally just call 
mental) causation under microphysical causal closure assumes: 
(1) The microphysical is causally closed. 
(2) The macromental (human and other animal consciousness) is located in 
macrophysical objects. 
These two theses seem to entail either that epiphenomenalism is true of at least some 
aspects of our minds or that macromental causation must occur in an inelegant way, no 
matter what theory of consciousness they are combined with. If our minds are 
macroscopic, and the macroscopic does not have fundamental causal powers or are not 
relata of fundamental laws, then our minds cannot be efficacious in the same way that 
fundamental microphysical particles would be. Either our minds must be non-
fundamentally causally efficacious, or there must be some extra structure that secures its 
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fundamental efficacy, structure which is compatible with microphysical causal closure, 
but also makes the world more complicated than it would otherwise be.  
If this is correct, then every theory of the mind that does not question these theses 
would have to reflect the inelegant state of affairs they prescribe in one of these ways. No 
theory could make these facts go away nor trivialize the situation they entail without 
implicitly trivializing the theses. In view of this, emergent panpsychism’s inelegant way 
of incorporating mental causation can be seen as an appropriate way of reflecting an 
assumed fact about reality, rather than as a theoretical vice. It secures fundamental 
(macro-) mental causation, but in an inelegant way. There are other theories that are more 
elegant, but they cannot then secure fundamental mental causation – at least in some 
sense of fundamentality.  
I will now argue that all the main competitors of emergent panpsychism are not only 
affected by the dilemma, they also come out of it worse than emergent panpsychism, all 
things considered. Other theories that secure fundamental macromental causation under 
microphysical causal closure – mainly overdeterminist dualism – do so even more 
inelegantly or unparsimoniously. Other theories that secure macromental causation under 
microphysical causal closure more elegantly – physicalism and constitutive panpsychism 
– cannot secure fundamental macromental causation. In chapter 1 (p. 18 and 48), I 
pointed out that physicalism arguably faces an empirical problem in the form of the 
exclusion problem, and that constitutive panpsychism might face an analogue of it. It is 
on this basis I will argue that these views do not secure fundamental macromental 
causation. 
The literature on the exclusion problem is vast and highly intricate, and it would be 
much too ambitious to attempt to establish this while considering the whole debate. I will 
argue for the more limited theses that given certain assumptions about agency, 
assumptions that will be familiar from the previous chapters, it would follow that neither 
physicalism nor constitutive panpsychism can secure fundamental macromental 
causation, in a certain sense, and that fundamental macromental causation, in this sense, is 
much more important than theoretical elegance. The assumptions I will argue from 
include: (1) there is such a thing as phenomenology of agency, (2) the core aspects of it 
must be veridical in order for agency not to be illusory, and (3) these core aspects put 
constraints on the character of mental causation.  
I will not base the argument on the further assumptions that in agency we experience 
something in virtue of which causation is intelligible, or something that reveals it as 
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essentially mental, i.e., the most controversial sub-premises of the argument from 
causation defended in chapters 3 and 4. Therefore, this solution to the combination 
problem will still not presuppose acceptance of the argument from causation. 
2.2.1  Physicalism and the Exclusion Problem 
According to Kim’s exclusion argument, if we reject downward causation from the 
macrophysical to the microphysical (which, according to Kim, is possibly incoherent, and 
in any case incompatible with microphysical causal closure), and hold that macrophysical 
properties are not type-identical to microphysical properties, then macrophysical 
properties will either be epiphenomenal or vicious overdeterminers. Physicalists ground 
mental properties in macrophysical properties, and hence the same must be concluded 
about mental properties. Physicalist responses to the exclusion argument divide 
(according to Robb and Heil 2013) into three main types. 
The first type of response is to argue that macrophysical properties, at least mental 
macrophysical properties, are after all type-identical to microphysical properties. This 
would avoid the problem but faces the very influential objection from multiple 
realization, as well as the charge that the exclusion problem will reappear at the level of 
aspects of properties: mental properties will be excluded qua mental (Robb and Heil 
2013: sect. 6.5). 
The second type of response is to accept overdetermination, but claim that it is 
innocuous. Overdetermination results if the macrophysical and the microphysical are both 
fundamentally efficacious. One reason for saying that there is fundamental macrophysical 
causation is to observe that there seem to be epistemically irreducible laws that hold for 
the special sciences, and that macrophysical properties will be subsumed by them qua 
macrophysical. It is then argued that the overdetermination that results is not problematic 
in the way the overdetermination that would result from substance dualism is (Robb and 
Heil 2013: sect. 6.3). 
The third type of response is to accept something some philosophers might call 
epiphenomenalism about the macrophysical, but also claim that it is innocuous. It is an 
option for those who hold that macrophysical properties are not fundamentally efficacious 
in the same strong sense as fundamental particles are – e.g., because subsumption under 
special science laws is not sufficient, maybe because these laws are not as strict as the 
laws of physics, or not irreducible in principle. However, macrophysical objects can still 
be efficacious via their microphysical grounds, in such a way that causal efficacy is 
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somehow inherited by the macrophysical from the microphysical. If some philosophers 
want to label this epiphenomenalism, then so be it, one might say, because it is not the 
kind of epiphenomenalism that matters. Inherited or derived causal efficacy should be 
good enough both for the special sciences and mental causation, proponents of this view 
would say – there is no reason why we would need the macrophysical to be efficacious in 
the absolutely fundamental sense (Robb and Heil 2013: sect. 6.4). 
Now, if we take phenomenology of agency seriously, difficulties appear for both of 
the two latter types of responses. On the basis of phenomenology of agency, it can be 
argued that when it comes to mental causation in particular, leaving special sciences 
aside, there is good reason to want fundamental and not merely inherited causal 
relevance. It can also be argued that there is good reason to want the kind of causal 
efficacy that would generate vicious overdetermination if it were to exist alongside 
fundamental microphysical causation.  
The importance of securing mental causation does not only, or even mainly, come 
from the desire to avoid inelegant nomological danglers, or from an inference to the best 
explanation for the predictive successes of folk psychology. In large part it comes from 
the fact that mental causation is a necessary condition for agency. As discussed in chapter 
3 (p. 108), many take it as a necessary condition for agency that our phenomenology of 
agency is veridical. Phenomenology of agency, if we assume that it is veridical, imposes 
two demands on the character of mental causation that do not seem compatible with the 
two latter responses to the exclusion problem just mentioned. The problem for the 
innocuous overdetermination response is that our phenomenology presents mental 
causation as irreducible productive causation, and given such a view about causation 
overdetermination is very hard to construe as innocuous. The problem for the inheritance 
response is that phenomenology presents mental causation as agent-causation, which is 
causation that has its immediate source in the agent, and which is incompatible with the 
source fundamentally being the agent’s constituents.  
As already discussed, much support can be found for the view that our 
phenomenology of agency presents mental causation as irreducibly productive, as 
involving power exertion or “bringing-about”. Esfeld argues that: “we need a more 
substantial metaphysics of causation than Humean regularities or counterfactual 
dependence if we take our experience as agents to be veridical” (Esfeld 2007: 212). In 
chapter 2 (pp. 86–87), I quoted Armstrong, Ginet, Mumford and Anjum, and Bayne and 
Levy as expressing the view that phenomenology at least seems to represent aspects of 
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productive causation. Kim also claims that “[…] agency requires the 
productive/generative conception of causation” (Kim 2007: 14), and O’Connor seems to 
agree: “we seem to directly observe […] causal connectedness – […] in the (putatively 
agent-causal) case of my own deliberate formation of intentions, the event […] seems to 
be my directly exerting causal control in bringing it about” (O’Connor 1996: 11).  
On a reductive view, overdetermination is not necessarily vicious, because the 
discernment of higher-level causes is not a matter of positing new concrete features of 
reality – irreducible powers or laws – we are rather just identifying additional abstract 
regularities or dependency relations among the concrete properties that the world (or set 
of all possible worlds) already contains. Esfeld notes how, “in recent years, however, a 
number of authors have claimed that it is reasonable to abandon (4) [the principle of no 
overdetermination], provided that one endorses a Humean theory of causation,” (Esfeld 
2010: 100) and mentions Karen Bennett (2003), Barry Loewer (2007), Ausonio Marras 
(2007: 318–319), Thomas Kroedel (2008) and Jens Harbecke (2008: ch. 4) among such 
authors. 
On a non-reductive view, on the other hand, where causation is a matter of concrete 
production or power exertion, overdetermination is clearly more of a problem. If both a 
macrophysical agent, understood as an organism or an area of the brain, and the aggregate 
of particles constituting the agent so understood, exert sufficient power to produce or 
bring about my bodily movements, it seems we have twice the power exertion or energy 
transfer that is needed. On a non-reductive view, overdetermination involves the 
multiplication of concrete properties such as causal powers, not merely making new 
distinctions and identifying abstract dependency patterns. It generates systematic 
redundancy in the same way as overdetermination by pairs of mental and physical 
Cartesian substances would. Loewer is one who supports this conclusion: “My diagnosis 
of what is going on in discussions of the exclusion argument is this: if causation is 
understood as production then it does seem that causal exclusion is, as Kim says, 
‘virtually analytic’” (Loewer 2007: 253). Esfeld is another: “[…] commitment to a 
production view of causation simply rules systematic overdetermination out” (Esfeld 
2010: 101). 
The inheritance view, on the other hand, which accepts what some may call 
innocuous epiphenomenalism, because mental causation will be derived rather than 
fundamental, does not have a special problem with irreducible productive causation. The 
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causal powers of an agent could simply be the sum of the causal powers of the agent’s 
microphysical realizers. This is Horgan’s view:  
First, mental properties and facts are determined by, or supervenient upon, physical 
properties and facts. Second (and contrary to emergentism), physics is a causally 
complete science; the only fundamental force-generating properties are physical 
properties. More specifically, the human body does not instantiate any fundamental force-
generating properties other than physical ones. Third, mental properties nonetheless have 
genuine causal/explanatory efficacy, via the physical properties that “realize” mental 
properties on particular occasions of instantiation. (Horgan 1996: 498)  
There is reason, however, to doubt whether the possession of such an inherited set of 
causal powers is sufficient for agency as we experience it. It seems that we as agents 
experience ourselves as complex in the sense of having many motives and mental states at 
the same time, but also as unified: firstly, in virtue of the unity of consciousness, which I 
have argued should be taken as prior to the unity of its parts (chapter 5, section 4.1.2), and 
secondly, in virtue of exerting only one single effort at a time (chapter 4, section 2.5). 
This experience cannot be veridical if the powers of macrophysical objects are always 
constituted bottom-up. A number of philosophers have claimed that unless there is 
fundamental macrophysical top-down causation, where the agent (organism or brain) 
determines its parts, rather than vice versa, as in constitution, there can be no such thing 
as free agency (Searle 1984; O’Connor 2000; Merricks 2001). Steward has recently 
defended the more sweeping claim that this is necessary for agency of any kind:
6
  
There are those who will say that to talk of epiphenomena here [in the face of the 
exclusion problem] is to make a premature and rather silly mistake. My activity, they will 
say, is just the same thing as the activity of my parts; there is no question of my agency 
having been usurped. We have simply said something about what constitutes that agency 
and have thereby reduced rather than eliminated it. It does not follow from the fact that 
my actions are constituted by neural firings, etc. that I do not really raise my arm, bend 
my leg, and so on, any more than it follows from the fact that my washing machine’s 
activities are constituted by various movements of the drum, switch, pump, etc. that it (the 
machine) does not really wash my clothes. But merely to say this is, I believe, to say 
much too little to answer the concerns that the reductive picture tends to engender. We do 
                                                 
6
 Steward does claim that a certain kind of libertarian freedom, incompatible with not only bottom-up 
determinism but also past-future determinism, is also necessary for agency. However, her argument for the 
necessity top-down causation in agency are arguments that a compatibilist with respect to past-future 
determinism can also accept.  
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not generally think that we relate to our parts in the way that a washing machine relates to 
its parts. We are really in charge of at least some of our parts, we tend to feel – the ones 
that respond to our voluntary control – and we initiate, orchestrate, and organize their 
movements into the patterns that are demanded for the execution of our plans in a way to 
which nothing corresponds in any inanimate entity. We are happy to concede, I think, that 
nothing is really up to the washing machine; its activities really are the sum total of the 
connected activities of its parts and there is no further sense in which it – the whole 
machine – can make anything happen. But with us, it is different. We feel that certain 
things are truly up to us; that our input can genuinely settle which way things will go. It is 
this idea that is so difficult to square with the picture according to which our activity is 
simply constituted by a maelstrom of neurological processes. (Steward 2012: 227–228)  
She concludes that agency requires top-down causation:  
If there is no irreducibly top-down causation, it is utterly puzzling how I am supposed to 
be anything other than a place where certain lower-level events produce others, how 
anything can ever really count as having been ‘up to me’. (Steward 2012: 233) 
Top-down, or downward, causation entails strong emergence and is thereby incompatible 
with microphysical causal closure. Steward bases the conclusion that this is required for 
agency on analysis and empirical studies of the concept of agency, but (as noted in 
chapter 3, section 3.4) it is likely that this concept in large part has its source in the 
phenomenology of agency.  
The prospects of physicalism getting past the exclusion problem thus look much 
worse if it is granted that phenomenology of agency must be veridical in order for agency 
to be real, and if securing agency is indeed essential to a satisfactory account of mental 
causation.  
2.2.2  Constitutive Panpsychism and the Agent -Exclusion Problem 
Does constitutive panpsychism face an exclusion problem if physicalism does? One might 
think that it helps for the purposes of preserving agency as we experience it if the 
constituents that are alleged to exclude the agent are themselves mental. It is not obvious 
that my agency would be threatened by my individual mental states, such as my beliefs 
and desires, being fundamental causes of my actions. Given constitutive panpsychism, it 
must be granted that the efficacy of beliefs and desires is derived from the efficacy of the 
basic microexperiential constituents of beliefs and desires, whatever they may be, but this 
would arguably not make a difference if it is in principle not so that mental states causally 
exclude their subject. However, if phenomenology of agency is taken seriously, as well as 
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the agent-causal picture which is derived from it, there is evidence that mental states do 
actually causally exclude their subjects. As Horgan argues:  
Experiencing one’s behavior as produced by oneself is fundamentally different from 
experiencing it as caused by internal states of oneself [...] Hence (one might well think), if 
the behavior is really state-caused, then it is not a piece of genuine action at all; the 
phenomenology of agency is illusory and non-veridical. The real source of one’s behavior 
is not really oneself, but instead is a state of oneself (or a combination of such states). 
(Horgan 2007: 190–191) 
If any collection of our mental states is experienced as the direct causes of our behavior, 
then we also experience that the agent is excluded as a cause.
7
 Horgan calls it the agent-
exclusion problem. The following example by Donald Davidson is a paradigmatic case of 
agent-exclusion: 
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on 
a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of 
the weight and danger. This belief and want might lead him to form the intention to 
loosen his hold on the rope, and this intention might so unnerve him as to cause him to 
loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did 
he do it intentionally. The climber experiences the loosening of his hold as caused by his 
intention to loosen his hold, but he does not experience the loosening of his hold as an 
action. (Davidson 1973).  
This example has been taken by agent-causalists (but not by Davidson
8
) to illustrate how 
any kind of causation by mental states excludes rather than constitutes agency: there is no 
agency because the agent’s mental states (i.e., his intentions) directly caused the behavior 
and the agent himself did not. Hence, exclusion would seem to be even more of a problem 
for constitutive panpsychism than for physicalism. If the constituents of agents are 
physical, we can theoretically derive via metaphysical reasoning that there would be 
exclusion. If the constituents of agents are our own mental states, as per constitutive 
panpsychism, we can also positively experience exclusion.  
                                                 
7
 Horgan thinks physical state-causation is compatible with mental agent-causation on reflection; however, 
the reconciliation depends on a kind of contextualism about causation that seems to me incompatible with 
the commitment to non-reductionism about causation that comes with taking agent-phenomenology 
seriously.  
8
 Davidson himself concluded only that intentions must cause behavior “in the right way”. Agent-causalist 
have argued that “the right way” is the agent-causal way, i.e., with the agentive subject as a causal 
intermediary.  
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Emergent panpsychism has no exclusion problem. Macroexperiences do not have 
constitutive parts that may exclude them. Macroexperiences have individual mental states 
as derivative parts, which will then be only derivatively causally active. They cannot be 
efficacious without the total macroexperience also being efficacious.
9
 Moreover, 
macroexperiences can clearly be productive causes, as I have already argued at length, but 
independently of the arguments discussed it chapters 2–4, it is an integral part of the 
Russellian view that experiences are the categorical grounds of dispositions, and with this 
an irreducible causal role is already in place. But can macroexperiences be agents? I have 
argued that emergent panpsychists should take macroexperiences to be identical to 
subjects, and an agent need not be regarded as anything more than a subject of experience 
with causal powers. If macroexperiences have causal powers and are identical to subjects, 
it follows that they are agents.
10
 
Emergent panpsychism thus secures mental causation in every way arguably required 
to preserve agency, or basic agency, as we experience it. It should also be noted that 
overdeterminist dualism does the same. It posits no physical constituents of the mental 
agent and need not posit any mental constituents either – it is open to a dualist just as 
much as a panpsychist to say that the agent or the total experience is prior to its parts. On 
the other hand, emergent panpsychism and overdeterminist dualism are both inelegant 
theories compared to physicalism and constitutive panpsychism. What is more important: 
mental causation – in the form of agent-causation – or elegance?  
Anti-physicalists often argue that it is more certain that seemingly irreducible 
features of consciousness such as what it is like-ness and subjectivity exist, than that 
                                                 
9
 According to the view I have defended, in the experiences of agent-exclusion it cannot be the case that we 
actually experience the efficacy of mental states, because on my view mental states cannot possibly be 
efficacious except via the agent or total experience that it is a part of. Also, according to my argument in 
chapter 3, we only directly experience mental causation that has its source in the agent. When experiencing 
mental state-causation, then, the experience must be taken as an indirect experience of causation, in which 
we make some instinctive or automatic judgment about causation and perhaps also have some special causal 
phenomenology, but without this directly revealing natural necessity. This would be analogous to the 
experience that comes with seeing typical mechanical interaction, such as things pushing each other, where 
we feel we can see the causation, but can still conceive of the causal sequence as having been otherwise. 
Furthermore, I would have to say that we cannot be correct if we judge the mental states themselves to be 
direct causes qua our mental states. When the climber experiences his nervousness to cause him to loosen 
his hold, the feeling of nervousness must be taken as a representation of, and another of the effects of, the 
actual cause of the loosening of his hold, perhaps some physiological state of nervousness constituted by 
microsubjects (i.e., microagents).  
10
 At least in a minimal sense sufficient for the views I am defending. Not everyone would be satisfied with 
agents that fundamentally speaking only last as long as a moment of experience.  
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various premises in arguments for reductionism are true. Similarly, it seems we can be 
more certain that we are agents in the basic way we experience ourselves to be than that 
the world is an elegant place. If so, we should think that a metaphysical theory that is 
compatible with the metaphysical structure of agency as we experience it is more likely to 
be true than one that is not fully so compatible, but is highly elegant otherwise. There 
would perhaps be a point where elegance trumps agency, if the theory that secures it is 
highly inelegant. Many find that this is the case with overdeterminist dualism. I will now 
argue that emergent panpsychism is at least significantly more elegant than 
overdeterminist dualism, and another version of dualism that could also secure mental 
causation within microphysical causal closure, so it could be within the acceptable limits 
of inelegance even if dualism is not.  
2.2.3  The Inelegance of Dualism and Emergent Panpsychism 
I will take overall elegance to be affected by a number of theoretical virtues such as 
systematicity, parsimony and absence of ad hoc maneuvers. In what ways is emergent 
panpsychism more elegant than the kind of dualism that can secure mental causation 
within microphysical causal closure?  
Some would perhaps argue that emergent panpsychism is less elegant because it is a 
virtue to be more conservative with mentality, as dualism is. But this is not clear cut. It 
seems qualitative parsimony is important, but it is less clear that quantitative parsimony, 
with respect to a fundamental kind of property that both theories must posit anyway, is 
important. Arguably, it is more systematic to have mentality be ubiquitous, as with 
panpsychism, as opposed to having mentality show up some places and not others for no 
clear reason, as with overdeterminist dualism.  
In order to settle which is the more elegant and virtuous theory, one should rather 
look at how ad hoc the extra metaphysical structure the respective theories posit is. How 
much of a fortunate coincidence is it that our kinds of minds can have causal influence in 
a way that is undetectable from the perspective of physical science, i.e., in a way that does 
not disrupt microphysical causal closure?  
With emergent panpsychism, a macroexperience does the same causal work, or 
realizes the same structure, as something which is in many respects similar to it, namely a 
group of microexperiences. These two causes, or realizers of causal structure, would not 
only be of the same fundamental ontological category, they would also possibly have 
qualitative similarities. Let us say that a macroexperience of co-conscious red and blue 
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replaces and takes over the causal grounding work of one individual red experience and 
one individual blue experience, after they fuse into it. It is not altogether unreasonable 
that very similar sets of qualities (though not identical, given the holistic influence on the 
qualities in the macroexperience) would systematically ground the same dispositions or 
enter into the same relations if all that varies is their organization into wholes (and the 
holistic effect that come with this).
11
 
With overdeterminist dualism, on the other hand, two fundamentally different 
properties or substances, a physical property or substance and a mental property or 
substance, systematically overdetermine the same effects. There is no reason to expect 
substances or properties with such radically different natures to converge in effects, even 
though there is nothing that rules it out. The overdetermination looks completely brute. 
For this reason overdeterminist dualism would be significantly more inelegant than 
emergent panpsychism.  
One might also imagine a “covert replacement” Russellian dualism,12 where, in 
analogy with emergent panpsychism, mental intrinsic properties or natures undetectably 
replace physical intrinsic natures
 
in brains or organisms. Then there would be no 
overdetermination. However, that this replacement of physical intrinsic nature by a 
completely different mental intrinsic nature is not detectable by a difference in the 
behavior they ground would be unexpected and ad hoc for the same reasons as with 
overdetermination, and therefore equally inelegant.  
In summary, here is how, according to my discussion, emergent panpsychism and its 
main competitors compare with respect to, on the one hand, mental causation in all 
desirable respects – which includes agency as we experience it – and theoretical elegance, 
                                                 
11
 Sometimes, however, two motives conceivably have a very different disposition combined than apart. For 
example, say that pain on its own disposes toward repulsion, pleasure toward attraction, while pain and 
pleasure at the same time could conceivable dispose toward indecisiveness, which would be different from 
both. Given microphysical causal closure, one could make the hypothesis that combination occurs only in 
situations when the combined disposition happens to be compatible with the sum of individual dispositions. 
Pain and pleasure would accordingly only combine to indecisiveness in situations where pain and pleasure 
belonging to respective microsubjects would, in the absence of combination, have resulted in a static 
situation resulting from an even struggle between these two microsubjects. For example, a microsubject in 
pain wants to repel an object, the microsubject feeling pleasure wants to attract an object, and they are about 
to enter a situation where these dispositions even each other out so that the object goes neither way. 
Combination then happens – they transform into a macrosubject feeling both pain and pleasure, which 
would also end up neither attracting not repelling the object, because it the pain and pleasure derived from 
the object is equally strong so it cannot decide.  
12
 Thanks to David Chalmers for the objection that dualists might try the same “tricks” as the emergent 
panpsychists. 
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on the other, insofar as they accept microphysical causal closure (it includes 
epiphenomenalist dualism, even though it has not been discussed): 
 
 
Mental causation in every 
desirable respect 
Elegance (in other respects) 
Physicalism No Very elegant (+1) 
Constitutive panpsychism No Very elegant (+1) 
Emergent panpsychism Yes Moderately inelegant (-1) 
Overdeterminist dualism Yes Very inelegant (-2) 
Epiphenomenalist dualism No Very elegant (+1) 
 
Given microphysical causal closure, it is necessary to make a compromise between 
mental causation and theoretical elegance, and it might look like emergent panpsychism 
actually offers the best one – at least if agency and phenomenology of agency are taken to 
be important.  
But should we really be so sure about the principle of microphysical causal closure? I 
will now consider the evidence for microphysical causal closure, and how it measures up 
to the evidence for mere physical causal closure. If only physical causal closure is true, 
and there is strong emergence within the physical, then strongly emergent 
macroexperiences would have a perfect structural correlate.  
3 PHYSICAL CAUSAL CLOSURE 
The principle of physical causal closure is compatible with the strong emergence of 
causally relevant macrophysical properties. The question of the status of the evidence for 
physical causal closure compared to microphysical causal closure is therefore also a 
question of the status of the evidence for strong (but not radical) emergence of properties 
that are not epiphenomenal. C. D Broad claimed that strong emergence is when the 
properties of a whole are not predictable in principle from complete knowledge of the 
properties and configuration of its parts – that is, the properties of the parts as they 
manifest in isolation or in different kinds of wholes (Broad 1925: 61). If strongly 
emergent properties are causally relevant, i.e., if they make a difference to the behavior of 
the macrophysical objects to which they belong, it entails the falsity of the principle of 
microphysical causal closure. Strongly emergent behavior is in principle not predictable 
from a complete physics, given that the domain of physics is limited to isolated particles 
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and the simplest wholes they form. Strongly emergent properties would belong to the 
domain of special sciences such as chemistry, biology or neurology.  
Strong emergence is only compatible with physical causal closure if the properties 
that emerge are physical, or the special sciences they belong to are physical sciences. 
How is the physical to be defined? Some think the physical must be defined with 
reference to physics, for example, as the kind of properties physics talk about and the 
properties that are grounded in them. On such a definition of the physical, physical causal 
closure would entail microphysical causal closure. But the physical does not have to be 
defined in this way, and in fact, there are notorious problems with doing so, starting from 
Hempel’s dilemma. A viable option is to define the physical negatively, as the 
fundamentally non-mental, non-teleological, non-intentional, non-divine, non-vitalistic, 
etc. (Papineau 2001: 12–13).13 One can also add positive attributes, such as having 
spatiotemporal extension or a spatiotemporal region of influence.  
If the physical is causally closed, and the physical is characterized as fundamentally 
non-mental, non-teleological and non-intentional, it does not entail that the nature of 
physical causation involves no mentality, teleology or intentionality. If this were the case, 
physical causal closure could not be compatible with panpsychism, and especially not the 
animistic panpsychism defended in the previous chapters, according to which causation 
has all of these properties fundamentally.
14
 It is, again, only the empirical content of the 
principle of physical causal closure (if true) that Russellian monism of any kind has to 
respect. The empirical content of physical causal closure, given that the physical is 
understood as the fundamentally non-mental, non-teleological and non-intentional, is that 
the causal structure of the world is most systematically interpreted as being closed under 
sciences whose fundamental concepts are not mental, teleological and intentional. In other 
words, no scientific causal explanations reference fundamentally mental properties, and 
no scientific explanations are irreducibly teleological or intentional by referencing 
irreducible purposes or final causes – and all physical events (that have a cause) have 
such a scientific explanation. This does not preclude that all physical events also have 
                                                 
13
 Papineau suggests we take the physical as the non-mental, and that we can add more special categories 
that we are interested in – I proposed the other categories. Stoljar objects that defining the physical as the 
non-mental makes the mind-brain identity theory incoherent (Stoljar 2010: 87), because the identity of the 
mental and the non-mental seems like a contradiction. By adding “fundamentally” to the negative definition 
we avoid this consequence.   
14
 However, if the physical is defined negatively in this way, then physicalism would of course entail the 
falsity of panpsychism – which is in accordance with how I defined physicalism (chapter 1, section 2). 
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complementary non-scientific and metaphysical explanations that do reference irreducible 
mentality, teleology and intentionality, as per animistic Russellian panpsychism.  
What is the evidence for physical causal closure, and how does it compare to the 
evidence for microphysical causal closure?  
3.1 The Evidence for Physical and Microphysical Causal Closure  
Physical causal closure is mainly supported by empirical evidence, or principles implicit 
in successful scientific methodology.
15
 The principle of conservation of energy rules out 
all causation that is not conservative, such as free and spontaneous causation (Papineau 
2001: 25), and therefore counts as evidence against some forms of causal influence that 
would be non-physical under the negative definition, e.g., mental forces qua spontaneous 
and creative, as they have traditionally been conceived (Papineau 2001: 19). Furthermore, 
science has not found anything going on in bodies and brains, places where non-physical 
influence would be expected to manifest, that requires explanation in terms of irreducible 
teleology, spontaneity, and so on (Papineau 2001: 30–32). The functioning of organisms 
and brains looks like it can be fully accounted for in terms of the mechanistic (i.e., lawful 
and non-teleological) interactions of their parts. From the empirical standpoint, then, there 
is no reason for, and good reason against, positing non-physical (by the negative 
definition) causation.  
Are the empirical considerations in favor of microphysical causal closure equally 
strong? It appears not. The main general reason against positing some kinds of non-
physical causation, the principle of conservation of energy, has no equivalent when it 
comes to non-microphysical causation. As discussed in chapter 5 (p. 157), the principle of 
conservation of energy plays a strong regulative role in science – whenever there is an 
apparent violation of the principle, scientists will set out to find the hidden source or 
destination of the energy that appears to either just show up or go missing. Proceeding in 
this way has been highly conducive to success.  
It is not clear that the ideal of microphysical ontological reductionism plays a similar 
regulative role. Kant argued that the unity of science was an essential regulative idea. 
However, philosophers of science such as Nancy Cartwright and John Dupré have argued 
                                                 
15
 There is also some empirical reason to think that physical causal closure is false, mainly that there is an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics which fits the observational data according to which consciousness 
collapses the wave function (Chalmers 2003: 125–127). But until this has been developed further and, if 
possible, tested, it seems the evidence for physical causal closure is stronger so far. 
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that scientific practice does not in fact proceed on the assumption that everything can in 
principle be reduced to levels below, and moreover, that it is very undesirable that they 
start doing so. Cartwright claims that “[...] belief in the unity of the world and the 
completeness of theory can lead to bad methodology [...] (1999: 13). She argues that the 
most successful science, e.g., applied physics such as engineering of lasers, actually 
proceeds as though phenomenological laws – higher level descriptive laws – are the true 
laws, while fundamental laws are treated as just one tool among many:  
Fundamental laws are supposed by many to determine what phenomenological laws are 
true. If the primary argument for this view is the practical explanatory success of the 
fundamental laws, the conclusion should be just the reverse. We have a very large number 
of phenomenological laws in all areas of applied physics and engineering that give highly 
accurate, detailed descriptions of what happens in realistic situations. In an explanatory 
treatment these are derived from fundamental laws only by a long series of 
approximations and emendations. Almost always the emendations improve on the dictates 
of the fundamental law; and even where the fundamental laws are kept in their original 
form, the steps of the derivation are frequently not dictated by the facts. This makes 
serious trouble for […] the view that fundamental laws are better. When it comes to 
describing the real world, phenomenological laws win out. (Cartwright 1983: 127) 
Dupré claims, similarly, that: 
[...] the disunity of science is not merely an unfortunate consequence of our limited 
computational or other cognitive capacities, but rather reflects accurately the underlying 
ontological complexity of the world, the disorder of things. (Dupré 1993: 7) 
He argues that in biology reductionism is often an inappropriate strategy for 
understanding the determinants of evolutionary change (Dupré 1993: 139), and that the 
reductionist strategy of population genetics, in particular, has led to few, if any, 
theoretical and practical benefits (Dupré 1993: 141). If Cartwright and Dupré are correct, 
we cannot say that successful scientific investigations in general proceed as though 
everything is in principle reducible to microphysics. 
Is there a microphysical counterpart to the second kind of evidence for physical 
causal closure, the evidence from the actual explicability of brains and organisms in 
(negatively defined) physical terms? Answering this requires considering in more detail 
what a violation of microphysical, but not physical, causal closure would amount to. 
Some think it would amount to a kind of downward causation which is logically or 
metaphysically incoherent. As Kim has objected (1999), if macrophysical wholes 
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somehow exert influence on the microphysical parts that constitute them, it might seem 
this would result in paradoxical self-causation. If so, i.e., if physical but not microphysical 
causal closure is paradoxical, then all evidence for physical causal closure must be 
evidence for microphysical causal closure, which would be the only tenable version of the 
principle.  
Irreducible macrophysical causation, which would be a form of strong emergence, 
can be conceptualized in various ways. Here is a simple way in which it might occur that 
involves no paradoxical causal loops. One might think that fundamental entities have 
certain dispositions that remain latent, i.e., are not triggered to manifest, in conditions that 
can occur in physics laboratories and other places where particles are relatively isolated. 
Rather, these latent dispositions are triggered by membership in certain complex wholes. 
For instance, when a particle ends up in certain close interactions with several other 
particles, like when forming a cell, this will trigger the latent disposition, and this will 
manifest in behavior that is different from the behavior the particle exhibited as part of 
simpler wholes or when isolated. Shoemaker (2002) explicates emergence in terms of 
latent dispositions.
16
 
If emergence is the manifestation of otherwise latent dispositions of fundamental 
particles, macroscopic wholes that are loci of emergence would still clearly be causally 
relevant. They are the contexts that trigger the latent dispositions, and if they were absent, 
different behavior would manifest. There would be no way of avoiding reference to these 
wholes in explanations of emergent behavior or when formulating the laws that govern it. 
Even if irreducible macrophysical causation is metaphysically coherent, another 
consideration against it is that it might seem to entail that macrophysical wholes have the 
power to violate the laws of physics, which science clearly tells us is not possible. Would 
the laws of physics be violated when latent microdispositions are triggered?  
If there is strong emergence of this kind, it does not entail that the laws of physics are 
not true. As Cartwright says: “to grant that a law is true [...] is far from admitting that it is 
universal, that it holds everywhere and governs in all domains” (Cartwright 1994: 281). 
As already suggested, the laws of physics could be taken to inform us about how particles 
                                                 
16
 McLaughlin (1992) also argues that what he takes to be the mistake of the British emergentists was 
empirical, not philosophical, i.e., that the concept of strong emergence contains no contradiction. O’Connor 
(1994) argues that conceiving of emergence in terms of latent dispositions is ad hoc, and not necessary to 
make downward causation coherent in any case, so fundamental emergent dispositions can instead be 
located directly in macroscopic wholes themselves. 
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will behave when they are relatively isolated or in simple contexts, without also being 
taken to tell us, at least not exactly, how they will behave in more complex contexts. 
There could be some laws of physics, which, like the laws of conservation of energy, 
would hold in any context, but for such laws, there are many ways in which particles can 
behave within their constraints. There would then be room for irreducible macrophysical 
laws (grounded in latent dispositions) to determine particle behavior precisely within 
these constraints. Therefore, we need not think of the laws of physics as being ever 
violated by strong emergence simply because there could be much about which they 
remain silent. 
We can now return to the question of whether there is a microphysical counterpart to 
the second kind of evidence for physical causal closure. What is the evidence that brains 
and organisms are devoid of not only non-physical causation, but also irreducible 
macrophysical causation of the kind coherently explicable in terms of latent dispositions? 
While what is going on in brains and organisms is to a great extent explicable in terms of 
the mechanistic behavior of their parts, it is not currently to any similar extent explicable 
in terms of microphysics. That we are able to account for the behavior of brains and 
organisms in terms of the regular, conservative and non-teleological behavior of their 
parts is evidence for physical causal closure only. In order to support microphysical 
closure, we also have to establish that the parts follow the same patterns of mechanistic 
interaction as we find in the very simple contexts that constitute the domain of physics, 
i.e., that their behavior can be fully accounted for by the laws of physics, and this has not 
been shown. That is not to say that there are no reasons to think this will, or could in 
principle, be shown. But considering only what has actually been shown, this seems to 
support physical causal closure much more strongly than microphysical causal closure.   
Typically, proponents of microphysical causal closure grant that we have not 
succeeded, and most certainly never will succeed, in epistemologically reducing all 
special sciences to physics. Carl Hoefer explains why he still favors microphysical 
ontological reductionism: “Why, then, do I think that physics today gives strong evidence 
for the existence of true universal and fundamental laws? [... ] We have already found 
such mathematical regularities that are true or very close to true wherever we are able to 
check” (Hoefer 2008: 309) He offers an example of how the structure of the hydrogen 
atom falls out “beautifully and exactly” from the Schrödinger equation. “Where we are 
clever enough to be able to test this theory [quantum mechanics] and this equation [the 
Schrödinger equation], they seem to be correct.” (Hoefer 2008: 317–318). This is 
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arguably a good inductive basis for concluding that everything is in principle reducible to 
physics, and that it is only the complexity of the higher levels that hinders us from seeing 
it. 
Arguably, though, these cases are too few, or taken from too limited a domain, to 
constitute a solid inductive case. The clearest cases of derivability are at the atomic or 
molecular level – so maybe they just show that there is no strong emergence at the atomic 
or molecular level? If strong emergence is correlated with macroexperience, then the only 
place we should definitely expect to find strong emergence (because we know that there 
is macroexperience there) is in organisms. Here we have no such clear cases of actual 
epistemic reducibility.  
The fact that the special sciences are to a large extent epistemically irreducible cannot 
be taken as a clear indication in the direction of either microphysical causal closure or 
strong emergentism. The case for microphysical causal closure gains plausibility for 
every new reduction or derivation that is made. But the strong emergentist need only 
point to one case where we have a complete overview of the microphysical facts, and 
where we can see that they do not entail the behavior of the whole, in order to falsify 
microphysical causal closure. Boogerd et al. have presented evidence for what could be 
such a case. They derive a notion of emergence, which I have already mentioned, from 
Broad and Ernst Mayr, who: “both think of systemic properties as emergent if they cannot 
be deduced, even in principle, from the behavior the system’s components show within 
simpler wholes” (Boogerd et al. 2005). They proceed to present evidence for it: “We 
show in an explicit case study drawn from molecular cell physiology that biochemical 
networks display this kind of emergence […]” (Boogerd et al. 2005: 131).  
The case they present is a system, a metabolic pathway, here referred to as A, which 
has an enzyme subsystem, here referred to as A1, as a component: 
The behavior of A1 in isolation is sometimes qualitatively different from the behavior of 
A1 in A, and therefore, since the behavior of A is a function of A1, understood as a 
component, the behavior of A cannot generally be derived from studies on simpler 
subsystems of A. In general, the (dynamic) behavior of A is not simply the superposition 
of the (dynamic) behaviors of its subsystems studied in isolation. Dynamic interactions 
can bring about qualitatively new behavior in complex systems. This is precisely where 
prediction of system behavior on the basis of simpler subsystems fails. We cannot predict 
the behavior of the components within the entire system and so cannot predict systemic 
behavior. This is emergence, with novel system behavior that cannot be predicted on the 
basis of the behavior of simpler subsystems. (Boogerd et al. 2005: 165) 
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If Boogerd et al. are correct, then the microphysical would not be causally closed; a 
Laplacian demon with complete knowledge of the laws of microphysics, as well as the 
initial and boundary conditions of the metabolic pathway, would not be able to predict its 
exact behavior. But whether Boogerd et al. are in fact correct in their account of the case 
is probably a matter of controversy,
17
 or so I would assume, given the wide acceptance of 
microphysical causal closure among philosophers.
18
  
In summary, speaking from the empirical point of view, it should be conceded that it 
is at least to some degree an open question whether the principle of microphysical causal 
closure holds. There is much room for disagreement about the direction in which the 
evidence most strongly points, and about what should count as evidence. But it seems 
clear that microphysical causal closure is not as strongly empirically supported as mere 
physical causal closure. 
3.2 Strong Emergence as the Correlate of Combination  
The possibility of the world being only physically, but not microphysically, closed fits 
very well with emergent panpsychism. Strongly emergent dispositions or behavior would 
be grounded in strongly emergent combined macroexperience. New dispositions would 
emerge on the basis of the emergence of new intrinsic natures, macroexperiences, that 
replace the microexperiences that grounded the earlier dispositions. Constitutive 
panpsychism could not easily explain emergence. On this view, strong emergence would 
seem to entail a change in dispositions without a change in categorical, intrinsic 
                                                 
17
 An objection to Boogerd et al.’s case, given by Chalmers (in conversation), is that while the system’s 
properties are perhaps not predictable from biochemistry or chemistry, the levels immediately below, it 
might still be predictable from the very bottom level of microphysics. To rule this out, one would need a 
complete microphysical specification of the system, which is not something we can obtain.  
Dupré’s view (as expressed in conversation) is that the matter is not empirically decidable in principle: 
reductionists can always claim that emergentists have missed microphysical details that would predict the 
seemingly emergent behavior, while non-reductionists can always claim that reductionists have insufficient 
basis for their inductive case, since they can never actually catalogue all microphysical details and show 
that everything else follows. 
18
 While many philosophers explicitly commit to physical causal closure, they tend to assume either that the 
physical is to be defined relative to physics, or that the evidence for physical causal closure is also evidence 
for microphysical causal closure. Chalmers defines materialism about consciousness as “the thesis that 
consciousness is physical: that is, that truths about consciousness are grounded in the fundamental truths of 
a completed physics” (Chalmers forthcoming-b). Philip Pettit (1994) argues that the physical should be 
defined relative to physics. Brian McLaughlin claims that there “seem not a scintilla of evidence that there 
are emergent causal powers or laws […]” (McLaughlin 1992: 55). In the introduction to an anthology on 
System Modelling in Cellular Biology, it is claimed (without any supporting arguments) that strong 
emergentism “is completely antithetical to materialism and remains as yet on the fringes of scientific 
thought” (Szallasi, Stelling, and Periwal 2006: 8–9).  
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properties. This would result in there being ungrounded dispositions, which is not 
compatible with Russellian monism.  
If we accept that having irreducible causal powers is a criterion of objecthood, then 
the mereological problem, discussed in section 1 above, should be solved along with 
finding a causal correlate of combination. But if an account of emergence in terms of 
latent dispositions is accepted, it might seem to persist. In experiential fusion, a 
macroexperience becomes the direct source of causal exertion and a direct bearer of 
dispositions, and microsubjects only survive in a non-fundamental sense. When particles 
form a whole that triggers their latent dispositions, on the other hand, they clearly survive 
in the sense of remaining bearers of dispositions. However, I think the mismatch is only 
superficial. The sense in which microsubjects can survive fusion and retain dispositions is 
really no weaker than the sense in which particles survive when they form a disposition-
altering whole, given some assumptions about the identity conditions of particles that 
would follow from the Russellian view of the physical.  
When microsubjects, streams of momentary microexperiences, fuse into a 
macrosubject, or one stream of macroexperiences, the microsubjects survive according to 
criteria analogous to Parfit’s psychological criteria for personal identity – criteria of non-
exact similarity and causal connectedness. If one of the microsubjects consists of a stream 
of pure redness, which subsequently contributes to a macroexperiences of red + purple + 
blue, the redness can survive within the macroexperience, but not the exact same redness, 
given the holistic influence of the phenomenal whole on the phenomenal parts.  
When particles, streams of momentary microphysical states or time-slices, fuse into 
an emergent macroscopic whole, or a stream of macrophysical states or time-slices, the 
particles also survive only according to criteria of non-exact similarity and causal 
connectedness. Like microsubjects, they do not survive according to criteria of exact 
similarity, because the behavior of the particles has been altered by the influence of the 
whole, by the whole triggering the manifestation of previously latent and unmanifested 
dispositions. On some metaphysical views, particles have a non-dispositional, quidditistic 
essence which would remain exactly the same and preserve their individuality in a strong 
sense through an altering of dispositions – which would result in a mereological mismatch 
with microsubjects which, after combination as fusion, do not survive in virtue of 
preserving any quidditistic essence. But according to the Russellian view, the physical is 
dispositional all the way down, and the identity conditions of physical objects such as 
particles must be based similarity of dispositions and the relations that result from them. 
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Therefore, particles can only survive disposition-altering fusion in the same weak sense 
that microsubjects survive fusion, namely via retaining imperfect similarity and causal 
connectedness.  
As agents, macrosubjects exert unified powers or efforts. But these efforts are exerted 
in view of a multitude of motives that exist within the unity of the macrosubject. Motives 
qua experiences are also holistically influenced – pain alone motives avoidance, while 
pain together with other motives can motivate other efforts. The way in which all the 
motives act as a whole – unified in one experiential field – can be different from how they 
would act as an aggregate, if they were contained in separate experiential fields. In the 
same way, the way in which particles act as an emergent whole is different from how they 
would act as an aggregate. As an aggregate, they would act according to the laws of 
microphysics; as a whole, they act according to emergent laws. It seems the individual 
motives experienced by an agent correspond well to individual particles of an emergent 
whole – both have their own dispositionality, but the way their dispositionality is 
manifested depends on the whole they form part of.  
Many panpsychists have already suggested emergent phenomena as correlates of 
combination. However, they have focused on emergence of more extreme kinds, where 
we have not only the emergence of new behavior belonging to what can still be regarded 
as the same particles, but rather complete transformations of matter into an entirely new 
state – a form, quality or structure which has very little resemblance with the forms, 
qualities or structures of antecedent states. For example, Keith Turausky (2012) has 
suggested Bose-Einstein condensates as the type of correlate we should be looking for. 
This is a so-called macroquantum phenomenon, where matter enters a completely novel 
state. 
As mentioned in chapter 1 (p. 49), Seager (2010) suggests that combination is a 
matter of so-called combinatorial infusion. Combinatorial infusions are “large simples,” 
which are “partless yet extended” (Seager 2010: 180). This is very similar to the way in 
which I have suggested that combination works. However, one important difference is 
that I have allowed that fusions or combinations have parts, as long as the whole is prior 
to them, in virtue of having a stronger unity than they have, and in virtue of holistically 
influencing them.  
As Seager points out, there is “little evidence that the brain supports any processes 
that could count as combinatorial infusion at the physical level” (Seager 2010: 181–182). 
On the conception of combination where the result is not a partless whole but merely a 
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whole that is prior to its parts, it is more likely that we can find a directly corresponding 
structure in places like the brain. We do not have to look for very distinctive states of 
matter like Bose-Einstein condensates, quantum coherence or, as per Seager’s suggestion, 
something analogous to classical black holes.
19
 We only need the behavior or dispositions 
manifested by particles to slightly change according to what kind of whole they are parts 
of, which according to Boogerd et al. there is already evidence for at the biological level.  
When we consider our own minds phenomenologically, they do not appear to have 
exactly the structure of a large simple; of being partless. Our minds clearly have parts in 
the form of individual feelings, thoughts and sensations. The unity of consciousness that 
encompasses all this variety has a much stronger and exact kind of unity than any of 
elements within it, but these lesser unities, individual qualities, still distinctly exist. Hence 
the conception of combined experience as a whole that is prior to its parts, as opposed to 
partless, seems both more phenomenologically adequate, and more likely to have physical 
correlate. 
3.3 Strong Emergence and Dualism 
If the microphysical is not causally closed, how does that fit with dualism? The principle 
of conservation of energy and the mechanistic explicability of organisms and the brain do 
not rule out the influence of mental substances or properties that act conservatively and 
non-irreducibly teleologically. It might seem that if the laws of physics leave the behavior 
of certain wholes undetermined, mental substances or properties can find a causal role in 
being what fully determines these wholes within the constraints of physics. Two problems 
remain for the dualist, however.  
The first is empirical: the evidence we according to Boogerd et al. have for 
emergence is found already at the level of cells, and traditionally, dualists do not see 
mentality as extending across the entire biological and biochemical realm, but limit it to 
humans and (some) animals. This is not essential to dualism, of course, but if dualists bite 
this bullet, they no longer have the advantage of being able to respect common sense 
judgment about how far mentality extends.  
                                                 
19
 Seager claims that classically modeled black holes would have the structure of a combinatorial infusion, 
but he does not suggest them as actual correlates of mental combinatorial infusions. Rather, he argues, as 
discussed in chapter 1, that the existence of such models shows that the notion of a combinatorial infusion is 
intelligible.  
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The second problem is one of insufficient motivation. I have already argued that if 
dualism tries to mimic emergent panpsychism’s account of mental causation within 
microphysical causal closure, it comes across as much more ad hoc than emergent 
panpsychism. This will also be the case if dualism tries to mimic emergent panpsychism’s 
account of macromental causation within mere physical causal closure.  
If there is emergent behavior on higher levels, this would not constitute any radical 
difference between the level of physics and the higher levels. Things at all levels behave 
according to the same basic principles of efficient causation, so the main difference 
between things with emergent dispositions and things with dispositions as described by 
physics, is their size and complexity, which are both matters of degree. If there were 
something like irreducible teleology to be seen in the behavior of things at higher levels, 
or some other novel characteristic rendering it discontinuous with lower level behavior, it 
would make sense to posit radically discontinuous mental properties or substances to 
explain such radically new behavioral principles. But why should an entirely new nature 
have to be introduced in order to explain the fact that the same kinds of things show the 
same kind of law-governed, efficiently caused behavior, the only difference being the 
exact pattern of the behavior?  
In other words, dualism’s problem is that emergent physical behavior is not radically 
discontinuous with microphysical behavior, but mental properties or substances 
dualistically conceived would be radically discontinuous with the physical. Emergence 
within a world closed under mechanistic, conservative principles for behavior is not 
special enough to warrant such a special explanation. It could be posited only on an ad 
hoc basis, for the sake of dualism itself.  
One could also argue that given the similarities between higher and lower levels, if 
macrophysical behavior needs to be determined by a mental substance or property, then 
there is no reason why microphysical behavior would not need it too. The laws of physics 
may leave certain things open, but the laws of nature do not, and mental substances or 
properties must act in accordance with the laws of nature. If the laws of macrophysics 
need a mental explanation or underpinning, then the laws of microphysics should need 
one as well – both being brute patterns. That both equally need mental explanation or 
underpinning, in the form of Russellian grounding, is exactly what panpsychists think, 
and this seems to be the less ad hoc conclusion.  
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4 COMBINATION AS CAUSATION: SUMMARY 
The two last chapters started out from a dialectical situation according to which 
panpsychism appears to have an advantage over competing views, physicalism, dualism 
and non-panpsychist Russellian monism, in avoiding their respective main problems. 
Panpsychism appears to avoid having to posit brute emergence, a posteriori identity, or 
other problematic relations between our mentality and its base, and to avoid 
epiphenomenalism and systematic overdetermination within the constraints of physical 
causal closure, all without appealing to unknown natures, properties or relations. It is up 
to defenders of competing views to either show that their respective problems can be 
solved, to show that panpsychism is an untenable position in and of itself, or to show that 
panpsychism, while tenable in and of itself, does not really solve the problems either, but 
only has them reappear in another guise. The combination problem has a good chance of 
achieving the latter result. It challenges panpsychists to close the epistemic gap between 
fundamental mentality and our own minds or, if this cannot be done, explain why our 
minds are not thereby to be regarded as inexplicable emergents relative to fundamental 
mentality. It also challenges the panpsychist to explain how our minds are not causally 
redundant once fundamental micromental causation is ubiquitous, and to do all this 
without appeal to unknown natures.  
I have argued that even if there could be no fully intelligible constitutive relation 
between micromentality and our macromentality, panpsychists are not forced into 
accepting that macromentality is radically emergent and not intelligible at all, because 
these are not the only alternatives: it is open to the panpsychist to claim that 
macromentality is caused by microexperience, and that there is a sense in which the 
causal relation is partially intelligible. Then, I showed the ways in which 
macroexperiences could not only be caused but also themselves be causally efficacious, 
without violating the principles of microphysical and physical causal closure respectively. 
In this way, panpsychism – of the emergent type – avoids the problems of competing 
views after all. If this is correct, those who oppose panpsychism must find another 
argumentative strategy against it than posing the combination problem.  
My general argument for this had two main parts, one concerning the intelligibility 
problem emergent panpsychism seems to inherit from emergentism, and the other 
concerning the empirical problem which it seems to inherit from dualism. My solution to 
the intelligibility problem began by proposing a distinction between causation and radical 
emergence. I argued that causation is partially intelligible in virtue of relating 
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determinates of the same fundamental determinable, or forms of the same matter, in ways 
that respect principles of conservation and continuity. I argued that radical emergence is 
unintelligible in virtue of not abiding by any such principles. From this, it could be 
concluded that the relation between our kind of mentality and its base could in fact be 
causal and partially intelligible given panpsychism, but could only be radically emergent 
and not intelligible at all given physicalism – only within panpsychism can our kind of 
mentality be a resultant of something which is a determinate of the same fundamental 
determinable, namely experientiality itself. That consciousness is not a form of non-
mental matter, and thereby cannot be intelligibly produced by a fundamentally non-
mental base or antecedent, is the fundamental problem that some well-known anti-
physicalist arguments can be interpreted as pointing to, as opposed to the presence of an 
epistemic gap that is not closable in principle.  
The solution to the intelligibility problem further consisted in showing how 
macrosubjects could be caused by microsubjects while respecting the criteria of 
conservation and continuity. Prima facie, the relation between different individual 
subjects seems not to qualify as being free of radical emergence, firstly, because a 
macrosubject is clearly not just a configuration of microsubjects, i.e., not a form of them, 
and secondly, because the coming into being of a new subject appears to involve 
discontinuity characteristic of radical emergence, since a subject seems to either exist or 
not exist, and cannot come into being gradually. I argued that the solution to this is to 
revise our view of what it is to be a subject of experience, along the lines proposed by 
Strawson and Parfit. We should think of experientiality as fundamental, as a kind of 
matter, stuff or determinable, and total experiential fields as the fundamental forms this 
matter can take. Subjectivity is then integrated into experientiality by seeing that both the 
subject of experience and the content of experience are inseparable aspects of 
experientiality itself. The unity of consciousness is identified with the unity of a total 
experiential field, where the whole is prior to its parts. The subject as something that is 
supposed to persist through time is reduced to a series of momentary total experiential 
fields connected by similarity and causation.  
On this background, we can think of mental combination as a kind of Parfitian 
psychological fusion, where a group of microexperiences jointly cause a single 
macroexperience, which is equally similar and equally strongly causally connected to all 
of them, so that they all count as having survived in it. Such a process would involve no 
discontinuity of the kind that indicates radical emergence and no violation of 
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conservation. It would also be manifested in the prima facie intelligible phenomenon of 
holistic blending of phenomenal qualities. The conclusion to the first part of the argument 
is that mental combination can be construed in such a way that it is just as intelligible as 
any causal process – at least just as intrinsically intelligible, i.e., intelligible insofar it is 
not taken into account how the causal process as described could fit into the causal 
structure of reality as a whole.  
The second part of the argument consisted in showing how the causal structure of 
combination as I construed it is compatible with the causal structure of physical reality as 
science reveals it, in order to secure the causal relevance of macroexperience. I first 
considered an indirectly related problem of mismatch between the part–whole priority 
structures of brains and macroexperiences: brains seem to be wholes whose parts are prior 
to them, while macroexperiences, on my account, are wholes that are prior to their parts. 
In order to restore structural match, it could be proposed that the brain can in fact be 
regarded as being prior to its parts, so that the particles within it are not actually objects in 
their own right, only potentially so – because the idea that all and only subjects are 
objects is, as Strawson has argued, a coherent solution to the open philosophical question 
of what is the true principle of mereological composition. However, if the criterion of 
objecthood is taken to involve causal efficacy, one cannot revise mereology as one likes. 
The problem of mismatch of part–whole priority structure would transform into the 
problem of macromental causation. 
If the microphysical is causally closed, as many philosophers think, it might seem 
that the macromental must be causally redundant. However, I showed that when we look 
more closely, emergent panpsychism with combination as fusion actually gives us mental 
causation in every way that we could want, only at the price of the inelegant posit that 
some physical dispositions can be multiply categorically grounded or that some physical 
structure can be multiply mentally realized. Other theories, physicalism and constitutive 
panpsychism, are more elegant, but they cannot give us (macro-) mental causation in 
every desirable respect, given that these respects include agency as we experience it. 
Overdeterminist and Russellian dualism can also secure mental causation in all respects, 
but even less elegantly. A different solution to the problem of macromental causation 
would be possible if it turned out that causal closure holds merely for the physical and not 
for the microphysical – which is a possibility I showed that there is good reason to take 
seriously. If there is strong emergence within the physical, then mental combination as I 
construed it would be its perfect structural correlate. The conclusion to the second part of 
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the argument is that panpsychism with combination as (emergent
20
) causation gives us 
mental causation in the same robust way that interactionist and overdeterminist dualism 
would, but in a more elegant way.  
The resulting picture might look complicated, but in a way, it is simple. Our 
experiences are just as fundamental as any other kind of experience. They cannot be 
derived from, nor be reduced to, anything else. Any total experience is a basic component 
of reality, and the relations they stand in are primarily causal and non-deductive. 
However, in a sense there is something that is more fundamental than any particular form 
of experience, namely experientiality itself. This is what all experiences have in common, 
and what conditions their existence. Thus, we end up with a kind of constitutive 
explanation of consciousness as we know it after all. Just as we ordinarily think the 
existence of a certain quantity of physical energy-matter or stuff explains how it is that 
particular physical things can exist, the fact that this energy-matter is fundamentally 
experiential explains how it is that our experiences can exist.  
When leaving constitutive panpsychism behind, it may seem as though we also leave 
behind an orderly picture of the structure of the world, where order is constituted by 
hierarchy. However, as the combination problem appears to show, that is an order into 
which our experiences refuse to fit, even as we go so far as to allow that the hierarchy is 
mental throughout. The combination problem appears to show that the idea that the 
mental is fundamental is must be taken all the way in order to achieve its intended result. 
Emergent panpsychism abandons all reductionism and constitutive hierarchy, but we are 
still left with a conservative and continuous causal order. It is a picture where our 
experiences are fundamental, but not exceptional, and integrated in the causal order of 
nature, but not subordinated – so it should also be an order we can live with as causal 
agents.  
                                                 
20
 I defined the notion of emergent causation in chapter 5, section 2.2, as a relation which is partially 
intelligible, and therefore different from radical emergence, but less extrinsically intelligible, and therefore 
different from ordinary causation. If microphysical causal closure is true, what appear as highly 
extrinsically intelligible causal relations from the physical aspect are grounded in less extrinsically 
intelligible relations between macroexperiences that appear from the mental aspect. If only physical causal 
closure is true, macroexperience grounds emergent causation, i.e., less extrinsically intelligible relations, 
and this is apparent from both aspects. 
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7 
Two Accounts of Causation: 
the Agentive and the Hylomorphic 
 
I have defended two different accounts of the intelligibility of causation. According to the 
argument from causation, defended in chapters 3 and 4, we experience fully intelligible, 
necessary connections between motives and efforts – we understand how motives such as 
pain must lead to avoidance efforts, ceteris paribus. This is the agentive account. 
According to my proposed solution to the intelligibility aspect of the combination 
problem, defended in chapter 5, there are partially intelligible, possible connections 
between different forms of the same matter – we understand how one form of matter can 
result from another form of the same matter. This is the hylomorphic account. In this 
final, short chapter, I will show how these two accounts fit together.  
1 IDENTITY AND DISTINCTNESS 
According to the agentive account, we only experience necessary connections within one 
and the same subject. The connection between efforts and their results outside the subject 
(or their results within the same subject, for that matter, as in mental action
1
) is not 
directly experienced – as Hume and other critics of volitional accounts of causation have, 
in my view, rightly emphasized. The hylomorphic account makes partially intelligible 
how there can be connections between different forms of the same matter. I argued that 
we should take subjects to be the fundamental forms of experiential matter. Therefore, the 
hylomorphic account makes partially intelligible how there can be connections between 
subjects and fills in the gap in the agentive account. The accounts are not in competition, 
because the agentive account concerns immanent causation, connections within a subject, 
and the hylomorphic account concerns transeunt causation, connections between subjects.  
                                                 
1
 That the connection between efforts and results within the subject is as unintelligible as the connection 
between the efforts and results outside the subject can be explained by the identity view of subjects, 
experiences and contents. A mental action and the mental state it results in will be different experiences, 
and therefore different subjects in the fundamental sense (i.e., thin subjects). All connections between 
efforts and results are therefore transeunt, i.e., hold between different subjects in the fundamental sense, and 
therefore equally unintelligible.  
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The identity view of subjects, experiences and contents, defended by Strawson, is 
essential to the reduction of subjects to forms of experiential matter, which is required in 
order for mental combination to be intelligible according to the hylomorphic account. As 
discussed in chapter 4 (section 2.4), the identity view is also helpful for the agentive 
account because it lets it avoid an aspect of agent-causation that many find implausible, 
the fundamental persistence of agentive subjects. However, the identity view can also 
seem to be in tension with the agentive account. On the agentive account, the subject is 
the causal nexus between motives and efforts, and both the motives and the efforts must 
be the subject’s own experiences. If the experiences of the subject are not really distinct 
from it, as per the identity view, it means that the subject in fact causally connects its own 
parts. This lack of distinctness gives rise to conflict with some traditional conceptions of 
causation and its relata.  
Firstly, causes are traditionally conceived of as temporally prior to their effects. The 
identity view entails that subjects fundamentally speaking only last as long as an 
experience, that is, for a moment, and it is subjects in the fundamental sense (i.e., thin 
subjects) that connect motives and efforts. Motives and efforts connected by such as 
subject would therefore have to exist at the same moment, i.e., be simultaneous, which is 
in tension with the traditional view. One response to this is to argue that the traditional 
view should be abandoned; that causes and effects are in fact best conceived as 
simultaneous. This was Kant’s view. He writes: 
A great majority of efficient natural causes are simultaneous with their effects, and the 
sequence in time of the latter is due only to the fact that the cause cannot achieve its 
complete effects in one moment. But in the very moment in which the effect first comes 
to be, it is invariably simultaneous with the causality of its cause. (Kant 1781/1929: 
A203) 
For instance, a room is warm while the outer air is cool. I look around for the cause, and 
find a heated stove. Now the stove, as cause, is simultaneous with its effects, the heat of 
the room. They are simultaneous and yet the law is valid […] If I view as a cause the ball 
which impresses a hollow as it lies on a stuffed cushion, the cause is simultaneous with 
the effect. (Kant 1781/1929: A203) 
On the simultaneity view, there is no temporal gap between the cause and effect. 
Causation can still take time, because, as Kant points out, the effect can take time to be 
fully achieved. The room is not heated instantaneously – the stove must continuously heat 
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it for several minutes. Another reason why causation takes time is because the cause and 
the effect can both be temporally extended, and only the end of the cause must be 
simultaneous with the beginning of the effect. When the stove gets warmer than the air 
around it, heat will start transferring to the air immediately without a temporal gap in 
between. However, it takes time for the stove to get to the point of being warmer than the 
room, and it takes time for heat to spread in the room. Mumford and Anjum (2011b: ch. 
5) argue at length that a dispositionalist view of causation not only allows but also 
requires that causation is simultaneous. 
A further response to the problem is to point out that experiences, while short-lived, 
are still temporally extended. Strawson claims that: 
There’s almost universal agreement that we don’t experience the present of experience 
just as a (moving) point or front in time that is itself temporally dimensionless, but as 
something that has an intrinsically temporally extended phenomenological character. 
(Strawson 2009: 249) 
Strawson thinks it can be taken for granted that “experience takes time: it can’t exist 
or occur at an instant, where an instant is defined as something with no temporal duration 
at all” (Strawson 2009: 256). He still takes experiences to be very short and speculates 
about durations from just milliseconds and up to a few seconds. But however brief 
experiences are, as long as their duration is not infinitesimally short, there will be time for 
motives to temporally precede efforts – either in the sense that there is a temporal gap 
between them, or in the sense allowed by the simultaneity view, according to which the 
experience of the motive begins before the experience of the effort, so that the beginning 
of the effort is simultaneous with the end of the motive only, as opposed to both 
experiences beginning exactly simultaneously.  
Secondly, causation is traditionally conceived of as a necessary connection between 
distinct existences – thereby violating what is known as Hume’s dictum. If motives and 
efforts are not really distinct, but are rather posteriorly carved out parts of a strongly 
unified total experiential field, then how can the necessary connections between them be 
causal? There are different ways of reading the terms “necessary” and “distinct” in this 
claim about causation. I will show that on the most straightforward reading, the 
connection between motives and efforts cannot qualify as causal; however, on closer 
inspection this reading can be seen to be contradictory and will thereby render it an 
analytic truth that no connections could possibly be causal. On another reading, which 
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removes the contradiction, the connection between motives and efforts does qualify as 
causal.  
What does it mean for two existences to be distinct? It seems that two things are 
distinct if there is some sense in which they can possibly come apart. If two things cannot 
possibly come apart, in any sense of possibility, they are not distinct. But what does it 
mean for two existences to be necessarily connected? It seems that two things are 
necessarily connected if there is some sense in which they cannot possibly come apart. If 
distinctness and necessity are taken to involve the same kind of modality, then the idea of 
a necessary connection between distinct existences would clearly be contradictory. For 
example, there could not be metaphysically necessary connections between 
metaphysically distinct existences, because then it would both be metaphysically possible 
and metaphysically impossible for these existences to come apart. The contradiction is 
removed if the sense in which the two things can come apart is different from the sense in 
which they cannot come apart. For example, if the laws of nature are regarded as 
metaphysically contingent, it will not be contradictory to say that there are nomologically 
necessary connections between metaphysically distinct existences. On this view, it will be 
metaphysically possible, but nomologically impossible, for causes and effects to come 
apart.  
But this reading cannot account for motives and efforts being distinct and necessarily 
connected. The connection between them is experienced as metaphysically necessary – 
pain (or affective, painful, pain) and avoidance effort cannot come apart (in the absence 
of interference from other motives) in any possible world. In general, dispositional 
theories of causation, of which the agentive account is a species, are often necessitarian, 
i.e., they entail that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. So this problem 
affects a broad class of theories of causation. All necessitarian theories must answer the 
question: if the necessary connection is metaphysically necessary, in what sense can the 
existences thus connected be distinct? 
My answer to this question must refer to the sense in which individual experiences 
are in fact distinct on the identity view. I have argued that individual experiences must be 
regarded as different aspects of a total experiential field, posteriorly carved out of it along 
no actually pre-existing joints, but still constrained by objective relations of similarity and 
difference (see chapter 5, section 4.1.2). In this way, individual experiences can be 
regarded as aspectually and/or conceptually distinct. The causal relation between 
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experiences of motives and efforts would accordingly be a metaphysically necessary 
connection between aspectually or conceptually distinct existences.  
2 A UNIFIED ACCOUNT 
The hylomorphic account makes transeunt causation partially intelligible, while the 
agentive account makes immanent causation fully intelligible. They are thus compatible, 
but do they also depend on each other? In chapter 4 (section 2.6, p. 134), I argued that 
with respect to the intelligibility of transeunt causation the agentive account is compatible 
with any combination of the following three options: (1) to take a (fully or partially) 
mysterian attitude toward transeunt causation, (2) to argue that we can infer a positive 
conception of the nature of transeunt causation from our acquaintance with the nature of 
powers in effort, and (3) to argue that we can abstract away from immanent causation a 
positive account of transeunt causation. As I will shortly defend, the hylomorphic account 
of transeunt causation fits option (3). Therefore, it does not have to be accepted along 
with the agentive account, because the agentive account is compatible with choosing 
option (1) or (2) (or both) instead. The argument for the hylomorphic account does not 
depend on the agentive account either; I only defended it on the basis that it seems 
implicitly presupposed in science, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, and to a certain 
extent on the basis that it makes intuitive sense. The accounts are therefore still 
independent even though compatible.  
However, both accounts could also be unified into a single theory of causation, by 
seeing how the hylomorphic account fits option (3). As I will now show, the agentive 
account and the hylomorphic account share are very similar structure, and therefore the 
latter can plausibly be regarded as an abstraction of the former. Such a unified account 
would be more complete and systematic, and therefore more attractive, than each of the 
views in isolation or their brute conjunction.  
In chapter 3 (section 3.7), I argued against the viability of abstracting away the 
metaphysical structure of agent-causation and taking it as a basis for a theory of non-
mental causation. However, I did not argue that abstracting the metaphysical structure of 
agent-causation is in itself problematic – I only argued that it is not suitable for the 
purpose of arriving at an account of non-mental causation of the sort to which agent-
causation can be seen to reduce. The hylomorphic account is not supposed to be a 
reductive basis for the agentive account, so my previous criticism does not prohibit 
regarding the former as an abstraction from the latter.  
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What structural similarities are there between the two accounts? Both accounts 
require that causes and effects have something in common that connects them: they must 
either be experiences of the same agentive subject or forms of the same matter. In both 
cases, the common nexus is a totality. An agentive subject is a concrete total experiential 
field. The matter that forms have in common – when the forms are subjects – is the 
abstract totality of all experientiality. In this way, on both accounts, causation relates parts 
or portions of the same experiential whole – a concrete experiential whole in the concrete 
agentive case and an abstract experiential whole in the abstracted, hylomorphic case. A 
difference between the accounts is that in the agentive case the whole is prior to and more 
strongly unified that the parts, but in the hylomorphic case, the opposite is the case: the 
parts or forms are more strongly unified than the whole, the totality of experiential matter. 
Individual subjects are substances that are composites of form and matter, while the 
totality of matter has no form of its own, its form is only an aggregate of the forms of its 
parts. However, in this respect, the hylomorphic account systematically inverts the 
structure of the agentive account, and they remain isomorphic. In virtue of this inversion, 
both accounts result in subjects being the strongest unities that exist, while the unity of 
individual experiences and the unity of all experiential matter are both weaker and more 
abstract.  
In view of these similarities, is seems like the hylomorphic account could actually be 
derived by abstraction from the agentive account, and perhaps ultimately justified on the 
basis of it, as opposed to on the weaker basis of making intuitive sense and actually being 
widely presupposed. However, I am not confident about any specific deductive 
connections between them, and so I will leave this as a proposal for how things could turn 
out and refrain for now from speculating any further about it. 
The unified account could perhaps be labeled the hylozoistic account. Hylozoism is 
the Greek term for a variety of panpsychism, the view that matter (hylē) has life (zōē). 
Pre-Socratic hylozoists regarded life as an animating principle, the property of being the 
source of one’s own activity or somehow directly connecting to a source of activity. 
Hylozoism can therefore be regarded as differing from hylomorphism and non-animistic 
panpsychism by requiring that that the forms of matter are intrinsically active, and in 
virtue of being active they must also be mental, in accordance with the agentive view.  
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3 PANPSYCHISM AND CAUSATION: SUMMARY 
In this thesis, I have defended a new (relative to the present debate) argument for 
panpsychism and proposed an account of mental combination, both of which on the basis 
of views about the nature and intelligibility of causation. They were both offered as 
responses to the most serious problems for the two main lines of argument for 
panpsychism, the argument from categorical properties from philosophy of science and 
metaphysics, and the Hegelian and anti-mysterian arguments from philosophy of mind. In 
chapter 1 (section 3.2), I showed how the former line of argument is in danger of being 
undermined by a challenge from irreducible dispositionality, as posited by 
dispositionalism and related views. I also showed (section 3.1) how the latter line 
argument is in danger of being undermined by the combination problem, on the basis of 
which panpsychism can be accused of only moving and repeating the problems it is 
argued to solve.  
According to the argument from causation, everything physical must have irreducibly 
causal properties, and since the only irreducibly causal properties we know are mental 
properties, it follows, via some supporting premises, that everything physical must have 
mental properties. In chapter 2, I presented the rich history of this argument, and showed 
its importance for panpsychism as well as the metaphysics of causation and agency in 
general. In chapter 3, I showed how the argument can be formulated as an argument from 
dispositional properties, which can again be generalized into an argument from non-
structural properties, which makes panpsychism immune to the challenge from irreducible 
dispositionality. I then defended the soundness of the argument, with most of the 
emphasis on the highly controversial premise that the only irreducibly dispositional (and 
causal) properties we know, or have a positive conception of, are mental properties. In 
chapter 4, I further defended the argument against both empirically and philosophically 
grounded objections.  
According to my account of combination, macroexperiences are fusions of 
microexperiences, and processes of fusion are causal processes. In chapter 5, I argued that 
this enables a solution to the intelligibility aspect of the combination problem, because 
causation can be regarded as partially intelligible on the basis of a hylomorphic theory of 
change. With this account, panpsychism would after all succeed in rendering the 
appearance of our kind of consciousness more intelligible, as the argument from 
philosophy of mind promises. In chapter 6, I argued that the fusion account enables a 
solution to the empirical aspect of the combination problem. Macroexperiential fusions 
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supplant their microexperiential bases, and will therefore not be causally redundant. 
Fusions can fit into the structure of a world closed under microphysics via the posit of 
multiple mental categorical grounding of physical dispositions. It fits optimally into the 
structure of a world closed only under the physical sciences broadly construed. On this 
account, then, panpsychism would after all succeed in causally integrating our kind of 
consciousness into the causal structure of reality as science reveals it, as the argument 
from philosophy of mind further promises.  
In this final chapter, I have dissolved some apparent tensions between the two 
accounts of causation that form essential parts of the argument from causation and the 
causal account of combination respectively, the agentive account and the hylomorphic 
account, and indicated how they can be systematically unified.  
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